COMMUNITY IN U.S THINK TANKS
4.1 The premise of this chapter – concepts and terms
This sub-section briefly reiterates the assumptions made, pertinent to the chosen lines of inquiry in this particular Chapter, on seven accounts: the plausibility of equating policy-researchers with expertise; the relationship between policy-research and China (the country); the existence of a community amongst China policy- research experts; the approach of equating the community with a Bourdieusian ‘field’; the boundaries of what constitutes a ‘think tank’; the appropriateness of including research subjects localised in New York; in addition to the links between China policy-researchers as a community with the construct of being a Bourdieusian field and the influence of being a sociological meso-field.
First, although being contestable, I am not disputing the notion that China policy- research experts can be labelled as experts/specialists on China and/or the realm of U.S.-Sino relations (if that is the way he/she presents themselves as) and if reflecting an aspect (i.e. claimed expertise/specialisation) of ‘social reality’ within the China policy-research community based on how they socially construct and strategise within the architecture of this ‘social field’.
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Most policy-researchers list their areas of expertise/specialisation on their websites – and for the same reason, I am not differentiating the latter term from the former due to both formulations seek, and enjoy, the role of authority (to various degrees) in the public sphere. For example, John A. Bolton, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) frequents in the role as expert-commentator on various Fox News Channel programmes. In fact, the notion of being an expert/specialist served as a main principle for deciding whom would be deemed part of my “sample” – which also would include those who had written extensively on China but without necessarily listing ‘China’ as an area of expertise/specialisation (but for example “East-Asia”). It is a term that policy-researchers are baffled with themselves. In effect, this reflects an important boundary-marker in their self-categorisation as ‘policy-researchers’. Hence, a discussion concerning expertise as an influential factor becomes interesting and warranted to scrutinise as a means to grasp the aforesaid ‘social field’, and consequently representing a finding in its own right (which will be discussed later in this Chapter).
Second, expertise is not precluded to those investigating the People’s Republic of China only.503 With few exceptions, most analysts conduct policy-research in
additional countries and/or themes504 other than China – and occasionally not having
China as a main area of specialisation.505 Moreover, there are also policy-researchers
503 An example relates to Malou Innocent, Foreign Policy Analyst at the CATO Institute, who also researchers Afghanistan and Pakistan (see http://www.cato.org/people/malou-innocent).
504 An example is Debra Liang-Fenton at the US Institute for Peace who researchers democracy and peace across various the African and Asian continents (see http://www.usip.org/experts/debra-liang-fenton).
505 For example, Satu Limaye, Director of the East-West Institute in Washington, DC, who researchers also on the Asia-Pacific in general as well as Japan and India (see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/about- ewc/directory/satu.limaye, n.d.).
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with a particular expertise/specialisation relating to China.506 In the undertaken
study, any policy-researcher who has claimed specialisation/expertise (thus, authority) on China and/or U.S.-Sino relations (or particular aspects of it) has been deemed eligible for this study. There are also nuances – expertise/specialisation on China and in regard to U.S.-Sino relations, are often used interchangeably by think tanks themselves as well as in public discourse – hence, not problematised.
Furthermore, there is what I call “issue-experts”,507 i.e. those who study China (and
might claim/portray some degree of authority in this regard among external audiences). This may be accomplished due to the nature of the issue rather than expertise/specialisation/interest/motivation concerning China and/or U.S.-Sino relations. Seth Cropsey, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, investigates China predominantly due to his expertise in international security and terrorism (naval and maritime issues specifically) where U.S.-China relations in the South-China Sea makes China, indeed, an unavoidable country to include in your research.508
Similarly, Keith Crane, Director of Environment, Energy and Economic Development at the RAND Corporations, repeatedly avoided to answer questions (during our interview) concerning the political aspects of U.S. foreign policies towards China (and U.S.-Sino relations in general) as his specialisation related to
506 For example Louisa Greve, Vice President for Middle East/North Africa, East Asia and South/South East Asia, Multiregional programmes (see http://www.ned.org/louisa-greve), who specialises on democracy particularly in relation to China, and Alan D. Romberg, Distinguished Fellow (East-Asia), at the Henry L. Stimson Center, who focuses specifically on Cross-Strait relations in regard to China (and Asia in general) (see http://www.stimson.org/experts/alan-d-romberg/).
507 Hence, assuming such authority might be intended or unintended – or a result of intentionality, and conscious and unconscious).
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military modernisation (which makes China of utmost importance) but not China per se.509
Third, the existence of a community comprised by policy-research experts on China can be justified by empirical evidence. In an email from Jennifer L. Turner, Director of the China Environment Forum at the Wilson Center, indicates a closely knit congregation of China policy-research people within the DC think tank environment.510 Her colleague at the Wilson Center, Sue Levenstein, a Programme
Assistant on the Asia Programme, expressed when probed about a community:
Absolutely… you know, in my experience, just from interacting with people who work on a particular issue, is that regardless if it’s China or if it’s Pakistan, everyone knows each other. And you go to these think tank meetings and it’s all the same people, who show up, and knowing it is a small world – it is a small world –
everybody knows each other by name.511
As an extension of the evidence imparted above, when interacting with interviewees and other policy-researchers, nobody seemingly rejected the notion of a China
community across the DC think tank environment. Arguably, it is a social
construction, and practised space, which already exist.512 Observations in the field
also support the notion of a China-community, for example in the recycling of speakers.513 This point is echoed by Bryce Wakefield, a Programme Associate (Asia)
at the Wilson Centre:
509 See http://www.rand.org/about/people/c/crane_keith.html.
510 Email correspondence 4th April 2011, Jennifer L. Turner, Wilson Center.
511Levenstein, Sue. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (Wilson Center), May 24, 2011 (006-F).
512 In interviews and invitation to partake in my study via email, I often referred to “China-thinking” and “China- community”. As there are multiple ‘social realities’ (see Martin Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography: Principles in Practice (London: Routledge, 2007), I make no assumption that the boundaries of these community are not varied – a point which ties into the notion of the field being a ‘cross-over field’ which performs a constitutive hybrid social space.
513 This point should not be exaggerated; to some extent it is a natural phenomenon due to think tanks often find themselves only having one or a couple of people working on China (from a methodological point of view, thus, it
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(…) those think tanks will often have the same people speaking (…) for an event at a certain think tank – they basically bring in their expert.514
Importantly, the construction of ‘community’ should not be mistaken as an epistemic community as the descriptions and analysis of China, and in effect U.S-Sino relations, are dynamic and vast within the DC think tank environment. Thus, the Bourdieusian construct of a ‘social field’ differs from Haas’ notion of epistemic communities in several ways:515 China policy-research experts do collectively reflect
a body of professionals pursuing influence through providing knowledge to policy- makers. Furthermore, they are known to each other as some sort of network. However, by no means does this China-field feature policy-researchers who all possess the label as a ‘recognised expert’ or that universal mechanisms concerning how to validate ‘expertise’ is instituted. Furthermore, as a group, they do not share a set of normative and casual beliefs, intersubjective understandings or are creating one mutually acknowledged reality.
Fourth, there are two entwined facets to this point, namely the relevance of approaching the China policy-research community as a field (Bourdieusian sense) on the one hand, and the germane linkage between applying the notion of ‘field’ in regard to the manoeuvrability of “China-thinking” on the other. The former facet relates to elucidating the opportunities, strengths, and limitations that China policy- research experts face during work and production of their “China-thinking”. The Bourdieusian lens provides a vocabulary for analysing the China policy-research
made more sense not to conduct a comparative study of China policy-researchers between think tanks). A more interesting minor point relates to ideological boundaries in this regard; during my time in the field and the myriad of events which ensued, would extremely rarely feature speakers from the other end of that spectrum.
514Wakefield, Bryce. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. May 19, 2011 (005-E). 515 See Peter M. Haas 1992a, op.cit.: 3.
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community coherently – and appropriately so – contemplating on the present relational aspects (as shown above).
This extends to the second facet, herein that “China-thinking” does not evolve detached from cultural structures or organisational factors but rather dialectically in symbiosis with such surroundings – where thinking also relates to negotiated social realities.516 Again, the construct of being a ‘field’ – hence a meso-field – enhances
the focus on the enmeshed macro-structures and micro-individuals and not investigating policy-researchers in isolation.
Fifth, the organisations included in this study are assumed to be identified as ‘think tanks’. However, two of them do not label themselves as such in terms of their self- image.517 For example, National Endowment for Democracy (NED) creates distance
to the ‘think tank’ identity. Louise Greve (NED), states at the very outset in our interview:
NED is not a think tank. It is primarily a grant-making institution. It is a private organisation, organised and incorporated in Washington as a what we call 501(c)3. The classic straight forward non-profit registration status under U.S law. And the intention was to serve, however, a public purpose, which is to provide non- governmental support from the U.S. to counterparts abroad who are working for democracy in their own countries (…) private actor to private actor, but with public money, so it has a public purpose, it has a public character – at the same time NED staff are not governmental employees, we have our own Board of Directors who are
private citizens (…) always bi-partisan (…). It is a mixed character in some ways.518
516 Two such ‘macrostructures’ have been established in this thesis (see Chapter Two); think tanks as a socio- political phenomenon (focal point of this chapter) and U.S.-Sino relations. This does not, of course, imply an assumption that there exist no other relevant and impactful phenomena in this ‘field’.
517 Two out of in 23 think tanks in my “sample”.
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In the aforesaid email from Jennifer L. Turner at the Wilson Center, expresses “we actually don't call ourselves a think tank, but I can explain that later!”519 This point
was echoed by her colleague, Bryce Wakefield:
We are actually not supposed to call ourselves as a think tank, and rightfully so, we are a center for advanced research.520
The justification for including NED and the Wilson Center are based on the following. Epistemologically, this study seeks to grasp the nuances of the multiple ‘social realities’ which exists “out there” where organisations such as NED and the Wilson Center are indeed considered as think tanks. No other interviewees discounted them as such as they are both evident in the broader policy-networks in addition to the general think tank scene. Thus, the identity as ‘think tank’ is externalised by audiences beyond these actors’ self-image.521
This sentiment is accentuated by both NED and the Wilson Center appear, and prominently so, on the influential McGann ranking of influential think tanks.522 Furthermore, the
organisations gladly accepted my invitations to partake in the study (which explicitly targeted, and requested, ‘think tanks’).523
Sixth, this study has included both research subjects as well as think tanks located in New York.524 The rational relates to the following, in addition to appropriately being
519 Email from Turner, Wilson Center. 520 Interview, Bryce Wakefield (005-E). 29.59
521 See C. Lemert and A. Branaman (eds), The Goffman Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1997), 2-3. 522 This is a somewhat two-edge sword, also experienced by Norwegian think tanks which attempt to upheld the academic elevation and thus distance themselves from the “think tank” label (often allotted a binary meaning of ideologised/party-politics), which is relational – herein, ‘think tanks’ perceived as “non-academic”. However, they gladly announce their prominent positions on the McGann ranking. See PRIO and NUPI.
523 See my invitation-email.
524 I conducted three interviews in New York as part of my study (the fourth one was cancelled due to changes in Trevor Houser’s itinerary, Visiting Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a Partner at the Rhodium Group).
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part of a “convenience sampling”. For example, Dan H. Rosen who works, and was interviewed, at the Rhodium Group located on 10 East 40th Street address in New York, is a Visiting Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (DC).525 This makes him an eligible interviewee and I would argue that his physical
location would rescind the counter-argument. The same applies to Leland R. Miller who works in a New York based global strategy and management consultancy firm, but is conjunctionally affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council (in DC) as a Fellow in International Economics.526
Additionally, the head-quarters of the Asia Society is located on a fashionable 725 Park Avenue address (in New York), but has a very active branch-office in Washington, DC, where I attended several events on Chinese Outward Direct Investment in the United States, and socio-historic comparisons of India and China.527 Thus, in all instances, they are affiliated via their organisations to
Washington, DC. And again, from a social constructionist perspective, their presence in DC also makes them part of the think tank environment and surrounding ‘social realities’ there, and I am not “authorised” to discount these nuances in a study aiming to be informed by the field-data (“bottom-up”). In fact, it provides a ‘social reality’ concerning the relationship between the DC and New York think tank environment.528
525 See Dan H. Rosen, http://www.iie.com/staff/author_bio.cfm?author_id=18.
526 See Leland R. Miller http://www.avascentinternational.com/International/About/Leadership/Leland-R- Miller.aspx.
527 On 21 June and 27 June 2011, respectively.
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