PEOPLE VS JUDGE INTING 187 SCRA 788 [1990]

FACTS:

Mrs. Editha Barba filed letter-complaint against OIC Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC, for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior pennission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.

Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervision of Dumaguete City to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case to file the necessary information in court and prosecute, if warranted.

After a preliminary investigation, Atty. Lituanas filed a criminal case with the respondent trial court which in turn issued a warrant of arrest against the Ole-Mayor.

Subsequently, however, the trial court set aside its order of arrest on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Sec 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution and further required Atty. Lituanas to secure the written approval of the provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall be under the supervision and control of the latter. Atty. Lituanas failed to comply so the case was dismissed.

ISSUE: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?

HELD:

NO. The Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. If ever the Fiscal or Prosecutor files information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation or election law, it is because he has been deputized by the COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of his office (People vs. Basilla, et al G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, ] 989). In the instant case, there is no averment or allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the Provincial Fiscal as a deputy of COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal to

"approve" the COMELEC's preliminary investigation, which is not proper.

Article IX C Section 2 of the Constitution provides:

"Sec. 2 The Commission on Election shall exercise the following powers and functions:

1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative. referendum, and recall.

xxx xxx

xxx

2. File upon a verified complaint, or on its

own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of votes, investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omission constituting election frauds. offenses, and malpractices" (Emphasis supplied)

In effect, the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws.

This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.

ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BASILLA

(G.R. NOS. 83938-40, NOVEMBER 6, 1989) FELICIANO, J.:

FACTS:

As an aftermath of the May 1987 congressional elections in Masbate, complaints for violations of Section 261, par.a-1 (vote buying) and par. p (carrying of deadly weapon) of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881) were filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate against the private respondents. After preliminary investigation of the foregoing complaints, the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate filed in the Regional Trial Court of Masbate the said criminal complaints. In three (3) separate

San Beda College of Law

THE ADONIS CASES 2011

orders, accused respondent Judge Henry Basilla motu proprio dismissed the three (3) informations giving the following justification: “….. The record shows that the complainant filed the complaint with the fiscal and not with the COMELEC. The COMELEC did not investigate the case.”

The Petition argues principally that the Commission on Elections ("Comelec") has authority to deputize the chief state prosecutors, provincial and city fiscals and their assistants, under Sections 2 (4) and (8), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, and that the Comelec did deputize such prosecution officers to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints for alleged violation of election laws and to institute criminal information therefore. The respondent judge therefore committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge erred in deciding that COMELEC in the case at bar failed to perform its function as provided in the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

Yes. There is no dispute that the Comelec is vested with power and authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code and to prosecute such offenses in court. Sec. 2(6) of Art. IX (C) of 1987 Constitution provides…”investigate and, when appropriate prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omissions, constituting election frauds offenses, malpractices."

It must be noted that while Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the Comelec, it at the same time authorizes the Comelec to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the Government. Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution clearly envisage that the Comelec would not be compelled to carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

xxx xxx xxx

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcementi agencies and instrumantalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

xxx xxx xxx

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

xxx xxx xxx

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.

xxx xxx xxx

The contention of private respondents that the deputation by the Comelec of the prosecuting arms of the Government would be warranted only before the elections and only to ensure tree, honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections, that is, to perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack substance. There is nothing in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a pinched niggardly interpretation of the authority of the Comelec to appoint as its deputies, officials or employees of other agencies and instrumentalities of the government. The prompt investigation and prosecution and disposition of election offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. The investigation and prosecution of election offenses are, in an important sense, more important than the maintenance of physical order in election precinct. '

All this the respondent Judge disregarded when he motu proprio dismissed the criminal informations filed in this case. The cases he cited in his identical orders can offer him no comfort at all; for these cases do not relate to the authority of the Comelec to deputize the regular prosecution arms of the Government for the investigation and prosecution of election offenses and those cases are not in conflict with our ruling here.

ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

PEOPLE VS. DELGADO (GR. NO. 93419-32, SEPTEMBER 18, 1990) GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:

Comelec filed an information against each of the private respondents for violation of Section 261 (y) (2) and (5) of the Omnibus Election Code. In three separate manifestations, the Regional Election Director of Region VII was designated by the COMELEC to handle the prosecution with the authority to assign another COMELEC prosecutor.

Private respondents, through counsels, then filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. An order was then issued by respondent court directing the COMELEC through the Regional Election Director of Region VII to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases and to submit his report within ten (10) days after termination thereof.

In its petition, the COMELEC contends that as an independent constitutional body, its actions on election matters may be reviewed only on certiorari by the Supreme Court. On the other hand, the respondents contend that since the cases were filed in court by the COMELEC as a public prosecutor, and not in the exercise of its power to decide election contests, the trial court has authority to order a reinvestigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court has the power or authority to order the Commission on Elections through its Regional Election Director of Region VII or its Law Department to conduct a reinvestigation HELD:

YES. The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial court requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation in this case and to submit to the court the record of the preliminary investigation on the ground that only this Court may review its actions is certainly untenable.

It is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case.

Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court.

The records of the preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court must be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless the court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

. The petition is brought in the name of the People of the Philippines. Only the Solicitor General can represent the People of the Philippines in this proceeding. In the least, the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General should have been secured by the COMELEC before the filing of this petition. On this account alone, the petition should be dismissed.

ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS VS. SILVA, JR

(GR. NO. 129417 FEBRUARY 10, 1998) MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

The COMELEC charged private respondents Erasto Tanciongco and Norma Castillo with violations of §27 of R.A. No. 6646, together with Zenon Uy, in twelve separate informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bataan. Tanciongco and Castillo then filed a joint

"Omnibus Motion for Examination of Evidence to Determine the Existence of Probable Cause; Suspension of Issuance of Warrant of Arrest; and Dismissal of the Cases." Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño, who had been designated by the Commission on Elections to prosecute the cases, filed a comment joining in private respondents' request. In view thereof, respondent judges Silva and Vianzon summarily dismissed the cases against private respondents.

The COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal of the cases to the Court of Appeals,but the respondent judges denied due course to its appeal. The sole basis for the denial was the fact that the prosecutor, whom the COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the cases, had earlier taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC. Said prosecutor stated that he cannot give his conformity to the Notice of Appeal filed by the Comelec as it would not be consistent with his position that he would abide by whatever finding the court may come up with on the existence of probable cause as against the accused Erasto Tanciongco and Norma Castillo.

ISSUES:

(1) Is the order denying due course to the Notice of Appeal of the COMELEC correct?

(2) Who has authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of dismissal — the COMELEC or its designated prosecutor?

HELD:

NO. Ther order of the respondent judges denying due course to the Notice of Appeal of the COMELEC is not correct. . The authority to decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC. Art. IX-C, § 2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the power and function to "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices." As this Court has held:

In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws.

This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary

San Beda College of Law

THE ADONIS CASES 2011

investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.

Indeed, even before the present Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) and, before it, the 1971 Election Code (R.A.

No. 6388) and the 1978 Election Code (P.D. No. 1296) already gave the COMELEC the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute them in court.The purpose is to place in the hands of an independent prosecutor the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.

Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They derive their authority from it and not from their offices.Consequently, it was beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño to oppose the appeal of the COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his power, as COMELEC-designated prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the determination of whether there was probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether the cases should be dismissed. Those cases were filed by the COMELEC after appropriate preliminary investigation. If the Chief State Prosecutor thought there was no probable cause for proceeding against private respondents, he should have discussed the matter with the COMELEC and awaited its instruction.

If he disagreed with the COMELEC's findings, he should have sought permission to withdraw from the cases. But he could not leave the determination of probable cause to the courts and agree in advance to the dismissal of the cases should the courts find no probable cause for proceeding with the trial of the accused. It was, therefore, grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judges to rely on the manifestation of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño as basis for denying due course to the notices of appeal filed by the COMELEC.

ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

ARUELO VS. CA GR NO. 107852. OCTOBER 20, 1993 FACTS:

Aruelo and Gatchalian were Vice-Mayoralty candidates in Balagtas, Bulacan in the May 1992 elections. Gatchalian was proclaimed as the duly elected vice-mayor. Aruelo filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of "fraudulent alteration and tampering" of votes. Aruelo also filed with the RTC a petition protesting the same election.

Gatchalian moved to dismiss, claiming that: (a) the petition was filed out of time; (b) there was a pending protest case before the COMELEC; and (b) Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed filing fees and cash deposit on the petition.

The COMELEC denied Aruelo's petition. However, the trial court denied Gatchalian's Motion to Dismiss and ordered him to file his answer to the petition.

Aruelo prayed before the CA for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the trial court from implementing the Order of August 11 1992, regarding the revision of ballots. The CA belatedly issued a temporary restraining order.

Meanwhile, Gatchalian filed with the CA another petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 28977), again alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the Order, which denied his Motion for Bill of Particulars. The CA dismissed this petition for lack of merit.

The CA rendered judgment, denying Gatchalian's petition, but declaring, at the same time, that Gatchalian's Answer With Counter-Protest and Counterclaim was timely filed. The appellate court also lifted the temporary restraining order and ordered the trial court to "proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer.

HELD:

NO. Petitioner filed the election protest (Civil Case No. 343-M-92) with the RTC, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of Particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:

"SEC. 2. Applicability. These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protest or quo warranto cases pending before the regular courts.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 6 [5]).

Private respondent received a copy of the order of the RTC denying his motion for a bill of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under

Section l(b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his motion for

Section l(b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his motion for