Personal Support

In addition to circumstances where material support would suffice, we can imagine circumstances where personal intervention in the family life of a child is required in order to ensure that a child has a reasonable chance at a desirable existence. For instance, consider again the case where a parent decides that certain biblical passages prohibit the consumption of blood, and on this basis refuses to permit his child to receive treatment that involves a blood transfusion.182 In this case, there is no way to intervene to protect the child from harm without interfering in the private parent-child relationship. Insisting on providing the blood transfusion would necessarily interfere with the parent’s ability to involve his child in a life lived together in accordance with the religious beliefs the parent holds sacred. At least according to some authors, the ability of parents to involve their children in their religious beliefs is an important part of the intimate parent-

182

This situation has arisen several times with Jehovah’s Witnesses, who believe that blood transfusions are impermissible. The courts have ruled that in these cases, the state is authorized to take temporary custody of the child, so that the procedure can be performed. See B(R) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto.

child relationship (though this does not mean that the right to do so is absolute and indefeasible).183

Like in the case of material support discussed previously, we can distinguish between cases where the gamete provider has an involved ongoing relationship with his biological offspring through which he becomes aware of the pressing need, and cases where there is minimal or no contact whatsoever. First consider cases where the gamete provider has an ongoing relationship with his offspring and has first-hand knowledge that the child is at risk. Here the gamete provider would have a responsibility to try and persuade the parent to reconsider his decision about the medical treatment. If this form of intervention proves unsuccessful, the gamete provider would then have a responsibility to challenge the parenting decision formally by contacting the child welfare agency and raising concerns about the appropriateness of the parent’s medical decision. The responsibility to seek state intervention rather than act unilaterally arises for the reasons discussed in the section on pre-provision responsibility: most importantly the need for an agreed-upon method for resolving conflicts between individuals who each have a

responsibility to ensure that the child’s welfare needs are met. However, in cases where the harm is imminent, for instance the parent was about to attempt an extremely

dangerous and unscientific ‘alternative’ therapy, the gamete provider would have the responsibility to remove the child from the dangerous circumstances (if able), and then contact the appropriate authorities to determine how to proceed.

Note that gamete providers of course do not have the authority to make unilateral determinations about the overall suitability of their biological offspring’s parents. Even

183

Mills, Claudia. "The Child's Right to an Open Future?" Journal of Social Philosophy. 34.4 (2003): 499- 509.

in cases where temporary removal of their biological offspring is warranted, or when the child welfare agency agrees that a particular parental decision ought to be challenged, it might be appropriate overall for parental responsibility and authority to remain with the child’s existing parent(s). For instance, in the case of the blood transfusion, the state might decide to temporarily remove the child from the custody of his parent in order to perform the medical procedure, then return the child back to the care of his parent.184

In extreme cases, the child welfare authority might determine that the child should not be returned to the custody of his parent. However, since gamete providers are not under an obligation to necessarily parent their biological offspring themselves (as discussed in chapter 3), so long as a competent person can be found to do so, there is no need for gamete providers to parent themselves. However, in cases where gamete providers are able to parent competently, and no other competent person can be found, then gamete providers would have a responsibility to parent their biological offspring.185 I further think that in cases where there is a meaningful relationship between a gamete provider and his biological offspring, and the child’s parent(s) are deemed no longer fit, parental claims made by the gamete provider ought to be given preferred status.

However, giving a complete account of how to respond to such claims is beyond the scope of this work.

It is worth noting that cases where it seems appropriate for involved gamete providers to become their offspring’s parents are not distant theoretical possibilities. In a recent case in California, In Re M.C., the court lamented that because there was no special legal recognition of non-parental progenitors, a young child would have to be

184

This is in fact what has been done in cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses. op. cit.

185

placed in foster care rather than with a genetic progenitor who had displayed interest in helping raise her.186 This case involved a lesbian couple who, due to a series of

unpleasant and unfortunate events, became unable to care for M.C.. M.C. was conceived during a previous relationship between M.C.’s mother, Melissa, and her then partner, Jesus. Jesus had helped care for Melissa while she was pregnant, and had voluntarily provided child support to Melissa and M.C. at various times. However, since Jesus was not a legal parent187, he had no standing to request custody when M.C.’s parents were no longer able to care for her. Consequently, M.C. was placed in the far-from-ideal foster- care system. In response to this case, California passed legislation permitting the

recognition of more than two legal parents, so that situations like this could be avoided in the future.188 Though not a gamete provision case, it is not a significant departure from the relevant facts to imagine Jesus as a willing gamete provider who had limited

involvement in the life of his genetic offspring.

According to my view then, gamete providers who have some meaningful involvement in the lives of their biological offspring have a responsibility to try and convince their offspring’s parents to reconsider parenting decisions that they think are deeply problematic. In cases where this intervention is not successful, gamete providers have a responsibility to contact child welfare authorities and formally challenge the parenting decisions that they deem problematic. In extreme cases where parents pose an immediate danger to the child, gamete providers have the responsibility to remove their offspring from these situations, but then must contact the child welfare authorities about

186_{In Re M.C.} 187

Jesus had no legal standing because, at the time, the law only permitted a child to have two legal parents, and MC already had two legal parents: Melissa and her partner.

188

how to proceed. Furthermore, in cases where their offspring’s parents are deemed no longer competent to parent, and no other competent person can be found, gamete

providers have the responsibility to parent their biological offspring. Let me now briefly turn to cases where there is little or no contact between gamete providers and their offspring.

In cases where there is no meaningful relationship between gamete providers and their offspring, gamete providers will generally not have first-hand information about the well-being of their biological offspring. This is especially true in cases where anonymity is maintained between gamete providers and intending parents. In these kinds of cases, gamete providers’ responsibility would be limited to responding to requests from the state to care for their biological offspring, either temporarily or permanently. In the event that no other person was willing and capable to provide this care, on my view gamete

providers would have the responsibility to do so.