Post Task descriptions

In session one, children were not able to express their choices using the analogous description. In session one, the most frequent description was the no preference description followed by perceptual-preference.

Similarly, table 13 shows that the most common explanation from those in the video condition was no preference and perceptual-preference. In the control condition, the most common explanation was the perceptual-based explanation. As in session one, those who had received the base problem were unable to explain their choices in an analogical way. Thus, because analogical explanations were low, it was decided that no further analysis on age, condition or paradigm was necessary on children’s explanations.

Table 13: Percentages of Descriptions of Object Choices by Condition

___________________________________________________________________________________________

Description of object choices Video Control ___________________________________

No Preference 39 36

Perceptual Preference 45 57

Goal-oriented 13 7

Analogy 3 0

5.6 Discussion

Thirty weeks on, children’s problem solving strategies changed from showing no preference in strategy choice to the analogy based object with adaptation being the dominant strategy, accounting for over a third of all choices. This suggests that over time children moved from selecting less effective level 2 error strategies based on just one aspect of the problem/object to a reliance on the analogy based object with

adaptation required to solve an analogous problem. Children continued to select the correct object but used it incorrectly to solve the problem. One explanation of children’s choice of analogy based object but without adaptation may have occurred due to fixed mental set. For example, because children know that to hold a water pistol, and to use it as a water pistol, they must hold it by the handle with the water end facing away from them. However, if children were using the information from the video analogue then they should have used the water pistol in the analogous way that is, by holding the water end and using the handle as a hooked object. Conversely, if children were simply looking to solve the problem without reliance on the base information then this could explain the incorrect object use.

The results in session two show, as in session one, no age differences in children’s use of the analogy based object with adaptation. Therefore, the hypothesis that 4-year-olds perform better than 3-year-olds was not supported even though the majority of 3-year- olds were now 4-year-olds and 4-year-olds were now 5-year-olds. When age was explored across condition, results revealed similar findings to 3-year-olds in session one; in that, the analogy based object with adaptation was chosen more in the video then in the control condition. Therefore, it can be concluded that 3-year-olds need the base to help them solve the target problem more than 4-year-olds. Again, similar to session one, 4-year-olds performance with the analogy based object with adaptation across condition was similar suggesting that 4-year-olds used this strategy to a similar degree with or without a base problem, whereas 4-year-olds solve the target problem using the analogy based object with adaptation to a similar degree. Furthermore, 4- year-olds in the control condition were able to solve the target problem with the analogy based object with adaptation more than 3-year-olds in the control condition. Again, suggesting the importance of a base problem for 3-year-olds. Instead of

selecting the most appropriate strategy or objects at random (as in session one), both 3- and 4-year-olds chose significantly more level 2 errors in the control condition than in the video condition. This shows that both age groups preferred level 2 errors when they did not receive the base problem. Thus, children were aware that they needed a long item, for example, to reach the toy/ball, but did not use the function (hook and drag). Thus, without the relational knowledge, children will rely on level 2 error based on perceptual similarity (length) only. This contradicts Goswami’s (1992) suggestion that children will show no preference for one strategy over another when they do not possess the knowledge of relations (as those in the control condition were not exposed to the relations).

However, since those in the control condition were not exposed to the relations in the base problem, children’s reliance on the level 2 error strategy was not related to the notion of lower-order relations. Instead it seems that this strategic choice was based on perceptual attributes of the object. For example, in the snake task, because children did not see that the actor in the video used a long tube to transport the bow to the desired location they could not transfer the relations to their tube-like snake. Thus, they chose the longest object (the stick) to attempt to reach the plate. Therefore, it seems that to select the level 2 errors strategy in problem analogies, children do not require an analogous base to select this strategy because it has certain physical

attributes which would allow a child to attempt and even solve the target problem and once children hit on this successful strategy they are unlikely to move away from a reliance on surface similarity. This suggests children’s continued use of level 2 errors across tasks and sessions.

The results of strategy choice across age and condition in session two revealed a number of important differences. Children chose the analogy based object with adaptation more in the video condition compared to the control condition. This was predicted and supports the notion that children in the video condition will use the analogy based object with adaptation more than those in the control condition because they receive the relations from the base problem. However, the significant differences between conditions were not a function of age. Three- and four-year-olds chose the analogy based object with adaptation to a similar degree in the video condition.

As in session one, the hypothesis that children would perform better on problems without an auxiliary task than problems needing an auxiliary task was supported. This supports the suggestion that children may not possess the relational knowledge

required to solve the hard problems. This was evident in children’s performance in the video condition. Despite them receiving the relations within the base problem,

children continued failing to use this information to solve the hard problems. Again, it is uncertain if these children failed to solve the problem due to difficulty in accessing the relations, or simply because the relations were too difficult and they did not recognise the relational similarity between the base and target.

This suggests that children who received the base problem on the problems without an auxiliary task were able to use the correct strategy more than those who had not received the base problem. Thus, it seems that optimal performance in the problems without an auxiliary task requires a base problem. Since no such differences occurred across condition in the problems needing an auxiliary task suggests that children need more than the presence of a base to enable problem solution of the problems needing an auxiliary task (i.e., knowledge of relations). The base is not sufficient, children need to understand the relations within the problem, i.e., a pendulum can be made from the clip and rope.

Since performance with the analogy based object with adaptation was high on the problems without an auxiliary task, compared to the problems needing an auxiliary task, children’s poor performance on the problems needing an auxiliary task is likely to be due to a lack of relational knowledge. If it was a problem of access only, then a similar performance should have been observed between problem types. Thus, children’s different performance across problem types suggests a lack of relational knowledge because when the tasks became more difficult and children no longer possessed the knowledge of relations, children reverted to less effective strategies. However, the problem of access can not be ruled out completely because there were still children in the problems without an auxiliary task, despite possessing the

knowledge of relations, failing to use the analogy based object with adaptation. This is likely due to not accessing the base information.

with adaptation, suggests that children were able to solve the problems without a need for relational knowledge. However, when inspected across the problem type, the use of the analogy based object with adaptation in problems needing an auxiliary task accounted for only 4 per cent of responses. This suggests that children in the control condition found these problems more difficult than the problems without an auxiliary task. This may have been due to the fact that children of this age find choosing a object to retrieve an item out of reach a straightforward task that requires no base analogue, but when it comes to having to select an item/two items to create the appropriate object to retrieve the item children find it difficult without the presence of a base analogue. This provides evidence that relational knowledge plays a larger role than access.

The prediction that children would perform better if they received the problems without an auxiliary task first was not supported. As in session one, there was no significant differences between receiving the auxiliary task first. Since both sessions found no benefit to children’s performance of receiving the problems without an auxiliary task first suggests that (1) success with the problems without an auxiliary task does not transfer to the problems needing an auxiliary task and (2) presentation of the problems needing an auxiliary task first has no negative effect on children’s analogical performance.

The findings here confirm the suggestion that children were not benefiting from the presentation of problems without an auxiliary task first. Six months on, children’s performance across both orders remained similar on the problems needing an auxiliary task which indicate that the problems needing an auxiliary task proved too difficult for children of this age regardless of whether they had help from the

problems without an auxiliary task first. As in session one, children’s strategy choices were not always consistent, but varied both between and within paradigms. To

determine why this was the case and to explore what caused children to change strategies across the different tasks children’s strategic variability was explored next.

Furthermore, the analogy based object with adaptation was the most dominant object choice in both 3-and 4-year-olds in the video condition. This preference changed in the problems needing an auxiliary task to analogy based object but without adaptation.

Thus, both age groups continued to use the correct object across problems needing an auxiliary task, but they were unable to utilise the object analogically. This also may be due to a lack of relational knowledge i.e., not understanding that a mat can be rolled up and used as a transportation object. Despite receiving this information in an analogous base problem – children failed to recognise the relations across the target problem, and thus were unable to solve the problem analogically. This is supported by the performance of 3- and 4-year-old children in the control condition. They chose the analogy based object with adaptation more in the problems without an auxiliary task than in the problems needing an auxiliary task.

Children’s preference for analogy based object but without adaptation in the video condition on the problems needing an auxiliary task, suggests that they may have understood that the tasks required the need to use the long hooked object in the toy retrieval task, but they were unable to transfer the correct action from the video. If children cannot access the relations then they would rely more on level 2 errors (perceptual) because this strategy does not require the use of analogy. It could also be that children do not possess the knowledge of relations. That is, they do not

understand that a long stick could be created out of the two shorter sticks or the clip could be made into a pendulum. Therefore, without such knowledge children select the correct object but do not use it to create the analogy based object with adaptation. This is what occurred. Three-and four-year-olds in the video condition were selecting analogy based object but without adaptation. This highlights both the importance of the base problem and knowledge when children are faced with difficult problems to solve. Children’s reliance on the correct object only indicates that to enable children to solve the problem using the most appropriate object, children need to be presented with an analogous problem for which they possess the relational knowledge, so that they can obtain the relevant [relational] knowledge to enable successful solution (but even then, this is not sufficient as evident in those in the video condition).

It was hoped that by asking children to represent the base problem that this would shed some light on children’s ability to recognise the relations within the base problem. If children could represent the base problem and go onto solve the target problem using the analogy based object with adaptation, then it could be suggested that children had knowledge of relations and were able to use this knowledge. This

occurred in almost half of children. Furthermore, because some children could

represent the base problem, but not solve the target problem correctly, then it could be suggested that children find the accessing of relations from the base difficult.

Children’s representational ability in the present study confirms previous findings (Chen, 2003) that indicate representation as an important component in analogy. Without it children have no mental image on which to base their solution. However, as the present findings have shown, the ability to form a representation of the base problem was not sufficient to solve an analogous problem. Children have to access this knowledge at the appropriate time, and access all aspects of that representation to enable successful target problem solution. Given that a large number of children, across both sessions, were unable to use the information represented suggests a problem of accessing this information at the appropriate time. Therefore, children’s lack of analogical reasoning may be as a result of not understanding that the base and target are related, and therefore children fail to use the appropriate information gained from the base problem. If this is the case then children’s lack of analogical reasoning in problem analogies is not due to a lack of ability to represent (encode) the base problem, but simply an inability to access this information.

This shift in representational ability is in line with previous evidence (Chen, 2003) that suggests 5-year-olds are capable of representing information from a base

analogue. This may also explain why 4-year-olds use of the analogy based object with adaptation increased from session one. This supports the notion mentioned in session one, that the difficulty of the tasks themselves may explain why children performed both poorly on representation and solution in the problems needing an auxiliary task.

Representation seemed to play more of an important role in young children’s ability to use information from the base problem in session two than in session one (51 percent and 40 per cent, respectively). As in session one, representation was more beneficial in the problems without an auxiliary task due to children’s success at both representation and target solution. However, this could simply be that children did not require a base for problems without an auxiliary task (as evident in the good performance with the analogy based object with adaptation in those in the control condition) and therefore, did not require a representation. Reasoning behind an inability to represent the base problem,

particularly in the problems needing an auxiliary task, may be that the tasks were too difficult to represent. Therefore, children were unable to notice the required relations which resulted in the failure to create the analogy based object with adaptation.

With the findings across both sessions relating to children’s representational use and subsequent target problem solution, it may be that children’s difficulty in using the analogy based object with adaptation was more than a lack of ability in representation formation or knowledge. The problem may lie in children’s ability to access and transfer the information from the base problem and transfer this information to an analogous problem. This is discussed further in the general discussion.

The results of the post-task descriptions were similar to session one. Despite an increase in children’s perceptual preference explanation, children’s analogical descriptions remained low. Children who received the base problem moved away from the no preference/irrelevant information explanation towards perceptual descriptions, suggesting that in session two children may have been taking more notice of the need for certain attributes i.e., length. However, this did not increase the likelihood of subsequent correct problem solution.

It is evident that, even 30 weeks on, children were unable to express their reliance on the base problem. Instead they relied on perceptual explanations. Such reliance on perceptual attributes may go some way to explaining why children were performing better with the problems without an auxiliary task. Given that the perceptual attributes of the objects in the problems without an auxiliary task were simple (relying on one transformation), for example, the long object could reach the far away item, children tried to look for these easy relations in the problems needing an auxiliary task.

However, the problems needing an auxiliary task required more than understanding of simple perceptual attributes. Children needed to understand that, for example,

something square and flat (piece of paper) could be rolled up into a tube-like transportation object. Therefore, children’s perceptual strategies may have caused them to select analogy based object but without adaptation more in the problems needing an auxiliary task compared to the problems without an auxiliary task. In this sense, it supports Gentner’s surface similarity.

In addition, it could simply be that those able to use the analogy based object with adaptation were using the base information, but were only able to verbalize about perceptual similarity (or level 2 errors). As in session one, children’s lack of ability to describe their choices as analogical suggests that they were not benefiting from