Problems With NDM

There are clearly strong theoretical reasons for professional or expert practice to be examined through the theoretical lens of NDM. However, Kahneman (2011) has argued (and for some time) that an over reliance on Type 1 (NDM) thinking can lead to the inappropriate application of heuristics to problems that demand greater thought and consideration. Heuristics are explicit or tacit cognitive rules that provide short cuts through to solutions of encountered problems. They work in two ways, firstly by directing attention to only key information or cues in the environment, thus avoiding committing resources to non-important cues. Secondly, by connecting cues quickly to known patterns of information and/or ready made solutions (c.f. with the second and third methods of RPD). Indeed, it is likely that without the capacity to draw on heuristics coping with everyday life would be almost impossible. However, Kahneman argues that societal culture demands that practitioners look like they are in always in control and decisive. Experts are very quickly hung for their indecisiveness, just watch

patients do it with doctors, students do it with lecturers, (poor) lecturers do it with students, interviewers do it with interviewees and performers certainly often do it with their coaches. So much so the continued application of heuristics almost becomes habitual.

This issue is also reinforced by the way humans recognise expertise. Kahneman and Klein, (2009) suggest that expertise is typically confirmed through peer review, i.e. the expert is the person recognized as being so by his or her peers (in coaching this could be players, staff, press, managers etc.). As such, if the peer support (and surrounding system) reinforces the need to looking decisive and ignores or even ‘punishes’

thoughtfulness then this is the approach that will emerge. It is in this space that

Kahneman argues real problems can occur – such as the economic crash (Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Kahneman, 2011).

Further to the problem of inappropriate application of heuristics, Kahneman also notes that a reliance on Type 1 thinking also increases the likelihood that dispositional biases, that all humans have, can guide action in a tacit uncontrolled manner. As with heuristics, biases do serve as important guides to human behaviour. However they can also hinder or reduce critical self reflection as noted by Tetlock (2005);

M the work of cognitive conservatism: the reluctance of human beings to admit mistakes and update beliefs. The other is the self-serving attribution bias: the enthusiasm of human beings for attributing success to ‘internal’ causes, such as the shrewdness of one’s opinions, and failure to external ones such as bad luck (p128).

Note also the piquant observations of Galbraith (cited in Gilovich & Griffin, 2002, p 7); “when faced with the choice between changing one’s mind and proving that there is no need to do so, almost everyone gets busy on the proof”. Both quotes point to ‘thinking through decisions’ as being low on people’s priorities if ready-made solutions exist. Of course, if no solution exists, people should have to think things through especially if the answer is important, given that they can resist socially generated pressures to provide quick decisive answers so as to maintain their apparently ‘expert’ status.

Within coaching one issue that exemplifies this issue is in the domain of talent identification and development. Recent research (e.g. Abbott, Button, Pepping, & Collins, 2005; McCarthy & Collins, 2014) has displayed that many past and present approaches are too readily based around the decisions of coaches towards applying high performance philosophies of selection and de-selection to attain more immediate and short term goals of having the best age group team. This approach was heavily

influenced by the coach’s desire (impression management bias) to generate an impression of being a winning coach, which was socially reinforced by significant others in the first place. As such, the coach continues to be drawn to select age group players who fit a profile and coach them in a way to achieve results rather than work to long-term development agendas; in short, apply a flawed ‘heuristic’ that ignores

information which shouldn’t have been ignored.

Kahneman argues that if motivated to think carefully, people will reflect on their

experiences and should/may seek external input (I acknowledge knowing where to look for this is probably crucial) to develop understanding and better actions. It is when individuals stop (or never start) doing this that inherent biases aligned with heuristics begin to dominate decision making, especially if important peers, perhaps unwittingly, recognize actions as being ‘expert’. There are obvious knock on effects here for how ‘communities of practice’ operate. As one important example, social reinforcement of increasingly ‘routinized’ decisions will almost inevitably stunt the growth of the coach, even if she/he had already achieved justifiably expert status. Without constant critical reflection and appropriate innovation, such ‘decisive’ experts will fall behind.

A further related problem with an over reliance on NDM can occur from expecting experts to always be expert in their responses to immediate events. While NDM relies on the expert being able to recognize some environmental cues (while ignoring others), connect them to relevant actions and make a decision, we must also acknowledge that coaches do come across situations that they do not recognize, with subsequent actions being far from expert (Bowes & Jones, 2006). Consequently, the coach will inevitably default to use of a heuristic that is biased by the moment they are in: for example, the first time a coach comes across a performer who breaks down in tears during training and needs to respond. This response will be heuristically based and probably driven by the emotion the coach was feeling at the time. Whatever the response, it may often not be driven by expert recognition.

As Kahneman and Klein (2009) would argue, if the coach recognizes this response as being weak (Anderson, 1987) then the moment can be debriefed and development can occur – i.e. the coach should then engage in critical incident reflection (Gilbert &

Trudel, 2001) but notably against the kind of external criteria described earlier.

However, if there is an over-confidence and/or no recognition/consideration that a sub- optimum solution may have been used, then no learning will occur and mistakes will inevitably occur again in the future.

I return, therefore, to the initial question of what the limitations of NDM are. When coaches forget what made them expert in the first place, is where the answer lies.

Subsequently, most situations are encountered with an (over) confidence that a quick and correct response exists; consequently NDM can quickly turn to biased heuristic problem solving.