The Problem of Demandingness 166 !

The literature on demandingness is vast, and it is deserving of far more attention than I am able to give it here. However, given the level of effort expanded individualism requires of individual agents, I will briefly address some of the concerns of demandingness that my discussion is likely to raise. Beginning with an explanation as to why my approach may appear overly demanding, I then turn to a discussion of the ways in which it does not actually ask as much of individuals as might be expected, and that complaints of demandingness are not necessarily damaging to an account if that account accurately reflects the harm in which an agent has been involved. Finally, I discuss the argument that demandingness should not be our primary focus when faced with the extreme moral problems that current social structures are perpetuating. An initial reaction to the idea of expanded individualism might be to simply reject a position that holds individuals responsible for social structural harms. Due to the nature of these harms and the difference that individual participants make to social structures, the obligations to redress harms in which an agent has participated, and the requirements to work towards the reform of structural processes which most people see as being beyond the concern of individuals, appears incredibly demanding. The minute, often indiscernible difference an individual’s participation makes to a social structural harm makes suggestions that such participation is blameworthy appear disproportionate and unfair. The inability of individual agents to alter these structures alone also makes such responsibility seem never-ending. There is no way for agents to fully discharge their moral responsibilities for participation in social structures.

Another reason this position seems so demanding is that participation, as well as the harm it produces, has become a normalised part of our daily lives. In a different situation, we would see participation in large-scale harm as something more morally problematic, something to be avoided and redressed. For example, people would not accept the reintroduction of institutionalised slavery, as this is something that has become universally morally unacceptable. Yet due to the widespread acceptance of harmful social processes, many continue to participate in similarly harmful social structures, but fail to recognise their action as participation in harm. We are highly influenced by the opinions of others in our community when it comes to what we

167 think reasonable and demanding.336 _{Therefore when few people, if anyone, question our}

involvement in social structural harm, we see little reason to question it ourselves. This problem of perception is not in itself much of a criticism of expanded individualism, as I have argued before it is quite possible for agents to have moral responsibilities that they fail to acknowledge. Rejecting expanded individualism on the charge of over-demandingness overlooks an important consideration of the content of the requirements of addressing social structural harms. This approach does require agents to put more thought into their daily interactions with others through social interactions and participation in structural processes. However, due to the massive amount of inequality involved in many of these exchanges, the actual amount of sacrifice required of participating individuals is not necessarily that high. If we reflect on an earlier example regarding the cost of trainers and the amount a factory worker is paid per item, we can see that very small increases in retail costs, or slight reduction in profits, can have a profound effect.337

Where agents can drastically improve the lives of others, particularly others who they have negatively effected through participation in large-scale harm, expecting agents to alter their involvement in structural processes to render these less harmful is quite reasonable.

Since the responsibility for social structural harm stems from participating in bringing this harm about, that an account requires agents to redress the harms they have helped bring about is not itself demanding; it merely asks agents to take responsibility for their actions and the harm they have caused. As Goodin notes, ‘[i]f anything, we ought to be blaming people for not doing the right thing without moral nagging.’338 _{It has been common knowledge for some time, for}

instance, that the demand for cheap clothing drives the continued use of sweatshop labour. Although agents know this to be the case, discount clothing retailers continue to thrive. Of course some agents will shop in these stores due to their own financial hardships, but many more do so who have no such appeal to necessity.339

Even if the demands of expanded individualism did require a lot of sacrifice on the part of more affluent participants in social structural harm, this in itself is not a sufficient reason to argue that the position is in some sense incorrect or misguided. This line of reasoning has been criticised by many, including Meyers who states that arguments suggesting that moral obligations which conflict with self-interest and profit are excessively demanding and therefore cannot be

336 _{Matthew Braddock, ‘Defusing the Demandingness Objection: Unreliable Intuitions’, Journal of Social Philosophy,} 44 (2013), 169-191, (p. 175).

337 _{See chapter 5.5 (ii).} 338 _{Goodin, p. 2.}

339 _{There is a further problem with defending the manufacturing of sweatshop-produced goods to provide clothes for} the poor, in that this merely deflects attention from the problem that some people in affluent countries lack the means to reasonably meet their basic needs without resorting to the exploitation of others.

168 required are completely unrealistic.340 _{It is not the case, when analysing an agent’s moral}

responsibilities, that we first decide what an agent thinks are reasonable expectations to which they are happy to be held, and then consequently work out what falls within that scope. We look to what an agent does and does not do in the world and how this measures up against what we think morality requires of them. In a world with huge amounts of inequality and international social structures which work to the advantage of the affluent, some agents will inevitably be required to do more to address these moral concerns than others.341 _{Meyers argues that many}

agents in affluent countries have demanding moral obligations concerning the global poor precisely because they are benefitting from their exploitation.342

A further argument in support of maintaining that affluent agents bear demanding moral obligations towards the global poor is based on the fact that many people in the world are currently living in what can certainly be referred to as an emergency situation. Ashford has argued that, given the extent of suffering currently endured by the global poor, any ‘complaints of unfairness from the affluent are outweighed by the demands of those in dire need.’343 _{If we take morality}

seriously, and maintain the belief that all people should be treated in a morally acceptable way as equally important moral beings, the current state of the world will lead affluent agents to have drastically more demanding moral obligations than common sense morality might be thought to indicate.344 _{When we compare the standard of living of agents around the world, the extent of the}

inequality and suffering, and the limited redistribution of resources required to transform the lives of millions of disadvantaged people, complaints of demandingness from the affluent are very difficult to justify. Even if it were the case that affluent agents were not involved in bringing about much of this harm, there would still be a strong case for arguing that they would bear demanding moral obligations to alleviate the suffering of the global poor.