countries?
4.1.1.1 Prelude to a comparative analysis
Rather than sift through each of the three existing AAs/DCFTAs,122 the analysis in the following sub-sections will
focus on the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA.123 As mentioned before, this
agreement not only formed the template for the other two AAs, its DCFTA was also the object of intense scrutiny in trilateral negotiations with Russia.124 Instead of re-hashing the in-depth
research already conducted on the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA with the aim of placing them in the context of the EU’s external relations accords,125 this study
tries to assess the breadth and depth of the agreement in a comparative analysis with the EU-Serbia SAA.126 As such, this
study not only reveals the unique
122 For textual commentaries and contextual analysis of each of the
agreements, see M. Emerson and V. Movchan (eds), Deepening EU- Ukrainian Relations. What, Why and How?, Brussels/Kyiv/London: CEPS/IER/Rowman and Littlefield, 2016, M. Emerson and T. Kovziridze (eds), Deepening EU-Georgian Relations. What, Why and How?, Brussels/Tbilisi/London: CEPS/Reformatics/Rowman and Littlefield, 2016, and M. Emerson and D. Cenusa (eds), Deepening EU-Moldovan Relations. What, Why and How?, Brussels/Chisinau/London: CEPS/ExpertGrup/Rowman and Littlefield, 2016. For deeper analyses into contentious issue areas covered by the AA/DCFTAs, see the policy papers produced in the context of the “3DCFTAs” project at http://www.3dcftas.eu.
123 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member
States, of the one part, and Ukraine of the other part, OJ 2014 L 161.
124 See M. Emerson, “2016 Already Puts its Mark on the Economic Map of
Europe”, CEPS Essay No. 22, Brussels, 8 January 2016, at 4.
125 See G. Van der Loo, The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Area: A New Legal Instrument for EU Integration Without Membership, Leiden: Brill, 2016.
126 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European
Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, OJ 2013 L 278/16.
This study reveals the unique and innovative features of the AAs and presents evidence to counter the claim that, as neighbouring states, the EaP countries cannot have an EU membership perspective.
and innovative features of the AAs but also presents empirical evidence that counters the political claim that, as neighbouring states, the EaP countries cannot have an EU membership perspective.
The case selection central to this part of the study is motivated by a range of factors that make the comparison of the EU-Ukraine AA with the EU-Serbia SAA more suitable than that concluded with any other (potential) candidate country. Firstly, negotiations of the agreements were launched in the same geopolitical and economic timeframe: talks with Serbia commenced in October 2005, and those with Ukraine barely 1.5 years later in March 2007.127 The leaderships of both countries
share the desire to see their countries accede to the European Union.128 Secondly, like Ukraine, Serbia is a strategically located
country with a major impact on regional stability and cooperation. It experienced a similarly bumpy trajectory of territorial instability and political development in its transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Thirdly, both countries have small economies,129
127 Macedonia negotiated and signed its SAAs much earlier (2000 resp.
2001) and progress on its pre-accession track has been seriously hampered by, inter alia, the name dispute with Greece. Albania (SAA 2003-06) and Montenegro (SAA 2005-07) are small states with very differently structured economies. Bosnia and Herzegovina (SAA 2005-08) is not a functioning state. Kosovo (SAA 2013-15) is not recognised as a sovereign state by five EU member states. Turkey has been associated to the EU since 1963, has a customs union with it since 1995 and started accession negotiations in 2005, which have not led anywhere.
128 Serbia has been granted candidate country status in 2012. Both
President Poroshenko and Prime Ministers Yatsenyuk and Groysman have said that they would like Ukraine to join the EU. See, e.g., R. Balmforth and N. Zinets, “Ukraine president sets 2020 as EU target date, defends peace plan”, Reuters, 25 September 2014; “Groysman: Ukraine will join EU within 10 years”, Euractiv, 1 July 2016.
129 In 2014, the GDP value of Serbia represented 0.07% of the world
economy; that of Ukraine 0.21%; that of Belgium 0.86%; and Poland 0.88%. Data available at http://www.tradingeconomics.com.
comparably low levels of economic and social development130 and
rule of law.131 Fourthly, Ukraine and Serbia participate in regional
institutional arrangements that influence their sectoral cooperation with the EU. For instance, both Serbia and Ukraine are parties to the European Energy Community Treaty (since 2005 and 2011, respectively) and the Danube River Protection Convention (since 2003 and 1994, respectively).
Of course, there are also differences to consider. Firstly, whereas the EU-Serbia SAA was signed in April 2008 – i.e. before the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis, the Russo- Georgian war of August 2008 and the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty dragged out talks with Ukraine until June 2014. One should, therefore, expect these differences to have impacted on the form and substance of the agreements. Secondly, there is the asymmetrical status to be considered in the area of trade. Ukraine has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 16 May 2008, whereas membership negotiations with Serbia are still underway. Conversely, the trade part of the EU-Serbia SAA, which has been provisionally applied since 1 February 2010 by way of an Interim Agreement, envisages the creation of an FTA within a period of six years after the entry into force of the SAA, i.e. by 1 September 2019. The DCFTA part of the EU-Ukraine AA, on the other hand, has been provisionally applied since 1 January 2016 and will be gradually implemented over a transitional period of ten years after the entry into force of the AA on 1 September 2017. Thirdly, the countries differ in size: Ukraine’s territory is
130 Data for 2014 are available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.PCAP.CD: GDP per capita at nominal values: Serbia - $6,152, Ukraine - $3,082. The average GDP per capita for the EU was $30,240, with Bulgaria closing the ranks at $ 7,712.
131 Data for 2014 are available at http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-
law-index: Serbia ranked 60th out of 102 countries with a score of 0.50; Ukraine ranked 70th with a score of 0.48. Bulgaria ranked 45th with 0.55. Ukraine scores worse in terms of perceptions of corruption. Data are available at https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014: Serbia ranked 78th out of 175 countries with a score of 41; Ukraine ranked 142th with a score of 26 (0: highly corrupt; 100: clean). Bulgaria and Romania both ranked 69th, with a score of 43.
seven times bigger than Serbia’s and the former’s population exceeds the latter’s by more than six times.
Despite the differences there are good grounds for a comparative study between the EU’s agreements with Ukraine and Serbia. The similarities in the countries’ aspirations vis-à-vis the EU and their comparable socio-economic indicators outweigh the differences in absolute terms, especially for the limited analytical purposes outlined above. The comparison will start with an analysis of the objectives, general principles and institutional provisions of the agreements, including matters of political dialogue, dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms, i.e. the areas where the AAs and SAAs diverge the most (section 4.1.2). What follows is a comparative study of the socio-economic core of the agreements (section 4.1.3), including an analysis of the trade- related commitments, the clauses concerning investment and competition policy, and the expected levels of sectoral cooperation.