A political perspective

The fundamental dispute is that the movement of wider privatization is, in most of its demonstrations, clearly understood as a political process rather than as a scientific process to alter circumstances or as an outcome of economic rights (Feigenbaum and Henig, 1994). Instead of dealing with privatization as an alternative between sources to attain familiar and wide social objectives, we debate that privatization frequently form of an approach to convert the state policy and rearrange organization and choice – forming a procedure to benefit the objectives of some groups over the challenging ambition of other groups. As shown in table 3.2, this political viewpoint varies from the organizational and monetary advancements in the main inspiration credited to political performers, the main unit of evaluation engaged, and the fundamental idea of privatization produced, planned, and logical (Schneider, 1990).

 Privatization strategies

There are at least three types of privatization strategies; pragmatic privatization , tactical privatization , and systematic privatization.

Pragmatic Privatization shows most of the properties regarding the organizational viewpoint but having one vital difference: while the organizational viewpoint shows this collection of properties as being applicable everywhere, the political viewpoint does not deem this privatization to be continuous context episodes. This type of privatization is

fulfilled by bureaucratic units that are derived from the push and pull of stresses by politicians. American municipal agreements for private stipulation of public jobs give a better picture. They are often familiarized as technological answers to fulfill an instant social issue.

The main players regard privatization as one of the many substitute ways through which they can support the familiar social concerns. While making a decision as to whether an enterprise should be privatized or not or the time when it should be privatized, little attention has been given to the political repercussions and philosophical stability. On the other hand, strategic privatizations are encouraged to accomplish immediate political objectives of specific parties, interest groups or politicians. They try to change the equilibrium of power by pleasing devotees and inviting partners. In several instances, privatization is strategically regarded as a type of differentiation in the political product. For instance, in France, during 1986-88, the Chirac government initiated the program of the sale of assets, which appeared to focus largely on getting the highest number of votes through the advertisement of a unique program, which was different from the routine traditional practices of the communists(Feigenbaum and Henig, 1994).

Table 3.2 Privatization Contrasting Approaches

Administrative Economic Political Emphasized Goal Achievement of Unit of Analysis Discrete societal

problem

General privatization tactics similar to those prevalent in Eastern Europe these days, are aimed at restructuring the whole society by changing political and economic institutions together with the alteration of political and economic interests. General privatization tries to 1) reduce the expectations of the people about the performance and responsibilities of the government, 2) to reduce the mistakes of the state-owned enterprises and its implementation structure, and 3) to change the interest group setting so that its contribution to the progress of government decreases. In the context of Weberian practice, the typology have selected is a logical concept focusing on learning by conceptualizing main hidden aspects of the communal behavior (Feigenbaum and Henig, 1994).

Per se, it unavoidably has several shortcomings that are characteristic of sort.

Initially, by stating particular groups as “pure”, it tries to minimize the intricacy of the case under consideration. Plans are frequently developed by many people having distinct purposes, therefore, particular privatization ventures hardly contain uncontaminated instances of any particular form.

Several people may find a policy attractive because of its long-range ramifications; therefore, Margaret Thatcher supported privatization as a means to change Britain into a capitalistic society run by people. On the other hand, some like short-range electoral gains like putting moneymaking public organizations on sale so that a politically disconcerting discrepancy can be reduced (Feigenbaum and Henig, 1994). Nau (1990) stated that impartial city administrators may, in order to deal with limited budgets, privatize the services of a city. He also added that the city managers may receive inspiration from the papers produced by the political lobbies. While others, having a desire to reach a higher position, may support privatization so as to be

recognized for creativity. Undeniably, the reason for a plea involves many explanations.

Rules are made because they lure associations of people having corresponding yet not very similar interests. In this case, privatization is not a rare phenomenon. Similar to several typologies, the typology developed by us tends to study events in isolation and overlooks those instances that oppose the vitality of a political lifespan. Tactics can change and privatization ventures carried out to accomplish a group of goals might transform in nature when distinct communities organize to attain power, or, as main players, re-establish their interests keeping in mind the ever-changing circumstances.

Lastly, while securing our typology in the inspirations of the main players, we are bringing attention to the effect of a single main aspect while the other main aspects having the real effect are being excluded. Even if the conditions were appropriate, there is a chance that things will not go as planned. We do not suggest that the struggle for privatization to bring changes in the system will have any greater effect even if the privatization policies were completely executed. The reason why we have chosen to aim for inspiration is that there exists a foundation for exploring the various types of sanctioned privatizations, their documented justifications and the associations endorsing them to obtain political motives. However, it is too early to conclude empirically the comparative impact of the latest privatization ventures. Whether these constraints offset the part played by a typology is based on the characteristics of its design and the manner in which it is used. Typologies should be presented as abstract tools for empirical research of significant occurrences rather than being posed as ends, because in so doing, they become damaging. The demonstrative worth of typology is stressed in the discussion without ignoring several intricate and dynamic characteristics of the instances under consideration. Moreover, we start adding onto our first typology by shifting from inspirations to the real effects. Keeping in view these changes, we provide

the critical view of the political groundwork of every type of privatization tactic(Feigenbaum and Henig, 1994).