PHILOSOPHERS AND CHILDREN

In the past only limited attention has been paid to children by philosophers. David Archard describes Locke’s writings on children as

“…typical of most philosophers in that his account of childhood has to be extracted from scattered remarks and is not to be found explicitly and systematically expressed in a single work. Moreover what Locke has to say about children in one context does not always sit easily with what he has to say about them in another. These tensions are due to writing about children from different perspectives.” [Archard, 2004; 1]. More recently, some philosophers and ethicists have paid more attention to children and parents. Some aspects, in particular parenthood and children's rights, have

attracted more attention, but others, such as what distinguishes children from adults, or what counts as a child’s welfare, have been neglected.

More generally, philosophers have created (and other philosophers have criticised) accounts of how people interact (or should interact) and in doing this have

concentrated on adults, seen as persons (in a technical, philosophical, sense) acting with moral agency and moral responsibility. Children are usually ignored. This has lead to two problems. Firstly, the way that children fit into the ethical schemes that have been constructed for adults is unexamined. Regan asks “Why have most moral philosophers failed to pay much attention to ethical questions about the treatment of children?” [Regan, 1989: 203]. Ruddick recognised the problem and gives a reason for its presence: “We do not think clearly about parents and children...There is also a metaphysical cause of confusion: children become distinct beings only gradually...We have no criteria apart from legal convention for deciding when in pregnancy there are two human bodies rather than just one, or when in adolescence there are two distinct lives, that of the ‘child’ and that of the parent(s), independently pursuable.” [Ruddick, 1979: 124]. The second problem is that it is just accepted that children and adults are different, but that what justifies the distinction in the way that children and adults are treated remains mainly unexamined. Schrag writes “...an enormous philosophical weight is made to rest on the adult/child distinction, yet the basis of the distinction is left unexamined” [Schrag, 1977: 169]. Part of the reason for this is that the interactions involved in ethics are characterised in different ways (I have drawn attention to

autonomy, contractualism and virtue ethics in the previous chapter: there are many more) and the distinction between adults and children would need to be characterised

differently for each scheme. Within many of the approaches to ethics there is often a dichotomy of ‘persons and things’. Beings that are not persons are treated as non- persons, but within non-persons are an enormous range of beings, amongst which are children, bonobos, dolphins and spiders42. It is unlikely that this diverse group should be treated in the same ways. A more nuanced approach is needed.

In philosophical approaches to children, two broad approaches can be discerned, firstly that children are seen in some sense as their parent’s property. The second is that children are special, as they are potential persons and so demand to be treated in almost the same way that persons would be treated. I will then discuss what

philosophers have said about the distinction between adults and children.

Children as Owned Contrasted with Children as Potential Persons

In discussion of children two concepts are prevalent, but difficult to reconcile one with another. The first conception is that children ‘belong’ to, or are owned by, their

parents. Aristotle described this in several different ways: “...a parent is fond of his children because he regards them as something of himself.” followed by “…a person regards what comes from him as his own as the owner regards his tooth or hair...” and “A parent then, loves his children as [he loves] himself. For what has come from him is a sort of other himself…” [Aristotle Book VIII Chapter 12]. More recently, Nozick wrote of children as being “...part of one’s substance” [Nozick, 1989: 28]. That parents reproduce through their children and do not just produce their children reinforces the link between parents and child, and the perception that parents have authority to mould their child in particular ways. It is these thoughts that are underlined by the statements describing a child as ‘…a chip off the old block…’ or remarking of a child ‘…the apple doesn’t fall far from the tree…’alongside ‘…she is her mother’s daughter…’.

42 _{“To say that a being is a person is merely to say that the being has morally significant}

interests, that the principle of equal consideration applies to that being, that the being is not a thing…for the moral universe is limited to only two kinds of beings: persons and things. “Quasi-persons’ or ‘things plus’ will necessarily risk being treated as things because the principle of equal consideration cannot apply to them” [Francione, 2004: 131]. Francione’s solution (discussing animal rights) is to elevate the status of animals to that of (non-human) persons. This leaves the dichotomy of persons and things. Children challenge any

The sense is that children are part of their parents, they are not separate individuals. And from the ownership comes authority, Hobbes wrote

“…children therefore, whether they be brought up and preserved by the father, or by the mother, or whomsoever, are in the most absolute subjection to him or her…and they may alienate them, that is, assign his or her domination, by selling them or giving them in adoption or servitude to others; or pawn them for hostages, kill them for

rebellion, or sacrifice them for peace…” [Hobbes, 1640: paragraph 8 Chapter 23].

These claims suggest that children are almost owned by their parents, and so are not individuals in their own right. Following on from this it suggests that parents have authority over their children (as they would over their own property) and that others, and indeed children themselves, should not interfere with decisions that parents make for their children.

The second important conception is that children are special: they have potential, children will become persons and persons cannot be owned. Children will almost inevitably become persons. And if so they are ‘special’ analogously to the way that persons are special. Locke stated this second concept clearly in recognising the limits to parental authority:

Children, I confess, are not born in this full state of equality, though they are born to it. Their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them, when they come into the world, and for some time after; but it is but a temporary one. The bonds of this subjection are like the swaddling clothes they are wrapped in, and supported by, in the weakness of their infancy: age and reason as they grow up, loosen them, till at length they drop quite off, and leave a man at his own free disposal. [Locke, 1689: § 55, Locke’s italics]

Locke’s approach contrasts with the concept of child as ‘owned’ by their parents. And more recently his approach was echoed by Schapiro, “Our basic concept of a child is that of a person who in some fundamental way is not yet developed, but who is in the process of developing.” [Schapiro,1999: 716]. Because a child will become a person, a child deserves special treatment. Children are not like other things that are owned by their parents, distinct even from the animals their parents own, because the child will become a person. Because they are developing, children cannot be treated as persons, but because children will become persons there must be particular constraints in the way that we treat children. Together both are important concepts for children, but the different conceptions are stronger at opposite ends of childhood - ownership for young

children, developing persons for older children. But both are present throughout childhood.

One approach is wrong: sometimes, children seem to drop out of sight altogether. Narveson gives an example of this. He grounds responsibilities to children in our responsibilities to each other, or society more broadly “...our rights against each other, as adults, are the proper source of rights for children. Children are potential adults. To treat them well is to set them on the road to being the sort of adults we want to have around, to treat them badly is virtually to invite them to become the sort of people we don't want around. Parents who fail towards their children are parents who fail their neighbours and fellow humans, as well, of course, as the adults those children become when they grow up.” [Narveson,1999: 269 (his italics)]. There are many different claims at work in Narveson’s arguments, but a thrust of his claim is that the child herself is not the focus of consideration. Regan criticises the sort of approach in which children are not considered directly, arguing that this misses the fact that children themselves can be wronged, it is not just that others around the children can be

wronged (for example the child’s parents who ‘own’ the child). Children deserve to be recognised directly for themselves [Regan, 1989]. Narveson’s approach, and others like it, will not work. Others express similar claims to Narveson’s but allow

acknowledgment of the child in her own right “...we must face the problem that a newborn is a different sort of individual than an adult - more of a stand-in for a person-yet-to-be than a person already.” [Brody, 1988: 39].

These arguments produce the conflicting requirements that children should be treated with the same significance that a person should be treated (for example that a child’s right to life is the equal of an adult's right to life), and yet at the same time children cannot be treated in the way that adults are (their decisions may be overridden, and they cannot consent as adults may) because they are immature. A straightforward demonstration of this problem is the way in which the rights in the Children's Rights Convention Rights are different to, and distinct from, the rights listed in the

Declaration of Human Rights. And the conflict between these requirements is compounded by the gradual growth and development of children into adults so the

point at which an individual becomes an adult is not marked by a distinct objective change. Children must be recognised as developing persons43.

Distinguishing Adults From Children

I have described the dichotomy of adults and children. What distinguishes children from adults, justifying the difference between the ways that they are treated? I will consider two responses to this distinction. The first is to deny that there is a difference between adults and children. The second is to base the distinction on reasoning or capabilities. The most plausible approach is one that depends on practical reasoning, though even this approach is an incomplete justification of the way that children are treated.

Denial: Child Liberationists

The first response is to deny that there are important differences between children and adults and that there is no justification for the different approaches, as the child liberationists do44 [Holt, 1974; Farson, 1974; Franklin, 1986]. Broadly, child liberationists take a rights-based approach to argue that children should have all the rights that adults have. “I propose instead that the rights, privileges, duties,

responsibilities of adult citizens be made available to any young person of whatever age, who wants to make use of them.”45 [Holt, 1974: 1, Holt's italics]. Children's liberation advocates were most vocal in 1970’s America, arguing that the then current child-rearing practices had been influenced by past abuses of children - such as child labour. On this view, the responses to past abuses of children had been such that children were now over protected, and were harmed by being overprotected. The segregation of children from the adult world allowed children to be treated wrongly. There were many different reasons for this. In protecting children from participation in the adult world, children were unable to develop their abilities and were thereby

43 _{Children are “...developing beings whose moral status gradually changes” [Archard &}

Macleod, 2002: 4].

44 _{“Children must have the right to full participation in society...valued for themselves not just}

as potential adults” [Farson, 1974: 3].

45 _{Holt distinguishes between having a right and having a right available, but what lies in this}

distinction is, is not made clear. A feature of many rights is that they are available. A right holder is not obliged to demand the fulfillment of the right: a right holder may waive the right, or negotiate the terms of the right and so on.

infantilised. In preventing children working, children were unable to become self- sufficient. In law, once the processes of protection were invoked the child was lost in a Kafkaesque world of paternalistic officialdom. A child would be better protected by having rights equivalent to an adult’s rights (this is comprehensively, though

polemically, described in the first and second sections of Gross & Gross, 1977 and de Mause, 1974). The special ‘protections’ afforded to children contributed further to the problems they suffered.

Liberationists used two ways to argue for equal rights for children. Firstly, they argued for equal rights for children on libertarian grounds “...self-determination is at the heart of children's liberation. It is, in fact, the only issue, a definition of the entire concept.” [Farson, 1974: 27]. Their second approach was to argue that the differences between adults and children are exaggerated and do not justify treating children differently from adults.

The first approach is a variant of liberalism. Farson writes “…asking what is good for children is beside the point. We will grant children rights for the same reason we grant rights to adults, not because we are sure that children will then become better people, but for more ideological reasons...expanding freedom as a way of life is worthwhile in itself” [Farson, 1974: 31]. This is a political or philosophical position, prioritising freedom in contrast to the usual approach that a child's well-being should be the concern,46 not the child's liberty. The child liberationists criticised the conventional welfare-protecting approach as “...more committed to the protection of children than to the protection of their rights.” [Farson, 1974: 74].

There are many problems with the liberationists’ approach. Firstly, a newborn baby is not free to choose in any meaningful sense. A baby of this age could not choose whether to stay with birth parents or to be adopted, or if abandoned at birth to choose between potential adoptive parents. And even for older children, freedom may be

46 _{In the preamble to the original version of the Children's Rights Convention it states}

“...mankind owes to the child the best it has to give” [United Nations, 1959]. In the current version of the Declaration the commitment to the “…best it has to give” is watered down to “The child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care…” [United Nations, 1989].

inadvisable as others may take advantage of their immaturity: ‘freedom for the pike is death to the minnow’ [Tawney, 1931: 208]. A further objection to rights for young children lies in Farson's use of self-determination. For at least some children (again a baby will serve), there isn't a self in the idea of a being that has awareness of itself as the same person continuing through time. And even for older children, the 'self' is not fully formed. A child’s values will likely change as they grow. Allowing children's decisions to stand will, in all likelihood, result in the adult that the child becomes (and others) regretting the decisions the child was allowed to make47_.

A third response is to agree with child liberationists that expanding freedom is

worthwhile, but to deny that granting freedom to children, when they are children, will increase their freedom. This point may be expressed using Berlin's two concepts of liberty. If children are given freedom (negative liberty) then they are free from control by their parents and other adults, but then children are less likely to develop the skills and self-control that are needed to choose one's own course throughout life (positive liberty) which will allow children to do the things that they would choose to do. The liberationist’s argument that we should expand freedom for children fails because children are different from adults. Increasing a child’s freedom (as negative liberty) will not increase the freedom (as positive liberty) that they have or will come to have in life [Purdy, 1992 and 1994]. For all of these reasons, the child liberationist’s first argument in favour of freedom for children as an end in itself fails.

A second way to argue for equal rights for children is to claim that children's abilities are similar to those of adults, and so claims that children are unable to make their own choices are exaggerated. If so, the justification for the distinction between adults and children (liberationists claim) does not exist. Evidence may be presented that the skills

47 _{“If children were regarded by law as the equal of adults, the result would be something}

infinitely worse than barbarism. It would involve a degree of cruelty to the young which can hardly be realized even in imagination” [Stephen quoted by Schrag, 1977: 174]. And in an example from medical ethics, a married 18 year old man with one child who had myasthenia gravis had a vasectomy after he himself had consented for it. He later claimed that as the age of majority was 21 he was unable to consent and sought damages because the procedure had been performed. He was unsuccessful [ Smith v Seibly 1967].

of older children are the same as the skills of adults48 though others disagree49. The liberationists then follow this with examples of the ways in which some adults make unwise choices in risk-taking, taking drugs or consuming alcohol to excess. That there is little difference between older children and adults may be true, but it is certainly not true for younger children. And for very young children there is no sense in which they can make a choice that is in any sense reasoned. The liberationist’s argument (if true) is not that there is no difference between adults and children but that there is no difference between some adults and some children. This argument claims that the dividing line between adults and children is wrong because it is arbitrary, or that it is in the wrong place. The argument that the distinction between adults and children is set at an arbitrary age may be true, but the response can be to try to set the distinction in the correct place, not to abolish it altogether. It is also true that an easily definable characteristic (like age) that distinguishes adult from child may well misclassify individuals, allowing some decisional authority too early (when they choose unwisely) and preventing others from having decisional authority when they are more than able50. Either way, the liberationists’ second argument against the distinction between adults and children fails51. When decisions, and especially medical decisions, are made for children, children are treated with regard to their interests, welfare or well-being. Adults, however, are recognised to be free to make their own self-regarding decision: they are autonomous.

Reasoning

So how may children be distinguished from adults? What justifies the difference in the