More moderate existentialists like Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose great contribution to existentialism is a book called Phenomenology of
Perception, think that there are sometimes limitations to freedom. Of course, people do sometimes do things over which they have no con- trol, like vomit after drinking fifteen bottles of beer – beer they chose to drink in the first place of course – but this is not really the kind of thing Merleau-Ponty has in mind. Vomiting after drinking fifteen bottles of beer is not really something that a person does, so much as something that just happens with his out of control body. Although, having said that, some people are able to hold down fifteen bottles of beer a lot longer than other people through sheer will power. Merleau-Ponty is thinking more of certain dispositions and responses that require con- scious awareness in order to occur but are nevertheless not matters of choice. Vomiting doesn’t necessarily require conscious awareness. People, mainly rock stars, often vomit in their sleep with dire consequences – Jimi Hendrix, John Bonham, Bon Scott. Philosophers who sympathize with Merleau-Ponty’s position list sense of humour, sexual preference, panic reactions and insanity as examples of disposi- tions and responses that require conscious awareness in order to occur but are not matters of choice. A quick examination of these examples does appear to reveal that not every conscious response is freely chosen.
Sense of humour: Although education and experience can change a person’s sense of humour over time, if he finds a joke funny at the time he hears it he is not choosing to find it funny. So, if you find the delib- erately and outrageously offensive English stand-up comedian Bernard Manning funny, go ahead, laugh it up, it isn’t your fault. Actually, I find Bernard Manning funny partly because he reminds me of all those sanc- timonious, right-minded, politically correct liberals who have taught themselves to find him offensive. Part of what I find amusing is their offence, but I’m not sure this point is relevant to the current debate.
Sexual preference: Although sane people are undoubtedly responsi- ble for all actions that stem from their sexual preferences they are not responsible for their sexual preferences. They do not choose them and can not choose to change them. On a genuinely serious note, we might
ask why some psychologists think they can counsel paedophiles out of their sexual preference? Do they think they can counsel heterosexuals and homosexuals out of theirs? Some paedophiles have asked to be castrated in order to stop them from doing what they do. In making this request they are conveniently confusing a sexual preference for which they are not responsible with actions for which they are certainly responsible, their intention being to cunningly evade responsibility for what they do.
Panic reactions: Panic has both a physical and a mental dimension. It is a physical response that requires consciousness in order to be made, but it is not always under the control of consciousness. Some- times panic overwhelms consciousness. It produces a fight-or-flight reaction which freezes a person between engaging the enemy or leg- ging it. He remains starkly conscious but he has temporarily lost control of himself. The fact that a soldier, for example, can eventually learn to gain control over his panic reactions through training and experience, and hence place himself in a position to be able to choose not to panic, does not imply that every soldier, particularly the rookie, has the choice of whether or not to panic on a particular occasion when the bullets start flying and the big guns start blazing.
Insanity: Psychiatrists recognize that the genuinely mentally disturbed have obsessive, compulsive tendencies over which they have little or no control. The hard-line existentialist theory of freedom does not allow for the diminished responsibility that is the accepted hallmark of mental illness.
It is surely correct to argue that responsibility can not be avoided or freedom limited by choosing not to choose. And certainly helplessness in many if not most situations in life is an all too familiar sham. It appears, however, to be wrong to argue that people are always respon- sible for what they do and the evaluations they make. Of all the exis- tentialist philosophers, Sartre probably has the toughest and most uncompromising theory of freedom and responsibility. To some extent it is a result of the historical period in which it was produced. Sartre, his
thoughts increasingly influenced by political concerns, did his bit to resist the rising tide of fascism and Nazism that culminated in World War II by arguing in favour of individual freedom and inalienable personal responsibility.
Perhaps, in the end, Sartre is not offering us a philosophical theory worked out in every single detail so much as an ideal to aspire to through sheer unrelenting will power and implacable bloody mindedness – a life of maximum responsibility and minimum excuses. Or would you rather aspire to be a whinging, irresponsible slob? There is a surprisingly large amount of public funding available for people with the latter aspiration.