The potential for integrating Israeli capabilities into wider regional frameworks, including infrastructure development for Jordan and Syria; development o f regional port facilities and rail links;

telecommunications; electricity grids; and oil distribution all need to take account o f Iraqi needs and market potential. For a discussion o f Israel’s role in regional transportation, including a comparison o f port hinterlands as determined by minimum costs o f transport, see HaShimsoni, Gideon ‘Transportation” in Hareven op. cit., pp. 116-34, especially map 5. Iraq also has a significant impact on regional water needs,

Chapter VII: Towardsacooperativeapproachtoregionalsecurity

the region, including the Gulf of Aqaba. Dealings between Iran and Iraq are a fundamental part of the regional security equation because they pose security dilemmas for other Middle East states. All Arab states of the region maintain diplomatic relations with Iran.

While these considerations present strong reasons for associating Iran and the Gulf states with the security framework in some way, such an association obviously presents problems of dealing with Iran and, under present circumstances, Iraq. One possible approach might be to settle upon support for the Charter of Cooperation,

and bilateral peace treaty arrangements with Israel, as the “admission ticket” for full membership of the Conference. Support for the Charter (without a formal peace agreement) might make non-regional countries eligible for dialogue partner status. Associate member status would be available on the same basis for countries such as Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, other Arab states including the Gulf states and North African states, and Turkey. Given their potential to strengthen links with the region, the possibility of interest among the Central Asian states in associate membership of the Conference should not be excluded. Unlike dialogue partners, associate members of the Conference might be entitled to observe various functions of the organisation, and to participate in those activities agreed upon by the full members.

Non state parties

The framework should seek to deal with the impact of non-state parties on security. In the Middle East context, the activities of non-state entities can affect the quality of the security that governments can provide to their citizens. At some stage, members of the Conference may wish to discuss terrorist activities in some form within an overall security framework.10 As with other sensitive issues, such as strategic doctrine, defence budgets, arms acquisition plans and the scope for intelligence sharing, the security problems associated with non-state parties would almost certainly need to be approached initially through dialogue between research institutes and “officials in their private capacities” until necessary levels of trust are established at the leadership level.

In addition to addressing the impact of non-state parties on states, a cooperative approach to security should, in principle, be able to address the needs of identifiable groups which present special difficulties within states. Particularly at risk are the 328,000 Palestinians registered with UNRWA in Lebanon, most of whom are families of Palestinian refugees from 1948.* 11 This is an area of great political

10 Particular problems are presented by non-state entities possessing or claiming to possess the support o f state parties. Governments generally seek to deny responsibility for the actions o f such groups but most face political constraints in doing so. Most regional states tolerate or even make use o f non-state parties at times. A blurring o f limits to responsibility and accountability can accentuate problems o f perception between the parties involved, particularly at the popular level.

11 The separation o f these refugees and their descendants from the social fabric o f Lebanon seems likely to continue for many years. They are unlikely to be accorded the right to return to Israel, despite Lebanese demands that this be allowed. They could not be accommodated in a Palestinian entity, nor would many have connections with that area. Jordan would face enormous economic and political difficulty absorbing a

sensitivity, however. Israel and its neighbours are unlikely to accept proposals to treat the situation of minorities within their borders as a regional security issue. Some countries, including Lebanon, will contribute national perspectives to debate on the issue in the context of the final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. But none of the parties involved (apart from the Palestinians) are likely to allow the question of minorities in their countries to be pursued as part of a formal security agenda.

Conclusion

Two critical questions face the development of a cooperative security framework along the lines discussed above. The first is whether leaders would be willing to seek regional arrangements which encourage states to deal with each other according to a negotiated set of principles involving burden-sharing. The second is whether leaders would be prepared to lend their support to in-country peace­ building activity while some key political differences between Israel and its neighbours remain unresolved. On both counts the answers at this stage are most likely to be negative, or highly conditional. It is appropriate therefore to take a modest view of the potential for developing fresh approaches to regional security for the present.

Whether political will to cooperate may overcome ongoing and emerging differences in regard to defence security is difficult to predict. On balance, there seems little reason to expect significant changes in existing, competitive strategic doctrine among the major states of the region. But it would seem unlikely that a failure to make significant headway towards cooperation in the defence security area alone would be sufficient to prevent the development of cooperative approaches in wider areas. A great deal would depend upon whether both leaders and audiences perceived significant advantages in such cooperation, and the political climate surrounding such proposals.

Under more promising political circumstances, initial unwillingness to address certain issues on a multilateral basis, such as defence security, human rights and minorities, should not present insurmountable problems for the basic concept of a new regional framework. It should also be possible to resolve sensitive but essentially procedural issues such as membership and timing of new arrangements. The growth of familiarity and contact between the various sides in the Madrid multilaterals has been impressive. It suggests that although the challenges remain very great, most of the Arab countries involved in that process, and Israel, may

further influx o f Palestinians. It has already faced the task o f integrating most of the 400,000 Palestinians expelled from Kuwait after the Gulf War, a higher proportion o f whom had professional skills than is the case among camp dwellers in Lebanon. For a discussion o f the grim situation facing Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, see Sayigh, Rosemary “An Uncertain Future for the Palestinians in Lebanon” Middle East International 13 May 1994 pp. 19-21.

Chapter VIL Towardsacooperativeapproachtoregionalsecurity

have shifted in their thinking from conflictual stances towards recognising the potential for cooperation. 12

If that process reaches a point where the parties see a real prospect of cooperative multilateral or joint solutions for mutual problems, this may mark the beginning of a pre-negotiation phase for cooperation in most areas, at least beyond the most sensitive aspects of defence security. But the necessary preconditions for entering the prenegotiation situation involve a shift to a “conciliatory mentality” including preparedness “to settle for an attainable second best rather than hold out for an unattainable victory.” 13 That approach is not yet evident between most Arab

countries and Israel.

The aim, for the moment at least, should continue to be to ensure that each of the parties has a reasonably clear understanding of the impact of their behaviour on the perceptions and policy responses of other states. Trust-building measures based on information exchanges and dialogue are more likely to attract regional support than proposals for measures such as constraints on specific arms acquisitions or operational military deployments. It also follows that for the foreseeable future, any framework along the lines discussed above would be likely to develop mainly as a mechanism for practical cooperation, information-sharing and consensus-building, and not as an executive, regulatory or supra-national decision-making body.

Israel and its Arab neighbours are likely to remain, to a considerable extent, the prisoners of history and geography. The promotion of interdependence between them is not politically realistic for the foreseeable future. Interdependence, moreover, is not necessarily a desirable short to medium term objective if evidence of the development of ever more intimate linkages between Arab states and Israel at the leadership level adds to the sensitivity, at the popular level, of outstanding political differences.

Only a modest cooperative security arrangement is likely to be acceptable to regional leaders at this stage and for the next few years. But a framework operating between states and within states along the lines presented here would have the capacity to evolve as political conditions allow. Even in its formative stages, such a framework would make its own distinctive contribution to regional peace-building, both at leadership levels and among audiences. It may help regional leaders to shape the political and economic changes which are already taking place within their countries, and which seem set to accelerate.