Post-communism: Individuals versus institutions

The discussion of the implications of person-centred political communication in a Western context has showed that the main issues of concern are unbalanced distribution of power, weakening of political parties, and irrationality of voters’

choices. The challenging of institutional checks and balances is a serious concern of person-centred political communication in post-communist systems too. However, the main effects are in this context seem to relate to the development of democratic institutions and the institutionalisation of party system.

Alongside the problematic informal increase in the power of Prime Ministers in governments, which was discussed in the Western context, post-communist societies face another problem which can cause an unbalanced distribution of power. Specifically, most post-communist countries are characterized by “dual leadership”, meaning that their political systems have both the positions of a Prime Minister and a President (Baylis, 1996). However, their powers vary according to the political system that was introduced. In post-communist parliamentary systems Presidents usually have little formal power, but nonetheless their informal power and prestige is often great (Baylis, 2007). They are more popular than Prime Ministers, citizens trust them more than any other political institution (Mishler & Rose, 1997), and in most cases they derive their legitimacy from direct elections (Baylis, 2007).

The discrepancy between a President’s weak formal powers and the strong support among citizens can easily lead to tensions and conflicts with other branches of government. Many post-communist Presidents have tried to exercise more power than they were constitutionally given and even change the institutional arrangements to formally gain more power (Baylis, 1996). Their interventions in areas of prime ministerial authority have often led to conflicts with Prime Ministers and weakened their roles in political processes. In other words, Presidents who try to exercise more power than they are given usually go hand in hand with weak Prime Ministers, what leads to an unbalanced distribution of power, ineffective government and reduces the legitimacy of the governments’ policies (Baylis, 1996, 2007).

Although this represents a serious obstacle to democratic consolidation, even greater threats to the quality of democracy are under-developed political institutions which may be locked in the cycle of irrelevance by person-centred political communication, although the effect is indirect at best. In the first place, because of the experiences of a former regime, citizens tend to trust more in individual political actors than in institutions. Schöpflin (1993: 268) captures it nicely by saying: “Almost

programmes, as a repository for society’s hopes and desires in particular, because persons were felt to be more reliable, more authentic and thus more likely to embody what the individual wanted.” Research into the levels of trust that citizens in post-communist societies have in different political actors and institutions confirms this thesis. Mishler and Rose (1997) looked at the levels of trust in political institutions in nine post-communist countries at the beginning of the transitional period and found that the institution of a President, the only one that is personalized (as opposed to parties, governments and parliaments), was the one that citizens trusted most. Therefore, citizens tended to invest individual political actors with authority and power, not institutions. Furthermore, it seems that the political processes were also revolving around individuals given that party leaders are said to have dominated over their parties in the early transition period (King, 2002; Lewis, 2000). And consequently, it might be expected that the media too framed the political processes as a personal struggle for power what could have made citizens perceive political institutions as nothing more than “facades hiding different personal interests” (Schöpflin, 1993: 276). It is suggested that all these developments might have contributed to the under-development of political institutions and hindered their ability to acquire legitimacy and inspire trust. Hence, the focus that post-communist political actors have arguably put on individuals, instead of collectives and institutions, might have inhibited the institutionalization processes, and indirectly contributed to the effects that the under-developed political institutions had for the consolidation of democracy.

For example, this direct influence of weak and under-developed institutions, and the possibly indirect influence of person-centred political communication, might be manifested in the increased reliance on informal practices of governing (e.g.

clientelistic networks, patronage politics, corruption), and unsanctioned abuse of power. Some authors go as far as to argue that the main democratic deficit in post-communist societies comes from the behaviour of the irresponsible political elite which abuses institutions and power (Fish, 2001; Gallina, 2010; Ledeneva, 2006).

Weak institutions are not able to provide distance between the individual and power and ensure that the individuals do not abuse power, so its exercise becomes arbitrary (Schöpflin, 1993). In addition, institutions serve as a base for constructing identities. If they are not able to perform that function, then the society is structured through other elements, such as ethnicity or religion, what can easily be manipulated and can provoke conflicts between opposing groups (ibid.).

Another implication of person-centred political communication in post-communist societies might be the under-institutionalisation of party systems. Mainwaring (1999)

describes weakly institutionalized party systems as those in which politics is dominated by individuals, not parties; levels of party identification are low; voters’

volatility is high and person-centred voting is more common than the one based on parties and issues. All these features are usually ascribed to post-communist party systems (Colton, 2002; Kitschelt, 1995; Lewis, 2000; O’Dwyer & Kovalčik, 2005) and they can be directly or indirectly related to person-centred political communication.

As was mentioned above, parties are often dominated by their leaders. The person-centred parties are less likely to support the development of programmatic party competition which is favored by the advocates of party democracies. Rather, these parties are often charismatic or clientelistic and favour patronage-oriented politics (Kitschelt, 1995), often putting leaders at the centre of their activities and communication efforts.

By contributing to the rise of patronage-oriented politics, the person-centred post-communist political communication might be seen as indirectly related to the negative effects that this kind of politics usually produces. For example, patronage-oriented politics have often led to the rise of massive state bureaucracies in post-communist periods. Clientelistic and charismatic parties, once in power, have tended to return the favour to their supporters by employing them in state institutions and in this way strengthening their clientelistic networks. This leads to ineffective governance and state bureaucracy since most of the employed are not qualified for the positions they get (O’Dwyer, 2004). Another problem with these practices is that they result in the weakening of mechanisms of democratic accountability. Given that the parties and their leaders are able to win elections and exercise power by relying on informal practices, such as corruption and clientelism, their accountability to voters is weakened (Ledeneva, 2006; Mainwaring, 1999). Also, strong party leaders tend to rule their parties in an authoritarian style, silencing opposition voices and centralizing the decision-making processes (Kasapović, 2001b; Lewis, 2000).

Furthermore, low levels of party identification and high volatility often result in changes of the ruling party. The changes in policies that may follow from this dynamic threaten the continuity of reforms and realization of long-term policy goals (Mainwaring, 1999).

On the other hand, some authors suggest that under-institutionalized party systems can have positive effects on post-communist democracies. The domination of party leaders on the political scene is seen as logical, given that the parties were in the beginning of post-communist period lacking clear programmes and policy initiatives (Kitschelt, 1995). Therefore, since it was not possible to instantly form a

individuals assumed a central place in politics (King, 2002). In addition, given the voters’ distrust of institutions, especially parties, and the confidence they have put in persons (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Schöpflin, 1993), the prominence of individual political actors seems unsurprising. If the politicians have used the trust of citizens to connect with them, promote political participation and democratic values, the person-centred political actors’ behaviour might have increased the quality of post-communist democracy. Finally, O’Dwyer and Kovalčik (2005) suggest that there is another advantage of an under-institutionalized party system. They argue that it is easier in weakly institutionalized party systems for governments to undertake radical reforms because of the unorganized and fragmented opposition. In other words, without coherent opposition it is easier to implement reforms and policies, which increases the political stability of the government and the efficiency of its policies.

Equally, there are perhaps good grounds to declare person-centred voting of post-communist voters rational, rather than irrational. Given the context – leader-dominated parties without clear policy stands and weak political institutions – it appears more rational to base electoral decision on the evaluation of a party leader than the party or issues it represents, if any. Although, this environment can also promote populism among political actors who want to appear in line with citizens’

anti-party sentiments and help them disguise a bid for personal power (Mainwaring, 1999; Schöpflin, 1993).

According to the same logic pursued above, person-centred media reporting can also be considered as having a positive impact on the quality of democracy. If the individuals dominate the political scene and the voters invest them, rather than institutions, with authority, it makes sense that the media are too pursuing this dynamic. The media in this context actually needs to focus on individuals to show who is responsible for political decisions, who has the power and who the voters should hold accountable. In person-centred political systems, those are the individual political actors, and arguably they need to be in the focus of media reporting.

However, the media that at the same time reveals the hidden dynamics of the political world, such as the informal practices of corruption, clientelism and patronage, can have a sobering effect on citizens. By showing citizens that the institutions are nothing more than structures used by individual actors for their own personal agenda, citizens might perceive politics as nothing more than a struggle for personal gain. This triggers cynicism and further distrust, makes citizens think nothing can be done to strengthen institutions and stop the power-seeking

individuals. Consequently this development can lead to lower electoral turnouts, and this in turn decreases the legitimacy of elected representatives.

To summarize, while the main criticism of a person-centred political communication in the West is that it can contribute to a crisis of a party democracy, in post-communist systems the main fear is that it might hinder the development of a (party) democracy in the first place. Although there might be good arguments for the dominance of individuals in political communication in the early transition period, it is possible that in the long run this practice can pose a serious threat to democratic consolidation.