“Person” action research (Torbert 2001) - Exploring disruptive contexts and their effect upon i

5.5.1 Summary of types

Traditional AR focuses upon problem solving and Participatory Action Research (PAR) emphasises the emancipatory nature of the approach, as too does cooperative enquiry, both with the objective of promoting a joint understanding of the participants‟ perceived world and the creation of new perspectives (Cornwall 2008).

These are grounded within the second person approach, promoting a community of enquiry, facilitating interpersonal dialogue leading to collective decision making within communicative spaces. Torbert (2001) refers to the inner dimension of first person AR and its inherent links to second person AR and the authentic engagement with the participants‟ dialogue. Specifically relating to this as "meditative inner work" (p. 252) this engagement with the internal context and the necessary associated interpersonal skills are tenants that are required for the third person transformational changes at an organisational level.

Initially I had been considering PAR, but my approach, in the early stages, did provide structure and direction and the participants‟ involvement was more collaborative in response to this33_{. After considering the types and categories, I}

would like to present a rationale for the choice of a second person collaborative action research (CAR) approach for this study.

5.6 Second Person Collaborative Action Research (CAR)

Any attempt to change and improve practice, has to acknowledge that participants can be restrained by the cultural and social perceptions that have a bearing on their ways of working (Winter 1989). Utilising CAR I set out to develop the insights and understanding of the participants into the focus of the study i.e. incivility and encouraged a critical discourse with their wider cultural and societal surroundings. Habermas (1984, 1987) would see this second person approach as a key objective of his communicative action theory, engaging individuals in open and meaningful debates. This offers up the opportunity of seeing their world from a new perspective, challenging some of the traditional implicit aspects of “habitus” (Bourdieu 1984, 1986).

Kemmis (2001) sees that this process of reconstruction, not only relates to practice and the individual, but also accommodates the actual context as well. This involves the connection between the individual person and the wider organisational, societal and political context. Recognising this, there is the potential to transform a situation and to overcome any sense of isolation, alienation and oppressive injustices. This can enhance and transform the “social capital” of the individual, empowering them with new insights (Bourdieu 1984, 1986). The focus upon disruptive contexts and the

33_{In the final joint workshop (see research design) the participants took the lead, after I left the group, to} engage with one another, thus the last workshop had evolved into a participatory one. Here they decided upon the outcomes, without any facilitation from me (see later in the study).

second person collaborative approach proved to be catalysts which enabled the participants to recognise what they were bringing to the workshops and as reinforced by Roberts & Dick (2003) and Kemmis (2006), they developed insights and understanding into how this might have a bearing upon their educational experiences (see findings chapters).

Mitchell et al (2009) incorporating the views of Hitchcock & Hughes (1995) focus upon the shift from anecdotal to action, based upon ―critical professional thinking,

from a routine and habitual action to an action based on self-appraisal, flexibility, creativity, social, cultural, and political awareness‖ (p345). The CAR challenged

some of the assumptions that the participants had about incivility based upon these routines and habits. The disruptive contextual approach takes into account the wider social and political awareness and its dynamic relationship with the internal context allows for self-appraisal. This is reinforced by the Collaborative Action Research Network (CARN) which recognises the fundamental importance of practitioners actively contributing to the generation of knowledge through the recognition and reflection upon these contexts (CARN 2014).

5.7 The role of reflection

Concentrating upon “interpersonal dialogue”, Raelin (2001, 2008) and Burchell & Dyson (2005) discuss the interplay between individual and collective reflection. Burchell & Dyson (2005) explore ways in which reflection can be developed within the context of a group and say that it;

―incorporates both the external dimension concerned with the provision of time

and a physical setting away from routine work activities, and the inner dimension of space for dialogue with oneself and others‖ (Burchell & Dyson 2005, p291).

This “inner dimension” complements the notion of the “internal context” and the dynamic relationship between this and the other contextual settings. This relationship is based upon the fluidity of interplay between the contexts and the dynamic elements associated with the developing participant relationships (Torbert 2001; Parsons & Brown 2002). Raelin (2001) refers to emancipatory discourse, uses the term social or public reflection, recognising that whilst it can involve introspection, the process can also be shared with others where the internal dialogue is enhanced by the external one.

Recognising the concepts of “self awareness” and the “internal context”, I am invited to have an “interpersonal dialogue” with myself as the researcher. Goff (2001) sees the transforming nature of CAR, where the sharing of power enables changes to occur. This is dependent on the skills of the researcher to facilitate the collaborative process, by promoting and sharing an understanding of the chosen method, with participants being given a choice in the ongoing decision making process (Kemmis 2001; Somekh et al 2005; Kinsler 2010). Ponte et al (2004) and Platteel et al (2010) both say that CAR is most productive when the process is guided by a facilitator who can promote this self enquiry effectively (Ponte 2002; Rahman 2008). My background as a mental health practitioner and as a university lecturer has provided me with a wealth of experience in facilitating collaborative group work. Utilising a programme of workshops, I applied my experience and skills in promoting a “reflective space” for the participants. This reinforced the importance of reflection and reflexivity in my approach. Being key components of action research and integral to the ongoing evaluation of the research design, this informed the process as the research progressed and developed (Winter and Munn-Giddings 2001).

5.8 Perceived limitations of AR

Critics of AR have been frustrated by a perceived lack of scientific grounding (Susman & Evered 1978; Frideres 1992; Waterman et al 2001; Ozanne & Saatcioglu 2008). Frideres (1992) was very critical of the lack of rigour associated with action research. He saw its evolution through the 1970s as a popular methodology of empowering people, but it has since been hijacked by researchers exploiting it for political and ideological means. Kemmis (2006, p459), a key protagonist in the field of AR, has also been disillusioned with the proliferation of the approach. He argues that it has ―become a vehicle for domesticating students and teachers to conventional

forms of schooling‖. This has undermined the original hope of action research being

a ―vehicle for educational critique‖.

Returning to Frideres (1992, p8), he argued that the outcomes of action research do not lead to the development of new theories, saying that;

―...it is not interested in developing theory, the goal of science. Rather it limits its focus to a single case, which may be unique and idiosyncratic‖.

Frideres‟ polarised perspective, ironically is “limiting its focus” and does not acknowledge the fact that living theory is valued as a key element of the collaborative process (Reason 1994, Reason and Bradbury 2006, Whitehead 2008). And in

practice I see that this dynamic approach to theory as one of the reasons why the methodology is constantly evolving, as it needs to change and adapt accordingly. Dover (2008) recognises that Frideres‟ reaction was over two decades ago and is so extreme, that today some action researchers would not even respond to it. Yet it still offers up an opportunity of recognising the differences between the research paradigms and highlights the importance of choosing an approach which accommodated my personal epistemology (see chapter 2). In providing some balance to this extreme and as I perceive a polemic attack on AR, Morrison & Lilford (2001, p441) ask why is it not;

―....perfectly respectable to engage in inquiry aimed at bringing about beneficial change in a manner sensitive to context, according priority to the perspective of those directly implicated, and working iteratively to increase understanding rather than mapping everything out at the start‖.

Here there is a contextual recognition, which is obviously an important aspect of my study and reinforces the iterative nature of AR. It would seem that Frideres (1992) is grounded in the positivistic paradigm and is using this notion of scientific enquiry as the benchmark to compare and contrast action research which has evolved from a very different place. Social scientists would say that this positivistic view has a hindering effect on the understanding that multiple realities can exist (McLeod 2001) and both AR and interpretive phenomenology (see later) recognise this.

From a practical perspective Ozanne & Saatcioglu (2008) and Mackenzie et al (2009) highlight that AR is both time and resource intensive. There is a high level of personal investment required by the researcher and this involves establishing close working relationships with the participants. Waterman et al (2001) point out that this closeness has led to the accusation that it can be too subjective and anecdotal. There is an inherent bias to the research which is predicated upon both a lack of researcher independence and separation from the participants. As a consequence the results cannot be generalised and are seen to be restricted to the “locale” of the research studies (Koshy et al 2011). Dover (2008) recognises this challenge in transferring their theoretical findings beyond the community of interest and cautions against the possible trap of seeing the prioritisation of participative validity as immunity to challenge.

Kothari (2001) and Waddington & Mohan (2004) focused on the issues of power with respects to the researcher-participative relationship. Kothari (2001) postulated if AR was just a “grand design” and the use of its emancipatory language e.g.

“participation” and “inclusion” providing a mask for hierarchical power relations? In response to this criticism, Koshy et al (2011) reinforced the importance of action researchers clearly acknowledging their epistemological stance early in the research process (see chapter 2). Equally important is the rigour associated with data generation and the authentication of the findings with the participants, on an ongoing basis (Robson 2002; Whitehead 2008). Recognising the nature of CAR, we could not be certain which direction the research would take us. This uncertainty reinforced the importance of having the structure of both the workshop programme and the contextual framework. These were underpinned with a strong ethical ethos which reflected the principles of the ISS, being situated within an ERS, where dialectical relationships were encouraged and established. Returning to the chapter‟s introduction I highlighted the importance of authentically capturing the lived experience of the participant‟s involvement and perceptions of these concepts.

5.9 Capturing the lived experiences and phenomenology

To capture these lived experiences I reflected upon Hughes & Sharrock‟s (1997 p98) discourse on the ideas of the hermeneutic philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) who espoused the perceived inadequacies of positivistic approaches to understand human behaviour. They purported that;

―Knowledge of persons could only be gained through an interpretative procedure grounded in the imaginative recreation of the experiences of others to grasp the meaning which things in their world have for them‖.

This “imaginative recreation” was reflected in the workshop programme, where the participants had the opportunity to “grasp” the possibilities of seeing their world in a different way. Tufford and Newman (2010, p82) acknowledge the work of Husserl in laying down the philosophical foundations of phenomenology (1913/1931), which involved the ―essence of understanding the lived experience entails ‗das unmittelbare

schen‘ or direct seeing, which surpasses sensory experience‖. This way of seeing

looks beyond constructions, assumptions and preconceptions. The study of human consciousness for Husserl‟s led to the identification of features relating to lived experiences that are shared by all those who have the experience. Natanson (1973) refers to these as universal essences or eidetic structures. Here the researcher would move from the consciousness of the “concrete” to the essence of the meaning, developing an intuitive “feel” for the shape or “eidos” (Greek). Lopez et al (2004, p728) say that;

―for the description of the lived experience to be considered a science, commonalities in the experience of the participants must be identified, so that a generalized description is possible‖.

This in effect is descriptive phenomenology which sees this generalisation as being integral to the method of enquiry. Alternatively in interpretive phenomenology, it is vital to capture the participant‟s unique and individual experience in relation to their given situation and interpret this accordingly (Heidegger 1962).

5.10 Interpretive phenomenology

Mitchell (1997, p151) provided the following definition of a phenomenological interpretative approach,

―Where the purpose is to study and understand the nature, meaning and essential structure of experiences in their situated context‖.

The workshops created this “situated context”, which was both a space and approach that engaged the participants in meaningful discourses. The epistemological underpinnings of a phenomenological approach of what can be known, believe that the knower is the actual individual who perceives the experience and that they become the authority against which the "truth" is measured. Frank (2006, p114) sees the approach as:

―A discipline of seeing and being, a way of deepening the perplexity and mystery of what is going on, especially who exists in what relation to whom‖.

This “mysterious” and ethereal perspective is where I perceived the interpretive phenomenological method complementing AR, both being approaches which enabled the application of the Habermasian conceptual underpinnings and the ISS. Habermas (1974) perceived scientific thinking as undermining an individual‟s ability to be critical and think creatively. Consequently this led to a misunderstanding of their social contexts, passively accepting this “illusionary” reality. The terms “mystery” and “illusionary” invite the idea of something being hidden or unseen, a specific entity or thing which is waiting to be discovered. By focusing upon the role of disruptive contexts, I recognised the need to look beyond our assumptions and preconceptions. The contextual framework invited the participants both to recognise the contexts and to explore if they had a bearing upon incivility (see findings and discussion later). Interpretive phenomenology presupposes that we can only develop knowledge of our constructed world through our own subjective experiences (Mcleod, 2001).

Accordingly we needed to look inwardly (internal context) when seeking some form of understanding. Habermas could challenge this concept of subjectivity, asking to what extent had this perspective been shaped and distorted by our grounding in the lifeworld?

There is a dichotomy between how Habermas viewed lifeworld, especially in relation to both Husserl, the originator of the term and Heidegger (Russell 2011). Husserl believed that our lived experiences are based upon the subjectivity of the experience within lifeworld and this subjectivity becomes our truth. Habermas challenged this dependency upon the intra-subjectivity, arguing that lifeworld consisted of hidden elements, often unknown to the individual and these personal experiences and interpretations were built around this illusionary effect. Accordingly how real and authentic were these experiences, especially if there is a perceived lack of awareness of these illusionary traps? This has a contaminating effect on the lived experience and therefore Habermas asks how accurate and authentic are the perceptions and narratives of the individual?

Acknowledging both perspectives, I focused upon my inclusion of the internal context and its interconnectedness with the immediate, institutional and social contexts. Interpretive phenomenology accepts that our personal experiences and perspectives are situated within particular contexts. In my view the internal context, associated with the subjectivity of the lived experience, had to become an integral part of the contextual framework. This enabled the participants to explore, through individual and group reflection, their thoughts, feelings and awareness of the other contextual elements, associated with the systems of lifeworld and the shaping effects of habitus within their lives. By personally engaging with the contextual framework, they had the potential to recognise and challenge some of their preconceived ideas, potentially discovering new perspectives (Lopez et al 2004; Navarro 2006).

Lifeworld and habitus are created through social interactions and associated patterns and are contextually transferable, not being fixed they have a fluidity about them and therefore;

―Can be changed under unexpected situations or over a long historical period"

(Navarro 2006, p 16).

Lopez et al (2004) cite Heidegger (1962) and his perception that humans are embedded in their worlds. This embeddedness, in effect their sense of habitus, is so deep that their subjective experiences cannot be separated from their social, cultural

and political contexts. This is referred to by interpretive phenomenologists as “situated freedom”. In effect individuals are free to make choices, but this freedom is not absolute, being bound by the conditions of their activities of daily living. By creating ERS I facilitated social interactions amongst the participants, with the emphasis on exploring disruptive contexts and incivility. Participants had been well prepared for their involvement in the workshops and therefore they should not have been perceived as “unexpected situations”. Alternatively I believe that they experienced ”unexpected insights” and developed new ways of seeing their world by challenging or at least attempting to bring to their consciousness this concept of “situated freedom”. By focusing upon my notion of “disruptive contexts” we explored the contextual link to incivility, enabling ―new interpretations, which in turn enable

new possibilities of action‖ mirroring the CAR approach (Frank 2006, p114).

5.11 Phenomenology and Action Research

The relationship between action research and phenomenology has been well documented (Zuber-Skerritt 2001; Gustavsen 2003; Ladkin 2005; Hussein 2008 & McVicar et al 2012). Ladkin (2005) acknowledged the role that phenomenology played in the laying down of philosophical foundations for “new paradigm” research approaches, including AR. McVicar et al (2012) conducted a comparative bibliometric review of action research designs in nursing and social care and their findings suggested that the use of the approach could be located between the epistemological choices of phenomenology and ethnography. The most popular methods involved interactive workshops (the chosen approach for this study) and other group approaches, including discussion forums.

Hussein (2008) utilised a hermeneutic-phenomenological approach to determine the meanings of the interpreted texts of adult students with the objective of legitimatising and validating the construction of narrative knowledge. Reflecting upon the interactive natures of phenomenology and action research Zuber-Skerritt, (2001, p7) says that;

―Phenomenologists believe that knowledge is socially constructed and created from within, and for, a particular group and context. The researcher‘s role is to describe and explain the situation‖.

This stance recognises the importance of context and that knowledge is socially constructed through group interactions and this study involved nursing students and lecturers within a HE context. To “describe and explain the situation” I collected,

analysed and interpreted data on their lived experiences grounded within the context of the workshop programme. Ladkin (2005) focused upon the action researcher‟s subjectivity and how phenomenology has the potential to explore the relationship between the “self, “other” and truth”. Gustavsen (2003, p156) explored the relationship between AR and phenomenology and the evolvement of new forms of knowledge production. This can be achieved through our relationship with theory and the recognition that;

―The role of theory, then, is not only to help us make a picture of the world as it is, but also – and of greater importance – actually to make us see how the world could have been‖.

This opportunity of seeing what could have been was facilitated through social interaction. Within the ERS, participants were encouraged to reflect individually and collectively, which promoted collaborative relationships, shaped by the contextual focus and in turn filtered through their internal context.

5.12 Internal context and IP

Within the general field of phenomenology, the concept of bracketing has been the point of much discussion. Bracketing involves the setting aside of former

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