Opinions in Loita were divided regarding Narok County Council’s proposal to turn the forest into a nature reserve. Although the majority opposed it and stood behind the Ilkerin group’s active opposition, a small group of Loita Maasai supported the County Council’s plan. They rallied behind a very wealthy man who had been a Loita council- lor. He had lost his seat in the December 1992 elections to someone who opposed Narok County Council’s forest plan, becoming the only councillor to oppose the gazettement plan (Péron 2000: 391). The defeated councillor was, however, able to get back on the County Council via the back door thanks to the influence of the other coun- cillors who wanted the forest plan to succeed and needed his support. He became a co- opted member of the Council, i.e. a co-opted councillor as opposed to an elected coun- cillor. I will henceforth refer to this man as ‘the co-opted councillor’. His stronghold in Loita was his homeland of Olorte, an area in the south of Loita on the Kenya-Tanzania border, which is why I have called the Loita group that organized around him the ‘Olor- te group’.
Co-option, which is different from ‘nomination’ (see Chapter 4), is not very com- mon. Key informants argue that he had been co-opted because he was a crucial Loita ally for Narok County Council and necessary for making the forest plan happen. As one of the key players of the Ilkerin group put it: ‘he was co-opted [with the aim of] de- feat[ing] Loita resistance to the forest issue’.58 More political manoeuvring was done in the County Council meetings held in Narok town to include the co-opted Loita council- lor and exclude the elected Loita councillor (Péron 2000: 391). The crucial meeting in September 1993, when the resolution on the Naimina Enkiyio Forest was adopted, was changed without prior notice at the last minute, from being an open public meeting to a closed meeting with the sole aim to excluding the press and Loita protestors from at-
tending (Ibid.: 392; CCD ‘Statement’: 6 (d)(e)). Two important observations can be made: both the Loita Maasai and the County Council were divided, with alliances crosscutting the local and district level; and the majority of the Loita joined the elected Loita councillor and the Ilkerin group in their opposition to the Narok County Council plan. The co-opted Loita councillor and a small group of Loita followers sided with the majority of the Narok County Councillors who were proponents of the plan.
These coalitions reached high levels, going in fact right to the heart of the state’s central government, i.e. the Cabinet. According to Péron (2000: 391), Rutten (2001: 424), Adano et al. (2012: 75), Zaal & Adano (2012: 202-203) and many of my Loita informants,59 Narok County Council’s forest plan was masterminded by the Member of Parliament (MP) for the Narok North constituency at the time, a Purko Maasai and po- litical heavyweight called William ole Ntimama. At a national level, he was known to be a ‘hawkish’ politician (Rutten 2001: 410, 411) who did not shun using state power to ensure his re-election and who was accused of triggering interethnic conflicts, killings and evictions by using inflammatory tribal speech (Ibid.: 413-416, Matter 2010a: 77-78, 2010b).60 Apart from being an MP, Ntimama also held the powerful post of Minister of Local Government (from 1988 until the end of 1996) and, as such, was responsible for all the local authorities in the country, including Narok County Council. This is im- portant because, as Minister of Local Government, he had the power to approve or re- ject certain decisions by local authorities, including the Naimina Enkiyio Forest plan. In the court case brought by the Ilkerin group, it was thus vitally important to prevent him from approving the plan, which is why he was also sued by them (CCD ‘Notice of Mo- tion’: 3; LNECTC 1994: 6).
Politics in Maasailand, as in Kenya more widely, is characterized by a system of po- litical patronage or neo-patrimonialism (Péron 2000: 388). And issues surrounding land and forests have become imbricated with the dynamics of patron-client networks, the politics of patronage and violence, and struggles among the political elite, particularly during elections (Matter 2010a, 2010b; Klopp 2001). Having been proclaimed as a ‘su- per-leader’ and ‘Supreme Spokesman of the Maasai’ (Péron 2000: 389-390), Ntimama was probably the most powerful political patron of Narok District, and possibly even Maasailand.61 His network of political clients was extensive. One reason advanced for
59 Ole Siloma & Zaal (2005: 274) and Zaal & ole Siloma (2006: 8) are more careful and see claims of
Ntimama’s involvement as speculation and rumours that, although contributing to the understanding of the conflict, have not been proven.
60 Ntimama also played a key role in the politically motivated evictions and violent clashes at
Enoosupukia in 1993 and 2005, including the reclassification of the land in Enoosupukia, which formed part of the Mau Forest, as a conservation forest. This occurred around the same time as the forest conflicts in Loita. However, the Loita forest case never reached the scale of violence seen in the Enoosupukia case. See Matter (2010a, 2010b).
Ntimama first entered district politics during the colonial period in 1954 as a councillor on the Narok African District Council (Rutten 2001: 433). In 1974 he became the chairman of Narok County Council (Ibid.: 409, 433). In the 1988 elections he became MP for Narok North, a position he held until he was defeated in 2013. Later, in 2013, he announced his retirement from politics at the age of 87, see www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-135798/i-am-leaving-politics-young-blood-ntimama accessed
19/2/14.
61 He was still an influential politician during my fieldwork period: at district level as the uncontested
Ntimama’s interest in the Naimina Enkiyio Forest was that he wanted to empower the Purko: ‘[s]trengthening the Narok County Council by acquiring the Loita forest would consequently mean strengthening the Purko Maasai, while weakening the Loita Maasai by limiting access to the Loita Naimina Enkiyio forest which acts as one their main sources of livelihood’ (ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 274-275). It was alleged that the Purko had planned this a long time ago but, expecting resistance, had waited for the Loita to be politically weak (and for themselves to be strong enough) to carry out this plan (Ibid.: 275). Indeed, interviewees insist that in the late 1970s/early 1980s, the County Council had approached the Loita PA chief and councillor with the nature reserve plan (Karanja et al. 2002: 31) but Loita leaders had refused, suggesting that Loita political power was strong enough at that time to resist Narok County Council. Kone appears to have played a key role in this resistance (Voshaar 1998: 113). The Purko had been mov- ing slowly towards the coveted forest and some families had already managed to occupy the area around the northern tip of the forest: ‘[t]he gazettement was thus seen by some as a move by certain Purko Maasai to occupy the forest and alienate it from the Loita people’ (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 9). Analysis by Adano et al. (2012) and Zaal & Adano (2012) of the Narok County Council conflict saw Ntimama’s manoeuvres and the collective interest by his fellow Purko as the main process underlying the conflict.
Another, more individualistic, explanation was, however, also given for Ntimama’s involvement. Having benefited personally from the touristic exploitation of the Maasai Mara,62 it is claimed that Ntimama had a vision of turning Naimina Enkiyio Forest into a similar park (Péron 2000: 391, 396; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 274; Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 8). It was rumoured that he had already had talks with investors from South Afri- ca about commercializing tourism in the forest (Péron 2000: 396; Karanja et al. 2002: 32; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 274). Through political patronage, Ntimama found mas- sive support within Narok County Council, where councillors were already savouring the economic benefits that would be opened up for their appropriation as tourist reve- nues would go to the County Council (Péron 2000: 391, 396; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 274; Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 8). The fact that the majority of the councillors were Purko like himself was important.63 To ensure support in Loita and give the impression that all Loita were supportive, he allegedly bribed their representative, the co-opted councillor, who was at that time the elected councillor of Loita (Péron 2000: 391).64 Rumours had it that, in 1992, the co-opted councillor, the Narok South MP ole Tuya
Culture. During the grand coalition between ODM and PNU following the 2007 violent elections, Ntimama was an important ally of Prime Minister Odinga, the ODM presidential candidate. Ntimama was part of the delegation that accompanied Odinga in his visit to the manyata in 2010 (see Chapter 1).
62 As the owner of tourist lodges (Rutten 2001: 433; Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 8; Adano et al. 2012: 75). 63 This bears striking resemblance to how some Dorobo of Enoosupukia understood the role of Ntimama
and his links to the Purko and Narok County Council in the context of the 2005 evictions, as can be seen in the words of a Dorobo man that Matter (2010b: 244) interviewed: ‘…Enoosupukia is a Dorobo area, but the County Council is mostly Purko, and they’re jealous of Dorobo land. Perhaps they attempted to clear the land so Purko can take over’.
64 Some say he was promised a political position after the following elections, others claim he was
promised private land. This latter claim finds some evidence in that Ntimama is said to have structurally rewarded councillors with prime plots of land in Nairobi for their political support (Rutten 2001: 435).
(whose constituency covered Loita) and Ntimama were already planning the gazette- ment of the forest (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 8-9).65 The co-opted councillor then mobi- lized his supporters in Loita, forming what I have called the Olorte group, and sided with the County Council and these two MPs in an effort to bring the forest under the control of the County Council (CCD ‘Statement’: 6).
The central figure in the Ilkerin group was the Ilkerin Project’s director, who was al- so one of the nine elders running the Trust Company and one of the two Loita repre- sentatives who went to the 1995 UN conference on indigenous people in Geneva (Péron 2000: 401). This wealthy, educated man was involved in a long-standing feud with the co-opted councillor (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 7). It was said that a long time ago these two men, who belonged to the same age-group (Iseuri age-set), had been inseparable friends. Around the same time, when their age-set became the governing age-group in Loita,66 they obtained powerful positions and became Loita leaders. The co-opted coun- cillor became a councillor in 1987 until he retired in 1997, having served one term as an elected councillor and another as co-opted councillor. The project director became a development leader of the Ilkerin Project after expatriate project leadership and man- agement were handed over to the Loita Maasai in 1982 (Knowles 1993: 24). One as a councillor and the other as a project director, they both had authority in the field of de- velopment: the co-opted councillor with regard to development policies coming from the state and the project director with respect to NGO-driven development. They both acted as intermediaries in development interventions, as local development brokers (Bierschenk et al. 2002) and, in a way, became competitors in this field. The first clash between the two men occurred in the 1980s at a time when pressure to adjudicate the land and make group ranches had increased (see Chapter 5).67 It was decided to turn Loita into two group ranches. The co-opted councillor (then elected councillor) was associated with one group ranch and the project director with the other. They disagreed about the boundary and, in the end, the group ranches never materialized. The story goes that from this first clash onwards, the Loita were divided into two groups: those behind the co-opted councillor and those supporting the project director. Every time either of the two came with a new plan or initiative, whether in the field of development or culture (see the Epilogue), the other group would automatically oppose it, and vice versa. The Narok County Council conflict provided yet another arena for these two men to fight out their long-standing feud (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 11).
65 The Narok South MP is not a Loita Maasai as Adano et al. (2012: 75) and Zaal & Adano (2012) claim.
He belongs to the Ilkunono blacksmith community of Leshuta, which is affiliated to the Purko section, and therefore identifies as a Purko.
66 I deduce this from the information I got on the enkipaata ceremony of the Ilkishili, Iseuri’s firestick
youngsters, which was around 1984. The enkipaata ceremony of the Ilkishili marked this age-group’s beginning of warriorhood and thus the beginning of the political term of their firestick elders, the Iseuri (see Chapter 7).
67 Zaal & ole Siloma (2006: 7-8) refer to another conflict: ‘[I]n the late 1980s, a number of projects were
initiated such as a cattle dip and dairy facilities in the sub-centres of the project area. Much of the proceeds of those facilities were kept in the coffers of ILIDP project [the Ilkerin Project]. After allegations that these funds had been misused, there developed a rift between the two individuals and their allies, and it was this rift that was mirrored in the factions in the later Loita Forest conflict.’
The view of the Olorte group
Against this backdrop, the Narok County Council conflict can be seen in a different light: it was just one battle in a longer-standing political war between two Loita leaders over authority and control in Loita. Supporters of the co-opted councillor claimed that the project director and his group had actually provoked the whole forest conflict as part of a deliberate campaign to discredit the co-opted councillor in the run-up to the 1992 elections, which he lost. It was not the new councillor who was to blame for his defeat, but the project director: ‘[the co-opted councillor] was not seeing the hand of [the elect- ed councillor] anywhere, he was seeing the hand of [the project leader]’.68 The personal vendetta between the two men, and not the forest, was, according to the Olorte group, the main motivation behind this political attack. The campaign against the co-opted councillor hinged on a letter that the co-opted councillor had allegedly drafted after agreeing with Ntimama and the Narok South MP that the Naimina Enkiyio Forest was to be demarcated for gazettement (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 8, 11; Adano et al. 2012: 75; Zaal & Adano 2012: 203). The letter stated that the Loita had agreed and it was to serve as proof that the Loita had been consulted on the Narok County Council plan. The Olorte group, however, claimed that the whole campaign was based on groundless ru- mours and had a different explanation for the famous letter.
It all started with another intervention by a different environmental organization called the Kenya Indigenous Forest Conservation programme (KIFCON) that had been established in 1991 and was supported by the UK’s ODA (now the Department for In- ternational Development or DfID) (Kronenburg García 2003: 93-94). KIFCON was a component of the Kenya Forestry Development Project (KFDP) and its mandate was the management of indigenous forests, which is why it was interested in the Naimina Enkiyio Forest.69 It appears that KIFCON approached the Ilkerin Project in 1992, as- suming that the project leaders were the representatives of the Loita community, with the idea of developing a forest management and conservation project (Karanja et al. 2002: 30). After consulting the leaders of the Ilkerin Project, KIFCON proceeded to send out a letter to the legal trustees, i.e. Narok County Council, requesting an alloca- tion of nearly 400 km2 of forest land for the project. The Ilkerin people later photocop- ied this letter and circulated it within Loita in the run-up to the 1992 elections, while spreading rumours that the co-opted councillor, who was the elected Loita councillor at the time, had drafted this letter and was ‘selling the forest’.70
From this long-term perspective, the KIFCON programme, and not the Narok Coun- ty Council plan, was the first forest intervention to trigger conflict in Loita. The Olorte group claims that Narok County Council only became a player in the fight when their authority over the forest was challenged by the formation of the Trust Company (see also ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 273; Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 10). The County Council’s
68 Interview NB: 17/8/12.
69 The KFDP started much earlier, in 1987. Apart from ODA/UK, the KFDP was also financed by the
World Bank, the Swiss Development Corporation, the Finnish Development Association (Finnida) and the Government of Kenya.
70 Interview ML: 1/10/01. The KIFCON programme stopped its activities in June 1994. The reason for
its early termination was mainly political (Forster et al. 1997: 19). One informant of the Olorte group suggested that Ntimama had been behind the termination of KIFCON.
indignation is evident from Minute 52/93 of the September 1993 Narok County Council meeting: ‘The Clerk to Council informed the Council that a private company has been formed with intention to take over the responsibility of Management of the above forest from the Narok County Council’ (CCD ‘Notice of Motion’: (1a)), and the motive for requesting the deregistration of the Trust Company during the court case (see Ibid.: 1(b)). The County Council’s forest gazettement plan was a way of reaffirming their au- thority over the forest. According to the co-opted councillor, the Trust Company intend- ed ‘to give’ the job of forest conservation to Richard Leakey, the then director of the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS).71 His side of the story emphasizes that it was the KWS (and not the County Council) that wanted to take control of the forest. The KWS, the Trust Company and the Ilkerin people (and not himself, Ntimama and Narok County Council) were the ones planning the disappropriation of the forest.
The Trust Company not only irritated Narok County Council but was also heavily criticized by members of the Olorte group. They questioned the assumption that every Loita was automatically represented in the Trust Company (Karanja et al. 2002: 33; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 275-276; Ngece et al. 2007: 177). But they were particularly un- happy about the ‘company’ status of the Trust Company, claiming it was a way for a few business-minded Loita individuals to try to own the forest and exclude all others. In this context, interviewees referred to the Kamorora Group Ranch case (see Chapter 5). After having signed a twenty-year lease with Stein in 1986, its legal status was trans- ferred to one of a company called Nguruman Limited Company, with the former group ranch members becoming the company’s owners. The land was divided into equal parts that represented shares in the company. Key informants claim that Stein had master- minded this move so that he could gain ownership rights over the land by buying land shares from other members, which he did, and now virtually owns and uses the land as