Peace Operations’ Lessons Learned and Observed

The principal concern found in the literature is the development of a “balloon economy,” a situation whereby the arrival of an influx of money into a community creates a disproportionate focus on servicing the wealthy international organizations, and at the expense of the local residents in two primary ways (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007:277; Aolain, et al., 2011;

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Woodward, 2002). These effects are comprehensive and ubiquitous, including, the inflationary effects upon food, housing/ offices and supplies due to demands made by a large number of internationals with money; the consequences of hiring of local staff and demands on local infrastructure (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Carnahan, et. al., 2006; Durch, 2004;

Gauster, 2006; Hegre, et al., 2010). Moreover, directly related effects are changes in acceptable social behavior and mores (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007, Gauster & Maruszczak,

2006:277), and gender-based criminal activity specifically resulting from interaction with peace operations’ forces.

2.5.1 Inflated Prices

Academic and organizational literature often point to “the rise in prices for food that can place even the basic foods out of range and inaccessible for local residents” (Narten, 2009), while housing costs increase dramatically, and community members are displaced from their homes in order to capitalize on wealthy outsiders (Anderson, 2000). Businesses also emerge to suit outsiders’ tastes and interests, and as Woodward notes, this rise occurs “even if there are an insufficient number of internationals to sustain (new) business” (Woodward, 2002:10). However, the same body of literature also widely disagrees to the extent and scale of this balloon economy.The UN’s organizational ‘best practices’ recommend field workers use the organizational commissaries, and similar UN resources that are brought in specifically to prevent overwhelming the local economy during this especially weak period (Carnahan, et. al., 2006; Durch, 2004). Carnahan (2006) also states price spikes are usually temporary; prices fall again once the demands of the initial surge of international staff are met. The increased prices also tend to be contained within the urban areas where international staff are located (Gauster & Maruszczak, 2006:55), or are offered specifically to the international staff (International Crisis Group, 2001). Moreover, Carnahan (2006) and Woodward (2002) both state that published

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datasets showing the rise in food prices also tend to include the prices of expensive imported ‘foreign foods’ which are preferred by the international community.

2.5.2 Purchasing and Contracting

General information concerning military contracting may be found in an array of widely available military publications. In the simplest terms, military forces may purchase and

transport its material, supplies and services from ‘home’ themselves; purchase directly from the local community; or, purchase through large contractors, who then hire local firms as

subcontractors - the latter being a frequently promoted best-practice (Carnahan, 2006; Durch, 2004; Gauster, 2006). MacDonald notes however, that returning expatriates with outside financial connections and newly developed culture and language skills that are more compatible with the military forces, may be continually found to be the ‘best qualified’ subcontractors, and therefore marginalize the small local contractors, (Bhatia, 2005; MacDonald, 2005); reinforce patronage networks (Dobbins, 2013; Woodward, 2002); or, increase opportunities for

corruption (Leonhardt, 2001:28; OECD, 2007). Consequently, even when contractors are hired from the surrounding area, additional consideration is necessary to determine the extent which the local community participates and benefits economically. Indeed, the arrival of military forces may lead to unrealistic expectations of economic opportunity for the community, and when those expectations are not met, lead to resentment or return to violence (MacDonald, 2005).

2.5.3 Housing and Office Building Scarcity

In addition to competing with local residents for usable structures to rebuild their livelihoods, peace operations organizations are often granted use of buildings and land by national-level political leaders, sometimes at no cost to the organization in exchange for their assistance, (Sharp, 1990; Williams, 2005), especially under conditions set by a negotiated peace agreement.

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However, Carnahan states community members often move in with family members explicitly to take advantage of the opportunity to rent their property to international staff at inflated prices (Carnahan 2006). Likewise, legitimate owners as well as opportunists will offer use of their buildings and land in exchange for income or other personal benefit through various patronage networks (Torjesen, 2013), even as discerning legal ownership for payment is attempted at a time when cadastral records are often conflicting, lost or destroyed (Demarest, 2007; Riedlmayer, 2007; Sewell, 2011).

Yet Gauster & Maruszczak (2006) assert the arrival of international organizations can provide significant community-wide economic opportunity. In particular, new construction and

refurbishment to bring hotel and residential property to the standards of the international staff typically hire local contractors and craftsmen, creating jobs and restoring livelihoods at a critical time (Carnahan, et. al., 2006:55). This initial economic benefit to the community remains when the international staffs continue to purchase food and other items for their daily needs; the benefit is further extended if the posting allows family members. In addition, the high number of restaurant meals consumed, and the natural proclivity for international staff to travel and buy local items for gifts and as souvenirs may lead to new industry such as tourism (Carnahan, et al., 2005), although such new industry may also cause disruptions to local labor markets (Bhatia, 2005; Dobbins, 2013), and the long term and unintended effects on this potential wealth are not yet well explored (Enloe, 2000; Weldon, et al., 2012; Woodward, 2002).

Nevertheless, while some of these initial conditions may be unknowable, the local community’s ongoing inability to obtain suitable property and restore livelihoods, and the international organization’s continued reliance on preferential treatment, or ill-gained benefits is likely to degrade the intervening organization’s credibility and reputation of impartiality (Shaw & Kemp, 2012).

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2.5.4 Bases’ Effects on Local Infrastructure

The importance of civil infrastructure, especially roads networks used for military supply, patrolling, and civilian livelihoods is well studied (Transportation Research Board, 2013; also, Anderson, 2000:27; Army, 2000; Kaiser, 1995), and the physical and social effects of heavy equipment and military vehicles on civil roadways is a long-practiced planning factor in military operations (Army, 1958; Transportation Research Board, 2013). Similarly, road and bridge repairs and upgrades - whether due to deferred maintenance or battle damage - are frequently made by military forces to ensure not only their continued freedom of movement for military operations, but also to maintain local commerce and promote community good will (Anderson, 2000: 27; AUSA & CSIS, 2002; Blair & Fitz-Gerald, 2009; Collinson, 2010).

2.5.5 Hiring Local Staff

According to much academic and the organizational best practices literature, the employment of local staff by international and humanitarian organizations gives legitimacy and promotes acceptance of the operation (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Call & Cousens, 2007:18; Carnahan, et al., 2005; Narten, 2009). Moreover, locally hired staffs typically have the best knowledge of the area and its customs and are generally more cost effective than international workers (Gauster, 2006; Sciarra, 2008). Natsios affirms these salaries “directly inject much needed cash into the economy” as these workers often support extended families while the local economy is particularly weak and before substantial development initiatives begin (Natsios, 2009; Sciarra, 2008). Finally, it is utimately the local staff that will ‘own’ and sustain peacebuilding activities (Narten, 2009).

Yet this literature also points to the unsustainably high wages usually paid by international organizations. While the rationale for high salaries is to recruit the best and most skilled (Gauster & Maruszczak, 2006), the discrepancy between salaries offered by the international

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organizations and local government is most problematic when senior officials, civil servants and high-skill professionals that work in their communities earn much less than unskilled labor employed by an international organization, and with far less responsibility (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Gauster & Maruszczak, 2006; International Crisis Group, 2001; Sciarra, 2008). At the same time, employment outside their professions tends to erode those skills. Moreover, younger employees who tend to have the best English and technical skills are likely to use their work with international organizations as ‘stepping stones’ to find better employment

elsewhere, collectively creating a ‘brain drain’ when their skills are needed most by their community (AUSA & CSIS, 2002). Gauster (2006) and Sciarra (2008) likewise argue the high wages and improved working conditions may become the new minimum “benchmarks” that cause pressure on the local community to continue both high salaries and well-resourced working conditions after the international organizations are gone (Gauster, 2006; Sciarra, 2008). Finally, where employment relies on word-of-mouth recommendations, self-appointed

gatekeepers may arise, entrenching conflict power structures (Narten, 2009). Particularly where ethnicity or national identities were dominant features in the preceding conflict, this can easily appear as continued institutional discrimination (Sowell, 1981), thereby encouraging

antagonism between international peacekeepers and the local population (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Higate & Henry, 2004).

2.5.6 Changes in Social Roles and Mores

Employment with international organizations can also have unexpected effects on social roles, particularly opportunities for women that would not have been possible otherwise, especially in traditional societies (Aolain, et al., 2011; Curtis, 2007). The “gender effect” of social roles is even more pronounced when the post-conflict primary family wage earner is female and holds a position of responsibility with an international organization, but is expected to assume her traditional position as a woman - wife or a child - at home (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007).

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Feminist literature more often points to the “unequal power structure between international staff and local women, which tends to place local women in insecure positions which reinforce (negative) gender roles, or foster exploitation, including trafficking and prostitution” (Aolain, et al., 2011; Eifler & Siefert, 2009; Enloe, 2000; Higate & Henry, 2004). However, the typical relations described between local women and men working for international organizations are reliably one-sided: local women are victims, while local men are absent, indifferent to women’s insecurity or are similarly predatory. Yet this overarching perspective does both women and men a disservice, especially as it overlooks the social and cultural dynamics of gender relations and inequalities in place before the conflict (Agustin, 2007; Cahn, 2007).

2.5.7 Peacekeeper Prostitution

Human trafficking and prostitution by peacekeepers are among the most contentious unintended outcomes in the post-conflict environment. The arrival and spread of organized criminal activities in the sex and drug trades have consistently been directly traced to the arrival of peacekeepers (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Aolain, et al., 2011; Autesserre, 2014; Baker, 2010; Carnahan, et al., 2005; Enloe, 2000; Higate & Henry, 2004; Martin, 2005;

Mendelson, 2005). This phenomenon appears to have two components: first, the early creation of brothels by opportunists and organized crime to ‘service’ the international community is cheap, easy and profitable (Carnahan, et. al., 2006:21). Second, this illicit ‘business’ provides cash and cover for its far more profitable component: trade in drugs and arms (Haynes, 2004:226). According to Haynes (2004), it is the tendencies of international organizations and peacekeeping forces to neither follow their own codes of conduct, nor hold offenders

accountable, which allows these illicit and damaging activities to continue and thrive, and directly undermines the security they have specifically been sent to provide (Carnahan, et al., 2005; Haynes, 2004; Higate & Henry, 2004). Moreover, such activities tend to become

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permanent and erode stability and security not just locally, but into adjacent countries as well (Colas & Peyroux, 2016:28).