Phase 5: Interstate war of 1948

END OF THE MANDATE – DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

May 14, 1948, marked the day before the end of the British Mandate of Palestine. While violence had already spread throughout the mandate area, many feared termination of the mandate would result in increased levels of violence, involving the regular armies of the Arab-League members. In the afternoon of May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the state of Israel from Tel Aviv. King Abdulla of Jordan declared himself commander-in-chief of all Arab forces, a declaration that was largely ignored by non-Transjordanian forces, leaving the Arab forces divided and unorganized (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). The United Nations Security Council appointed the Swedish diplomat Count Bernadotte as a mediator on May 20, assigned to negotiate a truce agreement between the warring parties in Palestine (Touval, 1982). The United States de-facto recognized the state of Israel on May 14, although de-jure recognition would only follow in January 31, 1949. The Soviet Union recognized Israel de jure at May 17, 1948. Britain refrained from recognition of Israel, as this might result in a treaty obligation towards Transjordan and Iraq to declare war on Israel. Formal recognition by Britain would only follow in April 1950.

111 OPENING – INVASION

Figure 3 Source: www.westpoint.edu/history/SitePages/Arab%20Israel.aspx (retrieved 11-01-2016)

The British Mandate formally ended on May 15, 1948. And as expected the Arab states set in motion their attack plans, with their regular armies attacking the newly proclaimed state of Israel. Dupuy (1978, p. 46), argues the Lebanese-Syrian invasion of the northernmost part of Palestine, is an example of successful Arab coordination at the tactical level. With the Lebanese attacking from the West, and the Syrians attacking from the East, both on the southern parts of the Huleh valley, the landmass could easily be cut off from the Israeli supply lines. Despite successful initial Israeli counterattacks, the valley would fall in Arab hands in

112 early June, breaking the defensive line to the central Galilee (Dupuy, 1978). Besides the attack on the southern Huleh valley, Syrian forces also advanced south of the sea of Galilee, towards the town of Tiberias. The Syrian contingent consisted of infantry supported by armoured cars, tanks, and artillery.

The Iraqi forces had aimed at taking Nablus, where the Arab Liberation Army headquarter was operating from, and captured towns as far west as Jenin. Israeli counterattacks were at first mainly focussed at Jenin, but met with superior Iraqi forces. Although the Israeli counterattacks succeeded in capturing ground north of Jenin, Jenin itself was occupied by Iraqi armour and infantry, supported by Iraq Air Force assets, elements of the Iraqi forces advanced and reached the coast, cutting the lines of communication between Haifa and Tel Aviv. The Arab Legion, the regular army of Transjordan, crossed the Jordan River and started occupying territory in Judea and Samaria, with its armoured units reaching Jerusalem the same day (O’Balance, 1957). By May 17, one of the Transjordanian brigades had occupied the area around Latrun, securing the lines of communication between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The second brigade assaulted the Israeli settlements in Judea and the towns around Jerusalem, such as Bethlehem. The battle for Jerusalem itself had been going on since February by mainly irregular soldiers, and would increase in intensity with the arrival of the Arab Legion brigades.

The Egyptian forces in the Negev region had consisted of Muslim Brotherhood volunteers, some Saudi-Arabian volunteers, and the regular Egyptian army units. The volunteers were ordered to raid the Negev settlements, while the Egyptian air force and army focussed on advancing over Gaza towards Ashdod and Tel Aviv (Dupuy, 1978). As the Negev was sparsely populated, the local Hagana units had a small population pool to draw its forces from. Egyptian motorized units, part of the Negev taskforce, took Beersheba on May 17, and was able to push through to Bethlehem at May 20. The coastal advance reached Ashdod on May 29. The Israeli Brigades had prepared defences, but were eventualy driven out by the combination of Egyptian infantry, artillery, armour and airpower. The Battle for Ashdod also marked one of the first deployment of the Israeli air force, which by know possessed 4 World War II fighter planes.

TRUCE – BERNADOTTE MEDIATIONS

Negotiations at the United Nations had not resulted in a peaceful acceptance of resolution 181, or any other peaceful solution. At the 20th of May, the Swedish diplomat Folke Bernadotte

113 was officially appointed as a mediator by the United Nations. After intense negotiations, he managed to attain a truce agreement which would start at June 11 for four weeks, until July 9 (Dupuy, 1978). While both sides in the conflict could benefit from a truce, according to Dupuy (1978) and Touval (1982) both actually badly needed a truce, as most actors were about to collapse. None of the militaries were mature organizations, and some, especially the Arabs were dealing with long logistical lines. The truce included a ceasefire and five additional conditions; “Neither would attempt to improve its military position; there was to be no movement of troop or materiel; no new fighting forces were to be introduced by either side; no immigrants of military age were to be allowed into Palestine, except with the specific approval of the UN mediator; finally, Jerusalem was to be supplied by convoy under supervision of the International Red Cross” (Dupuy, 1978, p. 67). None of the extra conditions were adhered to by either party, with the Red Cross convoys to Jerusalem as an exception, as most were allowed unhindered access.

All parties used the truce to their benefit, but in general adhered to the ceasefire. As of June 1, Israel had officially instated conscription and a central commanded Israeli Defence force (IDF), although the de-facto institution had suffered from the inability for reorganisations to take place during the Arab advances on all fronts (Dupuy, 1978). During the truce the Altalena affair took place (see Jewish perspective, phase 5), resulting in final absorption of the Irgun units in the IDF.

The Arab forces, although better organized needed the truce on the tactical level mainly to regroup, organize and supply the forces. On the strategic level, victory still seemed the most likely scenario, especially considering the UN involvement, renegotiating resolution 181 seemed possible. However, as Bernadotte presented his proposal for an armistice, in which Israel would be allowed to keep the conquered Galilee, and the Arabs the Negev, this was rejected by both sides (Touval, 1982). While Israel feared the diplomatic efforts, and fully appreciated having delivered an extraordinary feat of diplomacy on resolution 181, it preferred to continue fighting over and extension of the truce. This despite still lacking severely in heavy weapons. The Israeli forces did have a positive outlook, as they knew military equipment had been procured in Europe and was on its way. In this respect, from a military perspective, the Bernadotte truce could give enough respite for the equipment to actually arrive. To the Arab countries, the Bernadotte plan was unacceptable, as the plan was still based on the existence of a Jewish state. Despite not succeeding in agreeing on a strategic plan or central command, the Arabs had achieved large military successes before the truce,

114 and assumed that renewed fighting would further strengthen their position militarily and thus diplomaticly.

TEN DAYS OF WAR

Figure 4 Source: www.westpoint.edu/history/SitePages/Arab%20Israel.aspx (retrieved: 11-01-2016)

As both the Arabs and Israel had prepared offensives for when the truce would expire, fighting immediately commenced. The Israeli focus was securing the lines of communication with Western Jerusalem, were still a large community and a small fighting force were surrounded and cut off from supplies by the Arab forces. After the lines of communication to

115 Jerusalem were secured, the IDF would advance into the Negev, were many small settlements were overrun or surrounded by Egyptian regular or irregular forces. On the other fronts, the IDF would maintain a defensive posture. The defensive posture did not prohibit small scale offensive operations in order to take advantage of weaknesses in the Arab tactical situation. The IDF had inducted a small number of ten light tanks and three medium tanks, and formed some mechanized units based on halftracks. A small artillery unit had also been established, possessing some decade old European guns. The IDF air force, which before the truce had mainly consisted of agricultural and logistic airplanes, had by now acquired a few fighters from Europe and produced a few makeshift bombers.

The operation to secure the lines of communication with western Jerusalem, had as secondary goal to create and secure the tactical position to be able to take the old city. The operation, spearheaded by the new armoured unit of the IDF, was able to effectively outmanoeuvre the Arab forces, and secure the objective. Although the positions at Latrun, which were held by armoured units of the Arab Legion, was not taken, the corridor to Jerusalem was sufficiently secured. The Israeli units stationed in the Jerusalem area attempted a few assaults on the Old city, but although the walls were penetrated, no terrain was held. At the start of the second truce at July 17, the units withdrew to their positions outside the Old City.

The Israeli situation on the southern front was less secure. Egypt had brought in massive reinforcements, moved their headquarters to Gaza, and with the Egyptian air force effectively able to operate all over the Negev and southern Palestines, able to reach Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, the Egyptian position was strong. The Egyptians launched a large scale offensive (Dupuy, 1978). The Egyptians controlled the line from Ashdod to Hebron, and had elements advance as far north as Bethlehem. The main aim of the Egyptian offensive was to ensure the lines of communications between its brigades, and secure the Negev, where still a few Israeli battalions were operating, and many Israeli settlements still held out, forming a potential danger to the Egyptian supply lines. The objective of the Israeli offensive was the recapture of Ashdod and to secure lines of communication with the Negev outposts.

The Egyptian assault on the Negev front commenced 36 hours before the official end of the ceasefire (Dupuy, 1978). Although the Egyptians initially succeeded in securing outposts, and securing their control over the Negev roads, the settlement of Negba, close to Ashkelon, successfully defended their position. After 24 hours of fighting, the Egyptians retreated to regroup and plan a new assault. The commander of the Egyptian expeditionary force Mawawi

116 created a new plan, which included reinforcing the assault with additional units and executing two diversionary attacks. Brigade commander Naguib, who was tasked with executing the renewed assault on Negba, refused this order, as he considered the operational concept not to be effective. After relieving Naguib of command, the assault commenced, but failed after incurring heavy casualties. At the start of the second truce, the Israeli’s had improved their position marginally at the expense of the Egyptians, who had lost control over some vital roads for their east-west connection. Losing two large battles consecutively, combined with the issue in the line of command, decreased Egyptian morale (Bell, 1977; Dupuy, 1978) As circumstance had allowed for the IDF units on the northern front to advance, operation Brosh was launched, aimed at destroying the mainly Syrian forces east of the river Jordan (Dupuy, 1978). This operation failed as the Syrians effectively counterattacked, driving the IDF back to their starting positions. The Arab Liberation Army, which held positions in the Galilee, mainly around Nazareth, had planned two attacks on the Israeli positions. The Objective of the offence was to simultaneously capture Acre to the West, and Tiberias to the East, allowing free communications with the Syrians. The first offensive of the Arab Liberation Army was supported by Syrian artillery and air support, but failed to take any Israeli positions. As the IDF had been preparing a counterattack, this could immediately be executed, and mainly consisted out of taking defensible ground, in order to provoke an Arab counterattack. This tactic was successfully deployed, and when the second truce went into effect, the Arab Liberation Army, had ceased to be an effective fighting force. Moreover, as the Lebanese had not supported the Arab Liberation Army, the Israeli’s assessed that the Lebanese were either content with their current positions in the northern Galilee, or were simply unable to advance further.

TRUCE – BERNADOTTE ASSASSINATION

The second truce was enforced by the UN Security council at July 18, threatening sanctions on any actor breaking the truce (Dupuy, 1978). Bernadotte had from the beginning suffered from a lack of trust from both the Arab and the Jewish actors, as both accused him of acting in favour of the other party (Touval, 1982). Had Bernadotte intended the proposal during the first truce to serve as basis for discussion, this time his proposal was for an enforced settlement. His conviction was that an imposed solution could succeed, and was the only real alternative to combat, as currently none of the parties felt willing to negotiate a compromise. His proposal entailed that the Arab part of Palestine would be annexed by Transjordan, Israel

117 would receive a corridor to Jerusalem, which itself would become an international zone under control of the UN. Bernadotte did identify the difficulty in reaching a solution, as the Arab leaders were highly divided on the issue, and American and British support did not come forth. As opposed to during the first truce, this time all actors massively violated the ceasefire, although no offensive operations were conducted.

The renewed Bernadotte plan was altered, the Israeli corridor to international Jerusalem was scrapped from the agreement. Anglo-American consent began to form over the new proposal, and with the UN General Assembly due to meet in September, could be pressed and secured during that meeting (Touval, 1982). The new proposal was lacking in detail, such as it only stated that borders “should be established” (Touval, 1982, p. 47). To this end Bernadotte advised to discuss the plan at the General Assembly meeting, were a commission could be assembled that would negotiate an agreement that would be acceptable to both parties. Both the Arabs and the Israeli’s opposed the current proposal.

Lehi, a terrorist group that was not part of the defence forces of Israel and was not part of or imbedded in the state, feared that the Israeli provisionary government would accept the Bernadotte proposal, or that the United Nations would enforce the proposal through military or economic means. As it was perceived both by Lehi and the Soviet Union as a British strategy to regain control over Palestine (Touval, 1982), Lehi acted to prevent the proposal from becoming reality. While moving through Jerusalem, Bernadotte was assassinated by a Lehi hit team on September 17. Bernadotte was succeeded by his deputy, Ralph Bunche. While his renewed proposal was put on the agenda of the UN General Assembly meeting, it was not accepted, as American support began to waiver in response to internal domestic political pressure.

While extension of the truce had been considered a realistic option to most players, all expected, or at least prepared for, an end to the truce. In truth, according to Touval (1982), it was also true that none of the actors actually preferred continuation of the conflict. However, extension of the truce, which Bernadotte aimed at as a path to an armistice agreement, could only be agreed upon by the parties if this could lead to a political solution. While both the Arab and Israeli government did not foresee this outlook of a political solution, both recognized that negotiation would be held based on territory held, as opposed to territory allotted under resolution 181 (Dupuy, 1978). Most aggressive in assessing the need for

118 increased territory holdings was Egypt, which strengthened its position in the Negev considerably.

THE FINAL OFFENSIVES

Figure 5 Source: www.westpoint.edu/history/SitePages/Arab%20Israel.aspx (Retrieved 11-01-2016)

119 The second truce was crumbling over Arab and Israeli unwillingness to extend, and small scale violations of the ceasefire were commonplace throughout the frontline. As Egypt had continued to strengthen its forces in the Sinai, which now totalled over 18.000 soldiers, and had prepared for renewed offensives (Dupuy, 1978). The ten days between the first and the second truce, had shown Arab unwillingness to cooperate on any front. The IDF general staff had recognized this division amongst Arab forces, especially during manoeuvres against the Arab Liberation Army in the Galilee, and now sought to exploit this weakness. Israel also assessed king Abdullah to be content with control over the Western parts of the territories that were allocated to the Arabs under the resolution 181 partition plan. For this reason, the Israeli’s predicted a defensive stance from the Arab Legion, and thus could focus its main attention on offensives against the Egyptians.

In order to relieve the Israeli outposts in the Negev, and assure Israeli control, operation Yoav, also called operation ten plagues, was created (Kurzman, 1970). In preparation for the operation, the IDF had strengthened its forces in the Negev through convoys and airlift assets. The Egyptian positions regularly opened fire on the Israeli convoys, and thereby violated the ceasefire. During the truce both sides improved their positions, preparing for the coming offensive, but no large scale operations were conducted. It did however provide the IDF with the excuse to break the truce, and on October 15, a convoy was send to supply the Jewish Negev communities. As expected, the Egyptians opened fire, and destroyed several vehicles, forcing the convoy to retreat. This delivered Israel the excuse to launch operation Yoav, Egypt had broken the truce and Israel needed to secure its lines of communication with the settlements. The general concept op operation was to take out the Egyptian air force, and then penetrate deep into the desert in order to obstruct the Egyptian supply lines, in preparation for assaults in the Egyptian positions.

The Egyptian resistance was fierce, and the IDF had to adapt their plan accordingly. As the IDF managed to open a corridor to the Negev, this allowed them to effectively threaten the Egyptian forces at Ashdod with encirclement. As a result, the Egyptian command decided to withdraw south (Kurzman, 1970). The corridor also allowed to bring in more units to the Negev, and thus allowed an assault on the town of Beersheba, in turn cutting of the Egyptian forces that were deployed around Hebron. King Abdullah instructed his forces not to relieve