Priority Intuitions

As well as having intuitions about the accidental (or otherwise) nature of the modal correlations, many people judge the following claims to be true:

A. The flower is red because21 _{the flower is maroon}

B. The bicycle exists because of the existence and arrangement of the wheels, spokes, handlebars, etc

C. <a man exists>22 _{is true because Pythagoras exists}

D. {Pythagoras} exists because Pythagoras exists

E. <Pythagoras exists> is true because Pythagoras exists F. God loves X because X is good23

G. [Pythagoras exists] 24 _{obtains because Pythagoras exists}

H. 2+2=4 because 2 exists and 4 exists whilst judging the following to be false:

a) The flower is maroon because the flower is red

b) The arrangement of wheels, spokes, handlebars, etc exists because the bicycle exists

c) Pythagoras exists because <a man exists> is true d) Pythagoras exists because {Pythagoras} exists

e) Pythagoras exists because <Pythagoras exists> is true f) X is good because God loves X

g) Pythagoras exists because [Pythagoras exists] obtains h) 2 exists and 4 exists because 2+2=4

Let’s call the judgements that claims like (A) through (H) are true, while (a) through (h) are false, priority intuitions. The observation that we have these intuitions constitutes the                                                                                                                

21 _{I use ‘because’ as a neutral way of expressing these claims (i.e. a way that does not commit one to}

thinking there are grounding relations). Those who think that we need to posit a relation of grounds to explain these (and other) cases, will rearrange the relevant sub-sentential phrases and read ‘because’ as ‘grounds’.

22 _{I use <P> to indicate the proposition that P.}

23 _{Debates about the truth of (F) date back (at least) to the scenes described in Plato’s Euthyphro dialogue}

(the dialogue reportedly took place in 399BCE. Translation published 2002). The truth of (F) is contentious, with some believing (f): X is good because God loves X. Importantly, those disposed to endorse (F) will deny (f), and vice versa. I will account for this divergence in Chapter 4. It is less clear that defenders of grounding can do so.

24 _{I will use [square brackets] to indicate facts, which I take to be structured entities comprised of objects,}

second explanandum. This list of priority intuitions is, of course, far from exhaustive.25

Yet it serves to give a flavour of the kind of intuitions that need to be explained.

Notice that the priority intuitions have many commonalities. Firstly, they concern

non-diachronic connections, as there are no cases where one relatum exists at t1 and the

other exists at t₂. Intuitions regarding diachronic priority and dependence are another kettle of fish, and are not taken to be evidence for the existence of grounding relations, but evidence for the existence of causal relations, which I assume to be diachronic.26 _{Some of}

the listed cases are synchronic, such that each relatum exists at the same time. This is so for cases (A) and (B) (and perhaps (G)). The bicycle and its parts exist simultaneously, and thus the intuition of priority between the bicycle and its parts is an intuition of synchronic priority. Likewise, the flower manifests the property of being red and the property of being maroon at the same time. Other cases are not best described as synchronic, for at least one relatum is an abstract object, and is therefore not best thought of as existing at a time. For instance, it is odd to attribute a temporal location to a set, or the truth of a proposition, or God’s attitudes. As such, I think of these cases as

atemporal rather than synchronic.27 _{Thus, I am using the term ‘non-diachronic’ to capture}

25 _{The following is a longer—yet clearly still not exhaustive—list of the kind of claims one sees in this}

literature. Some of these claims are more plausible than others. As such, I am not endorsing the below list—its role is merely illustrative:

• The champagne glass is fragile because of the crystalline bonds between its component molecules • Action X is wrong because it will cause a great amount of suffering and no happiness

• James is in a state of pain because his C-fibres are firing • Dispositional properties are posterior to categorical properties • Mental properties are instantiated in virtue of physical properties • Singleton sets are grounded in their urelements

• <the rose is red> is true because the rose is red • Wholes are metaphysically explained by their parts • Smiles ontologically depend on mouths

• Sets ontologically depend on their members

• Events or states of affairs ontologically depend on their participants

• Chemical substances ontologically depend on their molecular/atomic constituents • Tropes ontologically depend on their bearers

• Aristotelian universals (e.g. redness) ontologically depend on their bearers (e.g. objects that are red) • Holes ontologically depend on their hosts

• Boundaries ontologically depend on their hosts

• The fact that this action is wrong obtains in virtue of the fact that it was done with the sole intention of causing harm

• The fact that this particle is accelerating obtains in virtue of the fact that it is being acted upon by some net positive force

• Endurantists believe that an entity’s existence is ontologically prior to the existence of its temporal parts, perdurantists believe that the temporal parts are prior to the whole

26 _{Some, such as Wilson (forthcoming) have argued that the relation the priority intuitions are tracking is a}

kind of metaphysical causation.

27 _{One might have background views about these cases that make it less odd to think of these cases as}

synchronic. For example, if sets are identical to their members then they occupy a temporal location. Nothing in what follows hangs on a distinction between intuitions of synchronic and atemporal priority.

both synchronic and atemporal cases, and rule out intuitions about diachronic causal dependence.

Secondly, these judgements involve a kind of asymmetry and irreflexivity. When I talk of the asymmetry of the priority intuitions, what I mean by this is that we do not observe a pair of priority intuitions such that we intuit both that ‘x because y’ is true, and that ‘y because x’ is true. We judge that (A) is true and (a) false, and so on for the other cases. Likewise, when I say that there is an irreflexivity of priority intuitions, what I mean by this is that we never observe the intuition that for some x, ‘x because x’ is true.

Thirdly, when we intuit the truth of ‘x because y’, we seem to be intuiting the truth of a certain kind of explanation; what I call metaphysical explanation. Let’s use some fresh examples to highlight this (these cases are drawn from the very same pool of cases that generated (A) through (H)). Consider: 28

1. Action X is wrong because it will cause a great amount of suffering and no happiness

2. The composite object James exists because of the existence and arrangement of the simples that compose him

3. James is in a state of pain because his C-fibres are firing

4. {Socrates} the singleton set exists because its urelement (Socrates, the man) exists 5. The proposition <A friendly Airedale terrier exists> is true because of the

existence of Jasper, the friendly Airedale

6. The champagne glass is fragile because of the crystalline bonds between its component molecules

These propositions are naturally thought of as expressing explanations, not least due to the tell-tale term ‘because’, which tends to be a reliable indicator of the presence of an explanation. Moreover, some theorists of explanation think that explanations are answers to why-questions (van Fraassen, 1980), and each of the above can be broken down into a why-question and associated answer. For example, (1) can be broken down into: ‘why is                                                                                                                

28 _{I foresee the complaint that (1) through (6) are less universally accepted than (A) through (H). Though,}

for example, (1) is more plausible than (F) above (for those of us who are not theists), given the perennial and seemingly irresolvable disagreements between deontologists, consequentialists, virtue ethicists, etc., one might insist that there is no convergence on claims like (1). Thus, I should reiterate that my

assumption of the convergence on the truth of these claims is friendly to my opponent, and that I have the resources to account for diverging intuitions (Chapter 4) where my opponent arguably does not (Chapter 3).

action X wrong?’ and ‘because it will cause a great amount of suffering and no

happiness’. The same interpretation can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to (2) through (6). The cases can also be given a contrastive treatment, which is a further indication of the presence of explanation (van Fraassen, 1980; Schaffer, 2005). Consider example (2):

The composite object James exists (rather than some other composite object existing) because some simples are arranged James-wise (rather than some other way).

Or:

The composite object James exists (rather than fails to exist) because some simples are arranged James-wise (rather than those simples not existing).

In the case of example (3):

James is in a state of pain (rather than pleasure) because his C-fibres (rather than his dopamine pathways) are firing.

Or:

James is in a state of pain (rather than Sam being in a state of pain) because James’ C-fibres (rather than Sam’s C-fibres) are firing.

In the scientific context, the use of contrast classes allows us to focus upon a particular aspect of an explanation. That this technique is of similar use here is indicative that we are, indeed, dealing with a kind of explanation.

Furthermore, debates about the more contentious claims above can be very naturally framed in terms of what explains what. Ethicists, for example, argue at length about precisely what explains why an action is wrong or right (though, non-naturalists aside, they tend to agree that it is some non-moral feature of the world which explains the wrongness or rightness of the action). Whilst (1) above reflects a broadly utilitarian view of first-order ethics, a deontologist could easily substitute her explanation of the wrong-making features of the action. Perhaps X is wrong because X is a murder. These debates are disagreements about what explains the moral properties of actions.

Consider, now, example (2), drawn from the domain of mereology. Mereological nihilists will deny that James, the composite object, exists. However, those universalists

and restrictivists who do accept his existence think that it needs an explanation: James’ existence is explained by the existence and arrangement of the parts from which he is composed, and the same applies to any composite object.29

Moving into the philosophy of mind, consider (3). Dualists, of course, won’t agree that a mental state of being in pain requires explanation solely in terms of a brain state. Yet a certain breed of non-reductive physicalist will suppose that there are mental states that are distinct from physical states, such that the former explains the latter. There is a mental state as of pain, but it is not unexplained. There is only pain because of the physical goings-on in James’ brain.30 _{Case (4) provides us with an example from set}

theory. On the iterative conception, a set is built from its elements, and thus the existence of a set is explained by the fact that its element(s) exist. The existence of a set is not inexplicable.31

Example (5) is drawn from the truthmaking literature. Truthmaker theorists contend that ‘truth depends upon being’, in the sense that whenever some proposition is true, there is some worldly entity that makes it true (Armstrong, 2004).32 _{These theorists}

also contend that the truth of the proposition is explained by the existence of that entity (see McFetridge, 1990; Liggins, 2005). Finally, (6) is an example of a dispositional

property being explained by a categorical property. There is debate about the direction of explanation in such cases. For example, dispositionalists seek to explain categorical properties in terms of dispositional ones.33 _{Regardless, both parties to these disputes}

agree that there are explanatory relationships between these kinds of properties.

In sum, a prima facie case can be made that the observed intuitions have characteristics associated with explanation, and, certainly, the theorists who engage with these kinds of claims treat them as explanations. Of course, this leaves it open that there                                                                                                                

29 _{Notably, if priority monism (as defended by Schaffer, 2010) is true, then, while there is an explanatory}

relationship here, it runs the opposite way to the direction presupposed above: it is the existence of James that explains the existence of his parts.

30 _{If one subscribes to the mind-brain identity theory then there is either no explanation to be had here, or}

this is an unusual case of reflexive explanation. See Jenkins (2011) and §3.5.

31 _{The exception to this rule is the empty set, which has no element to explain its existence. The empty set}

is best thought of as fundamental/unexplained.

32 _{This idea has roots going back to Aristotle, who claimed that “[I]f there is a man, the statement whereby}

we say that there is a man is true, and reciprocally—since if the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, there is a man. And whereas the true statement is in no way the cause of the actual thing’s existence, the actual thing does seem in some way the cause of the statement’s being true: it is because the actual thing exists or does not that the statement is called true or false.” (Aristotle, 1984:22, quoted in Schaffer, 2016).

are good reasons to suppose that these are not genuine cases of explanation at all, and hence not cases of metaphysical explanation. I will not take a stand on this. I merely seek to point out that some will think that the priority intuitions are intuitions about what explains what, and such folk will expect particular features from an explanation of the priority intuitions (see §2.4). In what follows, I will take seriously the idea that the priority intuitions are intuitions about metaphysical explanation. This is charitable to my opponent, for if there are no metaphysical explanations, then there is no argument to be made that grounding relations are indispensable to account for their truth.