4-21. Security operations require the commander assigning the security mission and the security force commander to address a variety of special operational factors. These planning considerations are discussed in the following paragraphs.
AUGMENTATION OF SECURITY FORCES
4-22. When it is assigned to conduct a guard or screen mission, the company team may receive additional combat, CS, and CSS elements.
Attachments may include, but are not limited to, the following:
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A scout platoon.•
A mortar section or platoon.•
Additional tank or mechanized infantry platoons.•
Military intelligence (MI) surveillance assets. For example, these may include elements equipped with night vision devices (NVD).•
Associated CSS elements.ENEMY-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS
4-23. Security operations require the company team to deal with a unique set of enemy considerations. For example, the array of enemy forces (and the tactics that enemy commanders use to employ them) may be different from those for any other tactical operation the team will conduct. Additional enemy considerations that may influence company team security operations include, but are not limited to, the following:
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The presence or absence of specific types of forces on the battlefield, including the following:n Insurgent elements (not necessarily part of the enemy force).
n Enemy reconnaissance elements of different strength and capabilities (at divisional, regimental, or other levels).
n Enemy security elements (such as fighting patrols and security patrols).
n Enemy stay-behind elements or enemy elements that have been bypassed.
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Possible locations that the enemy will use to employ his tactical assets, including the following:n Reconnaissance and/or infiltration routes.
n OP sites for surveillance and/or indirect fire observers.
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Availability and/or anticipated employment of other enemy assets, including the following:n Surveillance devices such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or radar devices.
n Long-range rocket and artillery assets.
n Helicopter and fixed-wing air strikes.
n Elements capable of dismounted insertion and/or infiltration.
TIME THE SECURITY OPERATION IS INITIATED
4-24. The time by which the screen or guard must be set and active will influence the company team’s method of deploying to the security area as well as the time it begins the deployment.
RECONNAISSANCE OF THE SECURITY AREA
4-25. The company team commander uses a thorough analysis of METT-TC factors to determine the appropriate methods and techniques the company team will use in accomplishing this critical action.
NOTE: The commander must make every effort to conduct his own reconnaissance of the security area he expects the team to occupy, even when the operation is preceded by a zone reconnaissance by other task force elements.
MOVEMENT TO THE SECURITY AREA
4-26. In deploying elements to an area for a stationary security mission, the company team commander must deal with the competing requirements of establishing the security operation quickly to meet mission requirements and of providing the necessary level of local security in doing so. The team can move to the security area using one of two basic methods—a tactical road march or a movement to contact.
Either method should be preceded by a zone reconnaissance by the task force scout platoon. The following paragraphs examine considerations and procedures for the two methods of movement.
4-27. Tactical Road March. The company team conducts a tactical road march to a release point (RP) behind the security area. From that point, the platoons (or sections) deploy to occupy their initial positions.
This method of deployment is faster than a movement to contact, but less secure. It is appropriate when enemy contact is not expected or when time is critical.
4-28. Movement to Contact. The company team conducts a movement to contact from the LD to the security area. This method is slower than a tactical road march, but it is more secure. It is appropriate when time is not critical and either enemy contact is likely or the situation is unclear.
LOCATION AND ORIENTATION OF THE SECURITY AREA
4-29. The main body commander determines the location, orientation, and depth of the security area in which he wants the security force to operate. The security force commander conducts a detailed analysis of the terrain in the security area. He then establishes his initial dispositions (usually a screen line, even for a guard mission) as far forward as possible on terrain that allows clear observation of avenues of approach into sector. The initial screen line is depicted as a PL and sometimes represents the forward line of own troops (FLOT). As such, the screen line may be a restrictive control measure for movement; this requires the company team commander to conduct all necessary coordination if he decides to establish OPs or to perform reconnaissance forward of the line.
INITIAL OP LOCATIONS
4-30. The company team commander may deploy OPs to ensure effective surveillance of the sector and designated named areas of interest
(NAI). He will designate initial OP locations on or behind the screen line.
He should provide OP personnel with specific orientation and observation guidance, including, at a minimum, the primary orientation for the surveillance effort during the conduct of the screen. Once set on the screen line, the surveillance elements (normally, either scouts or infantrymen) will report their location. The element that occupies each OP always retains the responsibility for changing the location in accordance with tactical requirements and the commander’s intent and guidance for orientation. OPs may be either mounted or dismounted.
Mounted OPs allow use of vehicular optics and weapon systems and maximize speed of displacement, but are more easily detected by the enemy. Dismounted OPs maximize stealth.
WIDTH AND DEPTH OF THE SECURITY AREA
4-31. The company team sector is defined by lateral boundaries extending out to a limit of advance (LOA) (the initial screen line) forward of a rear boundary. The team’s ability to maintain depth through the sector decreases as the frontage increases.
SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS AND/OR CONSTRAINTS
4-32. The company team commander must specify any additional considerations for the security operation, including, but not limited to, the following:
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All requirements for observing NAIs, as identified by the task force.•
Any additional tactical tasks or missions that the company team and subordinate elements must perform.•
Engagement and disengagement criteria for all team elements.INDIRECT FIRE PLANNING
4-33. The company team commander conducts indirect fire planning to integrate artillery and mortar assets into the security operation. A wide sector may require him to position attached mortar assets where they can provide effective coverage of the enemy’s most likely axis of attack or infiltration route, as determined in his analysis of METT-TC. The commander should position the mortars so that up to two-thirds of their maximum range lies forward of the initial screen line. The company team FSO assists the commander in planning indirect fires to adequately cover any gaps in mortar coverage with artillery.
POSITIONING OF COMMAND AND CONTROL AND CSS ASSETS
4-34. The commander normally positions himself where he can observe the most dangerous enemy axis of attack or infiltration route on terrain that best facilitates C2. Usually, the company team will have a follow on mission such as a defense or reserve mission. The XO will normally be involved in the coordination and preparation of this follow on mission.
Otherwise, the XO may position himself on the second most dangerous enemy axis of attack or infiltration route. If the company team employs a CP, it is usually positioned in depth and centered in sector; this allows
but they remain close enough for rapid response. The trains are best sited along routes that afford good mobility laterally and in depth.
PATROL REQUIREMENTS
4-35. Patrols may be required to cover gaps between the OPs. The company team commander will task elements to conduct either mounted or dismounted patrols as required.
COORDINATION
4-36. The company team commander must conduct adjacent unit coordination to ensure there are no gaps in the screen or guard and to ensure smooth execution of the team’s rearward passages of lines (if required).
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS
4-37. The company team commander’s primary consideration for CSS during the security operation is coordinating and conducting resupply of the team, especially for Class III and Class V supplies. (NOTE: One technique is for the commander to position prestock Class III and Class V vehicles at the team’s successive positions.) In addition to normal considerations, however, the commander may acquire other responsibilities in this area, such as arranging CSS for a large number of attached elements or coordinating resupply for a subsequent mission.
4-38. The company team’s support planning can be further complicated by a variety of factors. These include the extended distances from the task force combat trains and the BSA over which the team must operate (making resupply, CASEVAC, and vehicle recovery more difficult), the wide frontages that the team must cover, and the increased numbers of attachments for which the team must provide resupply and other support services (such as CASEVAC). To prevent these factors from creating outright tactical problems, the company team must receive logistical support, such as additional medical evacuation vehicles, from the controlling task force.
FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS
4-39. The complexities of security missions, combined with normal operational requirements can easily rob the company team commander of the time he needs for planning and preparation of follow-on missions. He must address these competing demands in his initial mission analysis to ensure that the team, and its leaders, can adequately meet all requirements for current and future operations. If METT-TC factors permit, for example, the commander can shift his focus to preparing for follow-on missions once preparations for the security mission are complete (or satisfactorily under way). Another technique is to detach the XO, with support personnel and vehicles, to prepare for follow-on missions. The XO’s party can handle such operational requirements as reconnaissance, coordination, and development of follow-on EAs and BPs.