A further distinction that can be made in control theory is between 'personal control' and 'perceived control'. These terms have often been used interchangeably but Walker (200 1 ) uses these terms to distinguish between two aspects o f control. 'Personal control' is when a 'sense of control' is gained through belief in one's own ability to influence the outcome. This can be contrasted with 'perceived control' , which is a 'sense of control' that is gained, not necessarily from 'personal control' , but from any source. This distinction will be clarified in this section by introducing theorists who argue for the value of 'perceived control' , and by outlining theories associated with each approach.
Personal Control
'Personal control' refers to an individual's belief in their own ability to control outcomes. Walker (200 1 ) defines 'personal control' as "self-determination of an event (things are
under my control)" (p. 10). Hence, the focus is exclusively on a person' s beliefs regarding the influence that his or her own actions and reactions have on the outcome and the implication is that a 'sense of control' will only come from a sense of 'personal control' .
'Personal control' is the dominant construct in the control beliefs field, with the more commonly known control theories, such as 'self-efficacy' , 'locus of control' , and 'learned helplessness', being 'personal control' theories. The dominance of 'personal control' has been so marked that terms such as, 'sense of control' and 'control beliefs', are often used interchangeably with 'personal control' , resulting in a mistaken but pervasive assumption that they are the same thing.
A well known example of a 'personal control' theory is one developed by Rotter ( 1 966), which suggests that the likelihood of a person engaging in a particular behaviour is a joint function of a person's belief in whether the behaviour would lead to a particular outcome and of the value of that outcome to the person. Thus, if a person values an outcome and believes that their behaviour can bring about that outcome then the person is likely to act. While Rotter' s emphasis on the value of the outcome is usually overlooked, the
generalised expectancy concerning the effect of the behaviour on the outcome has often been considered. It is this aspect of the theory that is called 'locus of control' . Rotter describes 'locus of control' as being a one-dimensional dichotomous construct; people perceive outcomes as either internally controlled or externally controlled. The theory suggests that a person with an internal 'locus of control' expects their actions to produce outcomes and so is an active, persistent person. A person with an external 'locus of control' is thought to expect that outcomes are not influenced by themselves but by
external factors such as 'chance', 'luck' and 'powerful others' , and so is passive and
withdrawn (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). This type of person has also been
described as fatalistic (Lefcourt, 1 976). Traditionally, it was thought that people should be encouraged to develop an internal orientation because this would encourage them to take charge of their lives.
In summary, the 'personal control' theories focus on the individual's beliefs concerning their abilities and the outcomes of their actions. Constructs such as unidimensional 'locus of control' (Rotter, 1966) and 'outcome expectancies' (Bandura, 1 977) focus on beliefs regarding the connection between the person' s actions and the outcome. Constructs such
as 'self efficacy' (Bandura) focus on beliefs regarding the ability of the person to perform the action. Thus, the focus of 'personal control' theories is very much on the ability of the individual to influence outcomes. Belief in the ability of others to influence events is either ignored or understood as attenuating the 'sense of control' because it is seen as reducing 'personal control' .
Perceived Control
'Personal control' theories can be contrasted with 'perceived control' theories . The focus on 'personal control' as the determinant of a 'sense of control' has been challenged by suggestions that a person's 'sense of control' may also be enhanced through belief in control by others. 'Perceived control' is defined by Walker (2001) as "the extent to which an event is believed to be under control (things are believed to be under control)" (p. 10).
The key difference is that 'perceived control' theories recognise that a 'sense of control ' can be gained not only from a sense of 'personal control' , but, can in certain
circumstances, also be gained when it is believed that control is held by other 'means' .
A number of theories will now be introduced which suggest that a person can have a 'sense of control' even when they cannot directly influence the outcome themselves. These theories will be outlined and compared in order to help with the understanding of the differences between 'personal control' and 'perceived control' .
Antonovsky ( 1 979) suggested that theories of 'personal control are about "I am in control" whereas, to have a 'sense of control' it is often sufficient to believe that "things are under control" (p. 1 55) which is the same contrast as w�s made by Walker (2001). Antonovsky argues that if one believes that control is in legitimate hands and that the person with the legitimate control will act in one's own interest, although there is no sense of 'personal control' a 'sense of control' can be maintained. A critical difference from Rotter' s (1966)
'external control ' , which is seen to have negative effects, is that Antonovsky' s theory prescribes that belief in control by an external force will be positive if the person also believes that the external force will act in the person' s interest. Rotter does not include the orientation of the external force in his theory. Antonovsky' s theory does not negate the value of 'personal control' , but rather, recognises the potential value of control from other sources. Theoretically, the person with a 'sense of control' from a greater number of
sources would be better off. Antonovsky introduced the term 'sense of coherence' to avoid the 'personal control' bias that he felt was associated with the term 'sense of control' , but the following definition shows that 'sense of coherence' acknowledges the potential value from both internal and external control:
The sense of coherence is a global orientation that expresses the extent to which one has a pervasive, enduring though dynamic feeling of confidence that one's internal and external environments are predictable and that there is a high probability that things will work out as well as can reasonably be expected. (Antonovsky, 1987, p. 1 23)
Antonovsky (1979) identified three core components of 'sense of coherence' :
'comprehensibility' , 'manageability' , and 'meaningfulness'. 'Comprehensibility' refers to whether the person perceives the stimuli they encounter as making sense (i.e. the stimuli are information that is orderly, consistent, and lucid). The person high in
'comprehensibility' expects that future stimuli will be predictable and, if it is not, they expect to be able to explain and organise it. 'Manageability' refers to the extent to which a person believes that the resources at their disposal are sufficient to deal with the stimuli that they encounter. Antonovsky explicitly states that resources "at one's disposal" are resources that are both under one's own control or in the hands of legitimate, trustworthy others such as a spouse, friends, colleagues, God or a physician. 'Meaningfulness' refers to the extent to which the person feels that problems and demands are worthy of the commitment of time and energy needed to effect change. Of these three components it is 'manageability' which is most easily identifiable as relating to perceived control.
Antonovsky ( 1 979, 1987) theorised that a sense of coherence would mediate the relationship between stress and health.
While 'dispositional optimism' is not normally described as a theory of control, optimism is considered to be closely related to control (Shapiro & Astin, 1 998; Weinstein, 1 993), and Scheier and Carver (1985, 1 987, 1992) have a valuable contribution to make to this discussion. Their initial interest was in the self-regulation of behaviour and the influence of expectancies on this self-regulation (Scheier & Carver, 1 982). Their theory proposes that 'outcome expectancies' are a major influence on behaviour. It should be noted
authors, such as Bandura (1977, 1986). When using the term 'outcome expectancies' , Scheier and Carver (1987) refer to the person's subjective belief about whether an outcome will occur or not. In contrast, Bandura used the term 'outcome expectancies' to refer to the belief that a particular behaviour will produce a particular outcome. Scheier and Carver postulate that people will continue to strive for goals as long as they expect that the goal is attainable. They believe that these expectancies can be stable over time, can be generalised to a variety of situations, and form the basis of an important personality characteristic. They label this characteristic 'dispositional optimism' and define it as "the tendency to believe that one will generally experience good vs. bad outcomes in life" (Scheier & Carver, 1992, p.203). This definition has strong similarities with the definition of Antonovsky's (1 979) 'sense of coherence'.
Scheier and Carver ( 1987) see important similarities between their theory and control theories in the emphasis given to expectancies. They argue that control theories are concerned with expectancies of control, which are thought to affect people's expectancies of success while 'dispositional optimism' looks directly at people's expectancies of success. Scheier and Carver (1985, 1 987, 1992) purposefully remove the emphasis from expectancies of control because they argue that this has traditionally focused around
'personal control' and they believe that expectation of success can also come from a number of other sources. They provide a number of examples of other sources of control which can also lead to positive expectancies of achieving future goals: assistance from other people, religious faith, belief in the effectiveness of medications or placebos, luck, and favour from others. They argue that by failing to consider such beliefs as positive sources of control, people who hold these beliefs are incorrectly categorised as not having positive expectations. Thus, Scheier and Carver argue that it is not the source of these beliefs that is important, but rather having the belief in a positive outcome, and that accordingly, it is sufficient to measure 'outcome expectancies' rather than the source of the expectation. The key point to be drawn from this discussion is that these theorists believe that belief in control by others can be positive and can lead to expectations of success, which is very similar to the thoughts of Antonovsky ( 1979). While Carver et al. (2000) explicitly separate 'dispositional optimism' from 'personal control' , 'perceived control' , as it is conceptualised here, includes similarities with 'dispositional optimism'.
Shapiro and Astin (1998) have proposed a theory of control aimed at integrating a number of control theories. While the theory is quite involved and the full detail is beyond this review, some aspects are of particular interest here. Like Antonovsky, Shapiro and Astin also recognise that a person can gain a 'sense of control' from sources other than 'personal control' . First, they differentiate between 'active/altering control' and 'yielding/accepting control'. 'Active/altering control' refers to when a person feels that they have the control to influence the outcome while 'yielding/accepting control' refers to when a person does not feel they have this control. They argue that 'yielding/accepting control' can be negative and may be characterised by terms like timid, hopeless and fatalistic. However, Shapiro and Astin also argue that 'yielding/accepting control' can be positive when it involves acceptance of what cannot be changed by personal control. Shapiro, Schwartz and Astin ( 1996) describe this positive 'yielding/accepting control' as maintaining a 'sense of control' by controlling oneself. This 'yielding/accepting control' is very different from the ideas of Antonovsky (1979). While both theories argue that a 'sense of control' can be gained when there is no 'personal control' this positive 'yielding/accepting control' involves acceptance of the status quo rather than trusting others to assist the achievement of desired outcomes. With 'yielding/accepting control' it is not the situation that is under control but the person's reaction to it.
However, a second aspect of Shapiro and Astin's ( 1 998) theory is very similar to the arguments of Antonovsky (1979). They also argue that people can gain a 'sense of control' when control is held by benevolent others. Their examples, of doctors and a higher power, are very similar to those of Antonovsky and Scheier and Carver (1985,
1987, 1992). Shapiro and Astin argue that a person should ideally have belief in control by both self and others and that deficiency or excess of either of these can be a problem.
Another similar theory has been expressed in terms of gains from 'relinquishing control' . Burger ( 1989) suggests that there are times when 'personal control' is not seen as
desirable and at such times people often choose to 'relinquish control' to others who are more likely to be able to exert control. This term 'relinquishing control' sounds very similar to Shapiro and Astin's ( 1 998) positive 'accepting/yielding control' but is actually closer to Anonovsky's ( 1979) ideas. This notion is illustrated by a study by Burger, McWard and La Torre ( 1986) in which participants were given the choice between taking a blood sample from themselves or having an experimenter administer the sample. They
found that 75% to 90% of the participants chose to have the experimenter control the administration. It was thought that this was because the participants believed that the expert would be less likely to cause them pain. Thus 'relinquishing control' , is very similar to Antonovsky's idea of gaining a 'sense of control' through belief in the ability of competent others. 'Relinquishing control' , as theorised in this way, was seen as resulting in a number of positive outcomes, which are usually attributed to increased 'personal control' such as reduced anxiety.
Burger (1 989) suggested that there are three conditions under which belief in personal influence can be negative and is likely to be relinquished: when it produces in the person an uncomfortable level of concern about how others evaluate them, when there is low belief in their ability to obtain the desired outcome, and when it leads to increased attention to the negative aspects of the situation. While this theory acknowledges that a 'sense of control' can be gained from believing that control is held by sources outside oneself, the strong influence of 'personal control' remains, and this is seen in two ways. First, through the term 'relinquishing control' ; although the theory states that through
'relinquishing control' , 'sense of control' is actually gained, the use of the term
'relinquishing control' still implies that without exercising personal control, control is lost. Second, it is suggested that 'personal control' will only be relinquished when the person believes that they themselves cannot produce the desired outcome. This means that belief in control by others is seen only as a last resort.
Skinner's ( 1 995, 1 996) theory, described above, also acknowledges that a 'sense of control' can be gained through control held outside oneself. This theory recognises that a variety of 'means' can be seen as influencing the 'ends' : it may be the ability of the person concerned, help from a friend, the power of another, luck or something else. The theory makes no assumptions about whether belief in control by any particular 'means' of control is positive or negative and it suggests that the belief in control by different 'means' should be investigated. Skinner proposes that different 'means' will be relevant in different settings and so suggests that the 'means' investigated in a study should be chosen specifically for each study to suit the population and the area of study. The 'means' that Skinner et al. ( 1988) have investigated in their educational research are 'effort' , 'ability' , 'powerful others' , 'luck' , and 'unknown strategies' .
'Locus of control' , which was outlined in the section on 'personal control' , deserves further comment at this stage because the construct has been developed since the original work by Rotter ( 1 966) and has not always retained the focus upon 'personal control' . While Rotter' s original formulation of 'locus of control' was clearly orientated to a
'personal control' perspective, its subsequent development into a multidimensional construct impacted on this. One of the earliest researchers to challenge the
unidimensionality of the 'locus of control' construct was Levenson (1 972, 198 1 ) who made two points. First, she argued that internality and externality are separate dimensions and not opposite ends of one dimension. Levenson felt that she could believe that the outcome was controlled by others' actions and yet still believe that she could have some influence. In support of this, Levenson (198 1 ) also pointed to factor analyses that suggest that 'locus of control' is multidimensional. Second, she proposed that externality consists of at least two separate dimensions because belief in control by 'powerful others' and belief in control by 'luck' or 'chance' has different implications. Levenson (1972) thought that people who believed that outcomes were controlled by 'luck' or 'chance' saw the world as unordered, whereas people who believed that outcomes were controlled by 'powerful others' still saw the world as ordered. She reasoned that these two sets of beliefs might cause people to behave and think differently. Interestingly, while Rotter
operationalised 'locus of control' as unidimensional, he originally conceived it as multidimensional. In fact, Rotter, Seeman, & Liverant, ( 1962) originally suggested that external control might comprise four dimensions.
The belief in the multidimensionality of external control has subsequently led to the investigation of other external dimensions. This is seen especially in the area of supernatural and religious beliefs. Richards ( 1990) has suggested that belief in the influence of "universal forces" on the outcome of events may be important. "Universal forces" does not refer to God as conceptualised by any religion, but more to psychic and mystical experience. Wallston et al. ( 1999) have suggested that people' s belief in the ability of 'God' to influence outcomes may be important. Wallston, Stein,& Smith, ( 1 994) also developed a measure with a separate scale for 'doctors' . These authors state that there was a growing perceived need to analyse people' s external beliefs about control at a more fine-grained level. Thus, the multidimensional approach to 'locus of control' has made it possible to acknowledge the role of beliefs in control by external 'means' .
While this multidimensional approach acknowledges that people can attribute outcomes to a number of different sources and to do so does not necessarily negate belief in 'personal control' , it does not necessarily imply that an individual can gain a 'sense of control' from