The  Problem  of  Exactness

The first objection, raised by Posner and Weisbach, relates to the problem of exactness.

Let us investigate the basis of this claim. Climate change is caused by the accumulation of acts by a large number of actors. The individual duties proposed cannot therefore fit the paradigm of direct duties such as the duty not to harm another human being in

which the duty bearer’s relationship with those he is not to harm is direct and obvious.

It is not possible to link a specific act of pollution to a specific effect of climate change.

Posner and Weisbach therefore argue that individuals should not bear moral responsibilities for climate harms, since we cannot say exactly what harm each individual has caused. This argument implies that individuals can only be responsible for direct harms in which the causal chain between actor and effect is simple and obvious. Assigning climate responsibilities to individuals would require deviating from direct, causal principle for duty allocation, and resorting to some kind of ‘rough

justice’.¹²¹

I will defend the multi-actor approach against this objection by proposing three possible responses. In doing so, I will show that this problem does not pose a significant

challenge to our multi-actor approach.

First, several theorists have argued that individuals can bear duties in cases where the action-effect relationship is complex. For example, Thomas Pogge has famously argued that individuals in the developed world bear causal responsibility for the dire situation of the global poor. Pogge argues that ‘the citizens and governments of the wealthy societies, by imposing the present global economic order, significantly contribute to the persistence of severe poverty and thus share institutional moral responsibility for it.’¹²² Pogge’s argument leads him to advocate a negative duty not to uphold unfair

institutions. Clearly, in this example, as in the case of climate change, the link between duty bearers and rights bearers is complex and indirect. It would be extremely difficult to identify the effect of an act of an individual person in the developed world on a poor person in the developing world, and yet, by advocating a negative individual duty, Pogge is claiming that individuals in the developed world share in the causal

responsibility for the poverty that exists in the developing world. To defend his claim, Pogge appeals to institutionally grounded duties, since institutions are capable of having an effect on the lives of those in poor countries and also of being upheld or affected by those in developed countries in the current global order. The institution carries the link between individual duty bearer and end effect. This is one example of a situation in which it is impossible to identify a precise causal chain between specific action of an individual and effect, yet in which individual duties are advocated.

121 Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice, 117.

122 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 121.

In the case of climate change, Cripps has also argued for individual responsibilities. She addresses the contentious complex nature of the relationship between individual actions and climatic effects, specifically addressing the fact that ‘it is difficult, if not impossible, to pin down individuals responsible for climate change’, due to the fact that climate change is caused by the actions of many individuals.¹²³ However, this does not lead her to the conclusion that individuals can therefore not be bearers of climate duties, but simply that we must look at the relationship in a different way. Cripps instead argues that ‘demands on individuals in such cases are most appropriately identified by

reference to the harm for which we, collectively, are responsible, and our corresponding collective duty to do something about it.’¹²⁴ This does not require identifying a

collective with a specific identity, but simply requires awareness that the individuals are part of a ‘putative’ group, which, as a whole, is responsible for dangerous levels of pollution. As Cripps argues, ‘collections of individuals who do not constitute formalized, acknowledged groups can and do cause great, and morally regrettable, harms.’¹²⁵ It would be wrong, therefore, to dismiss individual responsibilities in such cases simply because the type of relationship between action and effect is complex.

Cripps therefore defends a principle of ‘weak collective responsibility’ in which three criteria must be met in order to hold individuals responsible for actions caused by a collective. First, the harm must have been ‘reasonably expected to have been foreseen’, thus meaning that the individuals were not reasonably unaware of the possible impact of their actions.¹²⁶ Second, the individuals must have been reasonably expected to be aware that there were other individuals whose combined efforts would be enough to bring about the harm. Third, the harm must have been ‘collectively avoidable’, meaning that there were alternate ways in which the individuals who constitute the ‘putative group’ could have acted to avoid the harm.¹²⁷ In the case of climate change and individuals as duty bearers, we can see that there are many individual persons whose actions can be considered to fulfil all three criteria. We do not need to show the exact causal chain between action and effect, but simply that the person in question had enough knowledge about the likely effects that his or her actions would have. This is enough to confer moral responsibility on the actor as part of a group of actors who also share the responsibility.

123 Elizabeth Cripps, ‘Climate change, collective harm and legitimate coercion’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 14:2 (2011): 172.

124 Elizabeth Cripps, ‘Climate change, collective harm and legitimate coercion’, 173.

125 Elizabeth Cripps, ‘Climate change, collective harm and legitimate coercion’, 173.

126 Elizabeth Cripps, ‘Climate change, collective harm and legitimate coercion’, 175.

127 Elizabeth Cripps, ‘Climate change, collective harm and legitimate coercion’, 175.

A second response questions the logic of Posner and Weisbach’s argument. They argue against individual duties, whilst affirming state duties. However, it is not clear that the problem of exactness disappears when we are considering state actions. Whilst we can establish estimations of historic emissions of states, and could use this to calculate an approximate share of ‘blame’ if we so wished, the problem of exactness is still there.

For example, we cannot say which exact harms the emissions of the United States or China have caused. The argument raised against individual duties does not seem to be an argument against individual duties specifically. Instead, it amounts to an argument against climate duties in themselves, where this argument relies upon a backward-looking principle that can never be exact. So if we think that causal responsibility for past emissions is at all relevant for an account of climate duties then we cannot use the problem of exactness as a reason to dismiss individual duties specifically.

The argument of the second response relates to Posner and Weisbach’s allocation of responsibility for emissions that have already taken place. However, we also need principles for distributing responsibility for limiting current and future emissions. This raises a third objection. These principles are independent to claims of historic

responsibility, and are less sensitive to the problem of exactness. This is because we can make plausible general predictions about the effects of our combined actions. We know that climate change is not a direct, instant action-harm problem, but the effects of emissions on the climate are foreseeable and we can make use of this knowledge in making choices about our actions. Scientific research tells us that the build up of greenhouse gases in the air is causing the climate to change and beyond a certain point this will lead to serious harms. This is the key concept of foreseeability that Cripps refers to. When we consider the problem of exactness and current responsibilities, it is clear that the foreseeability of climate harms enables actors to make informed choices about their actions. It is this foreseeability of the effects of the actions that can be used to justify the attribution of responsibilities to various actors.

I have provided three responses to the problem of exactness. First, I showed that whilst individual effects on the climate cannot be calculated in an exact matter, individuals can contribute to climate change in a very real way as part of the aggregate of actors that are contributing to climate change. Their contribution to this group links them to the

impacts caused as a result of the cumulative emissions. Second, I showed that Posner and Weisbach’s backwards-looking claim was not only applicable to individual level duties but also state level duties, which they accept. Third, I argued that their argument

was not relevant to forwards-looking principles, and therefore did not undermine the argument for individual duties for current and future emissions. The problem of exactness, therefore, does not provide us with good reason to reject our multi-actor approach.