Processes at three interactive levels

The MLP framework (Geels 2012) is based on the premise that transitions in society are a result of the interplay of various developments at three analytical levels: 1) Niches of usage where innovations can be tested, 2) The regime of established practices and rules and 3) An exogenous framing landscape. The levels coexist in a hierarchy of stability, where the niches attempt to infiltrate the more stable regime, which in turn is embedded in the landscape. Due to the MLP’s non-linear form and its heuristic nature, it requires the analyst to use their cognitive faculty in order to appreciate the multifaceted issues and questions that arise from the MLP.

Figure 7.1 provides an ideal-typical representation of the way the three levels interact dynamically in the unfolding of socio-technical transitions. Although each transition is unique, the general dynamic is that transitions come about through the interaction between processes at different levels:

1. Niche-innovations build up internal momentum,

2. Changes at the landscape level create pressure on the regime, and

3. Destabilisation of the regime creates windows of opportunity for niche-innovations (Geels 2012).

Figure 7.1 Multi-level perspective on transitions. Source: Geels 2012.

Figure 7.2 Exploitation of windows of opportunity for electromobility in Norway, to be read from left to right as a chain of events. Arrows indicating opportunities arising from previous events. Source: Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt 2015.

The success of BEVs in Norway seems to be a result of the long-term, stable political framework built up piece by piece by many actors and stakeholders (Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt 2015). The BEV policies were found to become strong because of outspokenly positive politicians, a weak ICE regime, the early establishment and endurance of a BEV regime, efforts to establish a Norwegian BEV industry and a lack of counterforces. In addition, many windows of opportunity opened up, enabling stakeholders to lobby for large incentives over the years as seen in figure 7.2. Heavy vehicle taxes have given room for tax reduction incentives rather than direct subsidies. The incentives remained in place over a very long period with low BEV sales, a situation keeping the cost of incentives low. Over the years, this situation has grown into a stable framework.

The framing of the policies has evolved from first allowing the testing of BEVs, then to support industrial development, and finally the BEV policy was framed as a climate mitigation measure, a situation leading to higher acceptability for the policies, in line with Geels, Dudley and Kemp (2012). The lack of vehicle production in Norway means that the ICE regime actors are not affected much by which vehicle type they sell, although the dealers’ workshops may have less work as BEVs have less maintenance requirements. The car manufacturers in the international landscape (in the Norwegian case) may however fear losing sales of their existing products, as the consumers buy BEVs instead of ICEs.

Vehicles were supplied by small independent actors in limited numbers and only in some areas up to 2010. These vehicles were expensive and rather basic. In 2010/11, the traditional auto-importers could take advantage of the large package of incentives fought for during two decades by the independent EV regime actors. They applied all their experiences, resources and competences into launching a number of BEV models into the Norwegian market. Suddenly BEVs became available all over Norway in unlimited numbers, with a very attractive package of incentives to stimulate the sales process. Sales took off as new models came into the market, reaching an unprecedented 20% market share in quarter 1 2015.

A proposed general multi-level perspective (MLP) model for the BEV market development in Norway is shown in figure 7.3. The relevant activities at the landscape, regime and market levels are summed up. Further details are found in Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt (2015). The BEV activities in the Norwegian market must also be seen in relation to attempts to establish biofuel, PHEV and FCEV regimes in the same period (Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt 2015). From 2010, a BEV regime emerged inside the ICE regime, but merging with the independent BEV regime actors presented earlier. The result is a substantially strengthened BEV regime. PHEVs have suffered from lack of incentives, but also from few models being available. Since 2014, the sales of PHEVs have been progressing steadily, and a more stable PHEV regime is now being established supported by larger incentives and more models that are attractive. The hydrogen and biofuels regimes have suffered setbacks during the latest years in Norway. Large industrial actors have given up their hydrogen efforts, and a tax on biofuels has been introduced. The MLP model has been proven useful in explaining the dynamics of the policy framework and the introduction of incentives, the actors responding to or

influencing this framework, and consumers gradually picking up BEVs at the dealers. It also demonstrates the way the long BEV history in Norway gave the traditional car manufacturers a head start in the Norwegian market as they established a new BEV regime within the ICE regime system. This new regime could utilize the effects of all

the results built up by the independent BEV regime over a period of two decades. The success of BEVs in Norway is thus the result of a long chain of events and opportunities that could be exploited. Other countries can be inspired by Norway, but may need to follow other paths as different windows of opportunity open up.

Figure 7.3 Multi-level perspective framework for analysing electromobility in Norway. Source: Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt 2015 (Adapted from Geels 2012).

The BEV privileges in the Norwegian policy framework may have suboptimal effects. The future may consist of fragmented markets with multiple dominant designs, i.e. BEVs for short-distance travels, for cities, and FCEVs and PHEVs for longer distance travel, and biofuels for heavy-duty vehicles. Too much focus on BEVs could lead to a risk that other options are not developed. It should however be noted that all BEV incentives also apply to FCEVs, and that PHEVs are taxed less than ICE vehicles.

Using the classification of Geels and Schot (2007), the BEV diffusion seems to be on a transformation path internationally, where moderate pressure on the ICE regime from CO2 regulations and incentives in some countries lead to a gradual establishment of a

BEV regime. The BEV regime grows out of the old regime through a reorientation of the propulsion system of automobiles while keeping other basic vehicle features unchanged. In Norway, the policies and pressure from the landscape have been much larger, leading towards a “technological substitution path”.

The competitiveness of other technologies and the ability to provide incentives for these technologies have been hampered by the strong BEV regime in Norway. An

example is the limited incentives available to PHEVs. The difference between the technologies can be considered a result of the strength of the perennial BEV regime and its ability to influence politicians, but also the political uncertainty about how technologies that can be used in more or less environmentally friendly manners will be used in practice. A PHEV can operate either with a large percentage of driving in electric mode using electricity recharged from the grid, or as a hybrid vehicle using gasoline or diesel.