The study used Lange‘s (2004) five-pillar framework for mainstreaming peace and conflict sensitivity in an organisation (see section 2.4) to assess the PCS of the Com-mission. Components of this framework are commitment and motivation to peace and conflict sensitivity, readiness to make changes in organisational culture, building staff capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity, and accountability mechanisms and condu-cive external relations. Corresponding questions asked to determine the presence of each component included these: Is the NDDC committed and motivated for PCS main-streaming? Is its organisational culture reflective of PCS? Does it build staff capacity for PCS? Does it have accountability mechanisms? And finally, does it enjoy condu-cive external relations? Answering these questions shows the extent to which the PCS is mainstreamed in the Commission. These are discussed below.
Commitment and motivation could be inferred from the activities and docu-ments of the Commission, especially those that have to do with the board and man-agement. The nature and dynamics of activities characteristic of the NDDC interven-tion programming makes it difficult for the board and management of the NDDC to have commitment and motivation for peace and conflict sensitivity. Expectedly, the selfish interests and greed that drive the barefaced corruption (see sections 5.1 and 5.2) that characterise these activities are antithetical to factors and processes that drive commitment and motivation for PCS. Although the mission of the Commission has expressed bias for peace and stability, nevertheless, findings show that peace and con-flict sensitivity is not explicitly linked with the mandate and values of the NDDC. The analysis of NDDC documents such as MD/CEO speeches, report, and magazines clearly support this claim. In the documents, NDDC reports its achievements in devel-opment terms only. Indeed, the Commission reports success in terms of the number of projects, or participants in capacity-building training. The implications these have on peace and conflict dynamics of the context are rarely considered in the reports. Sam-ples of the Commission‘s reports are presented as follows:
A survey conducted by the Commission showed that most of the bene-ficiaries are either self-employed or gainfully employed in private insti-tutions. The programme has indeed reduced the high index of
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ployment in the Region and inculcated the spirit of self-reliance among youths.
(Computer education unit/Skills Acquisition Pro-gramme)
Under the scheme, more 1,000 buses and 136 boats have been given to cooperative societies across the nine states that make up the region.
Through this means, "by modest estimation, about 11,360 families across the region have been empowered". (Mass Transit Scheme) Three hundred youths of Bayelsa State have been trained in an NDDC agriculture empowerment programme in various income-yielding en-terprises at the Biotechnology Development Agency, Odi, Bayelsa State, while another 1,700 youths in Delta, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom and Bayelsa states have been trained at the Songhai Farms, Delta State on fish farming and so on. Now, they are self-employed and doing well.
(Agricultural Support Programme).
(www.nddc.gov.ng. accessed 21st November 2008).
Finally, the responses of the NDDC staff interviewed imply an assumption that, by meeting its target output (what is being done and quantity) in intervention irrespec-tive of the process (how it is being done), the Commission automatically builds peace in the NDR. However, empirical evidence supports claims that quantitative accom-plishments in intervention programming may not necessarily translate into peacebuild-ing in the operational context (Bush K. , 1998; Bush & Opp, 1999; Bush K. , 2003c;
Bush K. , 2009; Anderson, 1999; Anderson, 2004; Paffenholz, 2005).
Empirical evidence also shows that peace and conflict sensitivity is not inte-grated into the Commission‘s organisational culture, that is, its existing procedures and structures. The procedures of intervention programming, particularly conception and planning are driven by budget and other interests as discussed earlier. Hence, there is hardly any consideration for peace and conflict sensitivity. NDDC personnel inter-viewed (including those of the Community and Rural Development [CRD]) were completely ignorant of issues relating to peace and conflict sensitivity in the Commis-sion‘s activities. The CRD has the duty of informing community about NDDC‘s in-tended intervention and intervene in conflict arising as a result of the intervention in the community. This suggests that PCS is not mainstreamed in the Commission‘s or-ganisational structure.
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Furthermore, findings show that peace and conflict-sensitivity skills are not in-tegrated into staff training or incorporated into staff recruitment. Staff interviewed were not familiar with terminologies and issues germane to peace and conflict sensitiv-ity. However, since most staff are indigenes of the NDR, they have the advantage of contextual knowledge of the NDR such as knowledge of the geographical area, history of the NDR conflict, and knowledge of one or more NDR indigenous languages. The Directorate of Community and Rural Development is charged with the responsibilities of managing intervention-related conflicts in communities. Personnel of CRD are trained in conflict resolution. But ―…it‘s [the training] so very peripheral. The training is so peripheral. It‘s not sufficient, ok.‖ These are the words, representative of other participants‘ responses, of a staff that had participated in the training. He had also at-tended more intensive training and higher courses in Peace and Conflict Studies, so he was qualified to evaluate the CRD training. This suggests that the training did not build the capacity of the CRD personnel in any appreciable manner commensurable with the responsibilities of their field operations. Also, the CRD‘s field responsibilities are restricted to introducing the contractor/consultant to the community and mediating in conflict triggered by the NDDC intervention in the community. They are not in-volved in the conception and planning, as required by the NDDC guiding policy.
Hence, even their weak capacity is only restricted to conflict resolution and not full mainstreaming of PCS into staff training and recruitment.
Accountability mechanisms here refer to appraisal and incentives systems en-couraging peace and conflict sensitivity in intervention programming. It ―…includes documenting and disseminating better practice and rewarding progress to create posi-tive energy for moving forward‖ (Lange, 2004, p. 19). Nothing of this nature exists in the NDDC. In fact, findings reveal that report of evaluation of past effort do not inform planning of new intervention. This is consistent with the findings discussed under con-ception and planning. According to an NDDC desk officer,
But, you know, some of the project, I can tell you have not been suc-cessful at all. So…assuming that the planning process is democra-tized…we should have been able to make input, based on our field ex-perience.
Conducive external environment was evaluated in three domains —conducive relationships with other actors (other government agencies, NGOs, INGOs, oil compa-nies‘ intervention) working in the NDR; buy-in, participation and capacity of
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nities; and broader policy environment. Findings show that gap exist for a better coor-dination of intervention with other organisations pursuing similar goals in the region.
For instance, there were organizations such as BIODEC, FADAMA, CDB, and NGOs in Odi doing some things that the NDDC has been trying to do through its agricultural support programmes. The NDDC did not partner with organisations like FADAMA, having very similar agricultural programmes, in its agricultural support programmes.
However, some participants reported that the FADAMA initiative succeeded whereas the NDDC failed. A partnership with FADAMA would have made the NDDC more successful with its agricultural intervention. For instance, the NDDC could have part-nered with FADAMA, in which the NDDC provides the training and get its successful trainees organised into cooperative groups while FADAMA provides the fund and the two organisations jointly monitor the beneficiaries. The partnership that existed be-tween NDDC and BIODEC was at the latter's instance. In the second domain, findings revealed that the Commission does not ensure community buy-in or ownership of its intervention. The programming of its intervention are not participatory, hence they do not directly build community‘s capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity. Rather, Odi community itself has developed its own infrastructure and custom to manage conflicts related to intervention, which oftentimes are not acknowledged in the NDDC interven-tion programming.
The third domain of the external environment has to do with the socio-political terrain of the NDDC operations. The Nigerian political environment described as char-acterised by prebendalism (Joseph, 1996) seems hostile to values such as altruism, im-partiality or multi-im-partiality, equality, equity, justice, emancipation, peacebuilding, which are necessary for peace and conflict-sensitive programming. In prebendal poli-tics, state offices become prebends that can be appropriated by officeholders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups.
The Nigerian socio-political environment, which is the context of the NDDC interven-tions, supports systemic corruption. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), referring to government intervention in the NDR, once warned, ―the people of the region should receive this latest dish with apprehension. It will be yet another avenue for corruption and political favouritism‖ (International Crisis Group, 25 October 2006c). Public perception about the NDDC intervention as a means of cor-ruption and political favouritism has serious negative implications for the NDDC.
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Table 4.2 summarises the results of the assessment of peace and conflict sensi-tivity in the NDDC institutional context, using Lange‘s framework. Table 4.3 summa-rises the answers to pertinent questions in determining the mainstreaming of PCS in the Commission‘s institutional context.
4.4.2 Peace and Conflict Sensitivity of the NDDC Intervention