As for other commodities traded by the English East India Company, the EEIC was dependent on intermediary merchants to procure raw silk. Intermediary merchants linked export merchants, such as the EEIC and producers. The Company’s reliance on intermediaries however, meant that the European companies were often unable to procure the quantity and quality of goods needed and could not reprimand the deceitful behaviour of some merchants. These problems were imbedded in the procurement system.
In the case of raw silk, the system of procurement was also highly fragmented with many intermediaries involved in the process. The necessity of rewinding ‘country- wound’ silk introduced an additional stage of production and further complicated the procurement process. The Company lacked the power to enforce the supply of the quantity and quality of silk it demanded.
The most widely used system of procurement by the European companies was the dadni system.86 In the dadni system, a merchant was contracted to supply the Company with an agreed quantity of a specific commodity for which he received an advance payment, called ‘dadni’.87 Apart from its inability to fully control the quantity
and quality of procured goods, the EEIC often faced the threat of losing its investment as merchants “refused to give security for the dadni advanced to them”.88 In 1753 the
86 Sushil Chaudhuri, ‘Merchants, Companies and Rulers: Bengal in the Eighteenth Century’, Journal of
the Economic and Social History of the Orient 31 (1), 1998, p. 76. Dadni merchants retained a great deal of power because they could act together and stand against the EEIC. Rila Mukherjee, ‘The Story of Kasimbazar: Silk Merchants and Commerce in Eighteenth-Century India’, Review Fernand Braudel Center 17 (4), 1994, pp. 500 and 520; Davini, ‘Una Conquista Incerta’, pp. 23-24.
87 Chaudhuri, ‘Merchants, Companies and Rulers’, pp. 76-77. 88 Ibid. p. 77.
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EEIC decided to switch to the gomasta system.89 Gomastas were paid agents who
procured goods on behalf of the Company.90 The EEIC was not the first European company to switch to the gomasta system. The Dutch Company experimented with this system from 1747-49. However, the gomasta system also produced problems. In particular, the Dutch Company experienced “considerable difficulty in finding a sufficient number of capable gomastas and in maintaining uniformity of standards”.91
Similarly, the EEIC also encountered several problems using the gomasta system as can be illustrated for raw silk procurement.
The gomasta system was considerably fragmented and the silk passed through the hands of several intermediaries before reaching the EEIC (Figure 1.5). Before the cultivating season started, the EEIC had to advance money to their gomasta merchants, who then advanced it to the principal producers for the promise of silk. The system was further fragmented because these merchants employed other intermediaries. The principal brokers, Dellolls, employed agents of their own called Pycars to purchase Putney. Pycars were supplied with money by the Dellolls and they were to advance this money to peasants so that they could purchase silkworm eggs, prepare hats in which to
89 This meant very sudden decline of power for the dadni merchants. Mukherjee, ‘Story of Kasimbazar’, p. 531.
90 Roberto Davini in his PhD thesis argues that the gomasta system gave the Company more power over producers. The system of procurement became more bureaucratized, contracts were written and specified quantity and quality of goods to be delivered and the deadline for their delivery were set in these contracts. However, in practice the system did not work as smoothly as intended and the problems I describe below illustrate that the gomasta system was not a solution to the problems of the quality of silk. Moreover, it is questionable whether the system increased the power of the EEIC over procurement. The gomasta system was unable to eliminate intermediary merchants from the system of procurement or make them accountable, thus the EEIC continued to face principal-agent problems. See: West Bengal State Archive (WBSA), Committee of Circuit at Cossimbuzar, Letter from Pattle to Committee of Circuit, 25 July, 1772 as cited in Davini, ‘Una Conquista Incerta’, p. 28.
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rear silkworms, till the land for the planting of mulberries, and pay Cuttanies for silk reeling.92
Figure 1.5. Actors Involved in the Procurement of ‘Country-Wound’ Silk in Bengal, 1750s
Figure 1.6. Actors Involved in the Re-Reeling of Silk in Bengal, 1750s
Once procured, the Putney had to be re-reeled. Re-reeling was done by nacauds under the supervision of the head winders, the Sirdars. The employment of Sirdars was crucial because winders were prone to shirking. They needed supervision because, apparently, otherwise they would not wind properly, and would steal the Putney, tear it or take the advance and work for someone else.93 The Kasimbazar factory records show that the EEIC also relied on gomastas for the rewinding of silk (Figure 1.6). In each aurung (silk region) the Company advanced money to a gomasta, who employed winders for
92[G.L.], 1775 fol.: Williamson, Proposals, pp. 15-17. 93 Ibid., p. 17.
Gomasta Dellolls Pycars
Cuttanies
Peasants
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rewinding Putney into five or six qualities, under the A-F quality categories.94 The
Company advanced money to the gomastas around the beginning of each harvest season. The Commercolly factory required the gomastas to send musters of the rewound silk before it made a decision about the quantity of silk it was going to purchase from a particular aurung.
The gomastas who proved reliable were advanced higher amounts of money before they sent musters. Finding reliable gomastas often proved a difficult task. In several cases gomastas did not have enough rewinders in their service.95 The Kasimbazar factory faced deceitful behaviour by gomastas who sent musters of higher quality than the silk procured or overcharged the Company.96 Worse still, in some cases the factory could not even dismiss such gomastas as it would negatively affect the procurement of other goods. Thus was the case of Hissenda, a gomasta involved in both raw silk and piece goods procurement. When the servants in the Kasimbazar factory compared the prices Hissenda charged the Company for raw silk procurement with the ones charged by one of the Assamys – gomastas not in the service of the EEIC – they found that:
he [Hissenda] has overcharged the Goods he has delivered into the Company’s Cottah here, and by that means endeavoured to defraud his Employers of sicca rupees 8427 7 Annas 3 Pice [£913] but notwithstanding we have plainly discovered the above yet we are under a Necessity of continuing him at present in the provision of the Investment, he is already providing for should we turn him out of his Employ, and take the Assammys under our own Care, the Silk
94 The five letter system was sometimes expanded into six when the silk of letter E was very coarse. 95 IOR/G/23/13, 5 December 1757, p. 2, IOR/G/23/13, 30 December 1757, p. 10; IOR/G/23/13, 24 September 1758, p. 105
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Piece Goods Investment would fall greatly short, as we are already informed the Weavers are beginning to sell their goods provided for the Company to other Merchants”.97
This case shows just how difficult the situation was for the Company when the procurement of raw silk was involved. It is not surprising that the adoption of new reeling practices proved impossible. Neither the system of procurement of raw silk, nor the putting-out system under which raw silk was produced were favourable to introducing changes to production techniques.