Potential for an integrated approach

This chapter so far has considered strengths and weaknesses of a range of approaches to explain variations in industrial relations systems and actors’ behaviour. Market forces, institutions and actors’ strategic choices all influence changes in industrial relations systems and actors’ behaviour. But it is hard to say which factors or which combination of factors might have the most power to explain a particular event. In this regard, Kelly (2011:71) notes that:

Nobody disputes that market forces are powerful, that institutions can both attenuate and amplify such forces and that actors usually have some strategic choices, however limited. Perhaps one of the major challenges facing comparative researchers is to think through how we can specify more precisely the conditions under which each of these sets of ‘factors’ is more or less effective.

There are researchers who use the integrated approach as a way to overcome the weaknesses and limitations of each approach with a dual focus on both institutions and actors. The deterministic features of the new institutionalism tend to make it difficult for researchers to understand active roles of actors in industrial relations. Unions are not merely passive agents and can make a difference by formulating relevant strategies (Malo, 2006: 508), reflecting institutional opportunities and

46 constraints prevailing in each country (Kelly and Frege 2004: 183-185). The integrated approach places emphasis on the interconnection between actors and institutions in the context of international economic change (Bamber et al., 2004: 60).

There are a number of versions of this approach. Romo (2005) argues the importance of union strategies and interactions in the policy-making arena based on Scharpf’s (1997) ‘actor-centred institutional accounts’. Wailes et al. (2003) highlight the

potential to improve explanatory power by synthesising institutionalist and interest- based approaches. The other strand suggested by Frege and Kelly (2003), drawing on social movement theory argues that four independent factors (social and economic change, institutional context, state and employer strategies, and union structures) play a decisive role in union strategic choices as ‘framing processes’ as the ways in which unions perceive changes in their external environments as threats or opportunities. Besides, Marino and Roosblad (2008: 627) point out that union responses are influenced not only by external circumstances, but also by factors more related to the unions themselves such as available resources. In a similar vein, Cerviňo (2000) argues that factors internal and external to unions should be considered together.

The integrated approach stresses the importance of the interaction between interests and institutions in the context of international economic change (Bamber et al.,

2004; Frege and Kelly, 2003; Wailes et al., 2003). Romo (2005) and Wailes et al.

(2003) are representative of the studies which analyse changes in industrial relations and bargaining systems based on the integrated approach. Romo (2005) argues that changes in wage bargaining structures in Italy and Spain are better explained through

47 factors endogenous to national systems, in particular union strategies and interactions in the policy-making arena. Wailes et al. (2003) highlight the integrated

approach of institutionalist and interest-based approaches on the grounds that it could be a way to overcome the limitations of each approach: the structural determinism of institutionalism, and the reductionism and instrumentalism of interest-based approaches. As a consequence, they argue that the integrated approach is useful to explain both differences and similarities between and within countries.

Frege and Kelly (2003) develop an analytical model for explaining union strategic choices based on the social movement literature (McAdam et al., 2001: 17).

Although they highlight the explanatory power of institutions in how unions respond to the current challenges, they emphasise the importance of ‘framing’ processes through unions translate and act on changes and the role of leaders in the process of framing unions’ opportunities and threats and their choices of action (Frege and Kelly 2003: 14). Framing processes means the ways in which unions recognise and interpret social and economic changes and adopt particular strategies (ibid.). Given

the fact that unions as key actors retain a degree of independence in their choices, even if subject to external influences (Frege and Kelly, 2003), they devise strategies on the basis of available power and resources and existing constraints (Marino, 2012; Regini, 1981; Turner, 2005). The model suggested by Frege and Kelly (2003) intends to explain unions’ strategies through framing processes based on interaction of the factors mentioned above.

Cerviňo (2000) argues that union representation of contingent workers depends on how unions perceive the incentives and the costs and whether there exist appropriate

48 contexts to develop such a strategy. She points out that if the ideological and organisational incentives are greater than the costs, unions are more likely to represent these workers (Cerviňo, 2000: 10-11). Although Cerviňo highlights that factors internal and external to unions should be considered such as the organisational structure and employer strategies, coupled with incentives, her emphasis is worth noting because it puts weight on actors’ interests in interaction with institutions. According to that researcher, union leaders, based largely on the principles of class oriented unionism, may have interests in representing contingent workers beyond protecting existing members. This ideological objective boosts incentives for unions to represent contingent workers, which is directly related to the extent to which contingent workers can exert influence on unions. Given that unions seek to their organisational growth by increasing the number of memberships and gaining more bargaining power, unions are likely to represent contingent workers if this strategy would serve to increase their power, or at least, prevent further decline (Cerviňo, 2000: 11).