PBM and the interpretive tradition

In proceeding to review the way in which PBM overlaps with interpretive approaches Robinson makes two preparatory points. On one hand she anticipates her argument by concluding that the interpretive tradition is well matched with PBM. This is because it involves searching for descriptions of actors' understandings of their situations, of how they construct these through shared rules and linguistic practices, and of how researchers and practitioners might develop and reflect on their shared understandings. On the other hand she considers that interpretive inquiry has weaknesses because of its limited ability to critique the understandings of actors and thus its limited ability to apply the criterion of theoretical accuracy to its findings. Its capacity to move beyond explanation to critique and problem solving is therefore constrained.

In pursuing these arguments, Robinson notes an evolutionary trend in the interpretive field. This centres on an evolving view of the concept of Verstehen. She sees the shift from descriptions of actors' understandings of their circumstances, linked to this concept in the 1 960s, to a later development in the concept that shifts the emphasis to shared social practice and inter-subjective meanings. She identifies the first approach with the espoused theories of practitioners seen in PBM but notes that because the approach takes such

reports at face value, it is subject to the faults of incomplete reporting, conscious or unconscious, and post hoc rationalisation.

Robinson considers the latter form relates closely to the notion of practitioner theories-in­ use. Her central contention is that both of these understandings are required for accurate problem description and that espoused theories must be reconciled with theories-in-use through critical dialogue in pursuit of problem resolution.

Interpretive explanations cause concern in that they are shaped by the views and theories of the interpreters who thus "must become hermeneutically aware" of their own pre­ understandings (Phillips, 1991, p. 556). Thus, there arises the need to judge between alternative interpretations and two criteria are suggested for this; the coherence of the explanations, and the degree to which they make sense. These ideas are not independent and are also determined by the predispositions of those involved . The result is the hermeneutic circle. Seeing an action or account as sensible, suggests Taylor (1977) depends on ones reading of the context and that depends on the sense one makes of it. The actor within the context will see such an explanation as valid while an outsider may not and therefore is likely to reject the account.

Robinson is cautious in addressing this potential obstacle. She considers that this circularity can be useful in assisting to shift the understanding of problems towards a higher degree of structure. She also makes the point that where there is difference between the views of individuals, this difference is seldom complete. Groups or individuals often share common perspectives despite differences. These similarities may allow the description of different accounts of events to be treated as hypotheses to be explored and tested. Failing this, the criterion of improvability may be applied in order to select accounts by discounting interpretations that are "self-sealing and untestable" (Robinson, 1993, p. 214). Thus, while emphasising the importance of interpretive principles in understanding actions, meanings, and the processes through which these are discovered, she rejects the idea that the hermeneutic circle provides an obstacle which makes it impossible to resolve disagreements over the validity of differing accounts of the problem situation.

Where Robinson finds substantive fault with interpretive approaches, is in the inadequacy of their theories of change for the solution of most educational problems. The theory of change present within them relies on the development of self and mutual understanding. It relies largely on consciousness raising and description of the situation to lead to change.

There is an absence of any normative standard with which to judge the practices under investigation. In short, interpretive approaches suffer from values relativism. Further, by emphasising the agency of individual actors in their own contexts, such approaches, as Fay

(1975) explains, avoid examination of the social conditions which underpin the context and

therefore an examination of the relationship between structural elements and the behaviours and forms those structural forces give rise to. This is an extremely important point in relation to the focus of this thesis. Robinson's discussion belies an ontological clash between the structural position Fay implies and the individual agency and relativism of post-modern ontologies. Robinson does not mention this underlying conflict or articulate an ontological position. This ontological clash is a core component of the 'paradigm wars' that she stepped around . Robottom and Hart (1993) consider that it is the underlying clash of worldviews that makes competing paradigms incommensurate . This avoidance of the deeply rooted issue of differing lillderstandings of the nature of the world is a serious potential flaw in PBM that will be addressed later in this thesis.

In response to Fay's (1 975) criticism however, Robinson concedes that PBM must incorporate a review of the prevailing social conditions that sustain problematic practices and beliefs when these are lU1likely to change independently of those conditions. I would reiterate the point made earlier in this regard that the examples used in her book seldom involve this kind of analysis. This may be an idiosyncrasy of Robinson's approach rather than a failing of PBM and in the choice of simple rather than complex cases to illustrate her points. However, this matter needs to be addressed.

Robinson points out further, that in many cases the resolution of problems involves normative judgements which interpretive researchers are loathe to make. Such judgements often involve choices between internally coherent but conflicting positions. PBM focuses on an accurate accolillt of educational problems that interpretive techniques contribute to in a significant way, although they are limited in their capacity to consider wider social and structural elements in their descriptions . These unobtrusive and non­ judgemental strategies have little to offer the evaluation of effective solutions. This often requires the assessment of normative positions of greater or lesser worth, and the associated judgement of possible future consequences of potential solutions.

In asserting that solutions can be found and evaluated in this way, PBM is, like Popper's approach, ontologically bold (Corson, 1999) and contains approaches that allow for normative judgements. This contributes to its ability to be effective in educational problem solving. The absence of this capacity in interpretive approaches, in contrast,

limits its problem-solving capacity. Thus PBM has aspects In common with the interpretive tradition but also contains key differences.