A Postfoundationalist View of Language

Recognising that inadequate and oversimplified understanding of the nature and function of biblical language may impoverish discussions of scriptural authority, a postfoundationalist approach attempts to avoid attaching too much exclusive importance to any one form — whether propositional or narrative — at the expense of the others in

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a reductionalist way, which takes place in both the conservative-foundationalist and the postliberal-nonfoundationalist approaches. That is, postfoundationalists acknowledge the problem of the notion of propositional revelation to the extent that it is understood as “timeless,” “ahistorical,” or “abstract” facts. At the same time, they are also worried about falling into an opposite extreme which reduces the language of the Bible and theology to feeling-expressive symbolic language. It should be noted that propositions in theological discourse play a significant role in the interpretation of Scripture, even though scriptural truth should not be reduced to a set of proposition. Throughout the Christian history, theological assertions, along with their function as expressions of attitudes or commitments, have made cognitive-propositional claims about the reality of God, explicitly or implicitly. In this regard, Avery Dulles (1983:205) notes that, in biblical times, Israelites and Christians articulated their faith ‘in confessional formulas, historical claims, and finally in doctrinal assertions of a more reflective character.’ Obviously, the truth of Scripture is much richer than its propositional teaching. Without confidence in the propositional teaching of Scripture, however, we could hardly put our trust in God to whom the Bible bears witness. For this reason, a postfoundationalist view affirms ‘an ineradicable cognitive element to Christian doctrine’ (McGrath 1990:76). Although it is impossible to represent God exhaustively at the cognitive level, doctrines have capacity to represent God adequately for the purposes of Christian proclamation and existence.

In heated debate about religious language, the term “propositional” and “personal,” or “cognitive” and “existential” have often been used antithetically. Objection to propositionalism is often summed up in the notion of “personal” truth, with which the neo-orthodox theologians would argue that God does not reveal propositions through Scripture; rather He reveals Himself. In opposition to the neo-orthodox view that describes revelation in non-propositional or personal terms, conservative-evangelicals hold fast to the propositional character of revelation. However, the sharp antithesis between propositional and personal is a false dichotomy to be overcome. The claim that propositional language is essentially impersonal seems to rest on a misleading distinction between proposition and person. To the contrary, propositions could be

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faith. There should be no antithesis between believing a proposition and believing a person insofar as the proposition is understood as the assertion of the person (Helm 1982:27). As Daniel Treier (2007:37) correctly puts it, ‘[t]he propositional aspect of revelation conveys its central message personally, and these are not mutually exclusive.’ Therefore, all our encounters with persons can be thought of as “propositional” in the sense that propositions always involve communicative action (Vanhoozer 1994:179). Alister McGrath consents to this mutual understanding of “propositional” and “personal” in terms of the nature of Christian doctrine. McGrath (1990:78-79) says: ‘To speak of doctrine as “truth” is rightly to draw attention to the fundamental Christian conviction that doctrine has to do with veridicality, rationality and comprehensive elucidation; nevertheless, it is also concerned with maintaining the possibility of encountering the truth, which the Christian tradition firmly locates in Jesus Christ as the source of her identity.’ Christian doctrine is concerned with faith and demands personal involvement. Truth is something that must be personally appropriated. There are both cognitive- propositional and personal-existential component to the truth-claims of Christian doctrine. Thus, it may be said that Christian doctrine as “truth” does not merely represent or describe reality, but also calls for the renewal and transformation of the human situation.

From a canonical-linguistic approach that has close parallels with a postfoundationalist approach, Vanhoozer attempts to revise the notion of proposition. Vanhoozer (1986:85) rightly notes that truth must be comprehensive and unified — at least for God, if not always for us — and also that reality is so multifaceted to be conveyed by an equally rich and diverse literary forms. The various literary forms of Scripture are not impediment to the truth at all; instead, it must be seen as the very possibility of truth’s full expression. Thus, from a postfoundationalist view of biblical language, it is imperative and important both to preserve the substance of revelation and to appreciate the diversity of its literal forms. Vanhoozer (:92) thus says:

In its revised sense, “propositional revelation” has reference to the things that God has propounded for our consideration in Scripture. As Christian readers,

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we ought to be interested not only in the propositions themselves but in the manifold ways these propositions are presented for our consideration. In the context of Scripture’s various genres, these propositions count as warnings, commands, prayers, questions, etc. as well as assertions.

In this postfoundationalist view, Scripture does more than just contain facts or convey information but acts with a diversity of voices that are diffused by way of a plurality of interpretive traditions, and by so doing leads to a plurality of theological systems which interact (Osborne 2006:405).

LeRon Shults provides a helpful insight for a postfoundationalist view of language. Given a distinction between explanation and understanding,48 Shults draws a comparison of the two opposite positions. On the one hand, the aim of the foundationalist emphasis on propositions is to explain things according to universal truth and to offer absolute explanations, which are obviously similar to natural science. This inevitably leads to an insistence on universal, acontextual, ahistorical, atraditional, certain, and absolute explanations. The nonfoundationalists, on the other hand, embrace “the turn to understanding” and set their aim in understanding that is conditioned by the historical context. Discerning this distinction as an outdated and false dichotomy influenced by German idealism, a postfoundationalist model gives full weight to the mutual conditioning of two movements in human rationality, with which ‘explanation aims for universal, transcontextual understanding, and understanding derives from particular contextualized explanations’ (Shults 1999:70). Within this understanding, the postfoundationalist task of theology can be described as (Shults 1999:77-78):

to engage in interdisciplinary dialogue within our postmodern culture while both maintaining a commitment to intersubjective, transcommunal theological argumentation for the truth of Christian faith, and recognizing the

48 _{Shults draws on German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911)’s distinction between Erklärung}

(explanation) and Verstehen (understanding). According to Dilthey, Erklärung relates to the inclusion of a particular phenomenon under a general rule and Verstehen pertains to the consideration of a particular in the light of the whole of its context. With this distinction, Dilthey stresses “subjective science of the humanities,” which must be differentiated from “objective natural sciences,” and argues for the necessity to pay attention to human-social-historical reality.

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provisionality of our historically embedded understandings and culturally conditioned explanations of the Christian tradition and religious experience.

To sum up: a postfoundationalist view of language is marked by its seeking to overcome a false dichotomy between propositional and personal, between cognitive and existential language, and between explanation and understanding. Moreover, a postfoundationalist view attempts to understand them in a mutually interrelated way, and by so doing affirms both the truthfulness of the Christian truth-claims and the

provisionality of our understanding and explanation of them.