7 Price of fairness beyond additive setting
A.1 Proof of Proposition 4.5
We first prove the upper bound. Let A = ( π΄1, π΄2, π΄3) be a PMMS allocation and we focus on agent 1. For the sake of contradiction, we assume π1( π΄1) > 43MMS1(3, πΈ). We can also assume bundles π΄1, π΄2, π΄3 do not contain chore with zero cost for agent 1 since the existence of such chores do not affect approximation ratio of allocation π΄ on PMMS or MMS. To this end, we let π1( π΄2) β€ π1( π΄3) (the other case is symmetric).
We first show that π΄1 must be the bundle yielding the largest cost for agent 1. Otherwise, if π1( π΄1) β€ π1( π΄2) β€ π1( π΄3), then by additivity π1( π΄1) β€ 13π1(πΈ) β€ MMS1(3, πΈ), contradicting to π1( π΄1) > 43MMS1(3, πΈ). Or if π1( π΄2) < π1( π΄1) β€ π1( π΄3), since π΄1 and π΄2 is a 2-partition of π΄1βͺ π΄2, then π1( π΄1) is at least MMS1(2, π΄1βͺ π΄2). On the other hand, since A is a PMMS allocation, we know π1( π΄1) β€ MMS1(2, π΄1βͺ π΄2), and thus, π1( π΄1) = MMS1(2, π΄1 βͺ π΄2) holds.
Based on assumption π1( π΄1) > 43MMS1(3, πΈ) and Lemma 2.1, we have π1( π΄1) > 43MMS1(3, πΈ) β₯
4
9π1(πΈ), then π1( π΄3) β₯ π1( π΄1) > 49π1(πΈ) which yields π1( π΄2) < 19π1(πΈ) owning to the additivity.
As a result, the difference between π1( π΄1) and π1( π΄2) is lower bounded π1( π΄1) βπ1( π΄2) > 13π1(πΈ).
Due to π1( π΄1) = MMS1(2, π΄1βͺ π΄2), we can claim that every single chore in π΄1 has cost strictly greater than 13π1(πΈ); otherwise, βπ β π΄1 with π1(π) β€ 13π1(πΈ), then reassigning chore π to π΄2 yields a 2-partition {π΄1 \ {π} , π΄2 βͺ {π}} with max{π1( π΄1 \ {π}), π1( π΄2 βͺ {π})} < π1( π΄1) = MMS1(2, π΄1βͺ π΄2), contradicting to the definition of maximin share. Since every single chore in π΄1 has cost strictly greater than 13π1(πΈ), then π΄1 can only contain a single chore; otherwise, π1( π΄3) β₯ π1( π΄1) β₯ | π΄31|π1(πΈ) β₯ 23π1(πΈ), implying π1( π΄3βͺ π΄1) β₯ 43π1(πΈ), contradiction. However, if | π΄1| = 1, according to the second point of Lemma 2.1, π1( π΄1) > 43MMS1(3, πΈ) can never hold. Therefore, it must hold that π1( π΄1) β₯ π1( π΄3) β₯ π1( π΄2), which then implies π1( π΄1) = MMS1(2, π΄1βͺ π΄3) = MMS1(2, π΄1βͺ π΄2) as a consequence of PMMS.
Next, we prove our statement by carefully checking the possibilities of | π΄1|. According to Lemma 2.1, if | π΄1| = 1, then π1( π΄1) β€ MMS1(3, πΈ). Thus, we can further assume | π΄1| β₯ 2. We first consider the case | π΄1| β₯ 3. Since π1( π΄1) > 43MMS1(3, πΈ) β₯ 49π1(πΈ), by additivity, we have π1( π΄2) + π1( π΄3) < 59π1(πΈ) and moreover, π1( π΄2) < 185π1(πΈ) due to π1( π΄2) β€ π1( π΄3). Then the cost difference between bundle π΄1 and π΄2 satisfies π1( π΄1) β π1( π΄2) > 16π1(πΈ). This allow us to claim that every single chore in π΄1 has cost strictly greater than 16π1(πΈ); otherwise, reassigning a chore with cost no larger than 16π1(πΈ) to π΄2 yields another 2-partition of π΄1βͺ π΄2 in which the cost of larger bundle is strictly smaller than MMS1(2, π΄1βͺ π΄2), contradiction. In addition, since π1( π΄1) = MMS1(2, π΄1βͺ π΄2), we claim π1( π΄2) β₯ π1( π΄1\ {π}), βπ β π΄1; otherwise, βπβ² β π΄1 such that π1( π΄2) < π1( π΄1\ {πβ²}), then reassigning πβ² to π΄2 yields another 2-partition of π΄1βͺ π΄2 of which both two bundlesβ cost are strictly smaller than MMS1(2, π΄1βͺ π΄2), contradiction. Thus, for any π β π΄1, we have π1( π΄2) β₯ π1( π΄1\ {π}) β₯ 16π1(πΈ) Β· | π΄1\ {π}| β₯ 13π1(πΈ), where the last transition is due to | π΄1| β₯ 3. However, the cost of bundle π΄2 is π1( π΄2) < 185 π1(πΈ), contradiction.
The remaining work is to rule out the possibility of | π΄1| = 2. Let π΄1 = {π11, π12} with π1(π11) β€ π1(π12) (the other case is symmetric). Since π1( π΄1) > 43MMS1(3, πΈ) β₯ 49π1(πΈ), then π1(π12) > 29π1(πΈ). Let πβ2 β arg maxπβ π΄2{π1(π) : π1(π) < π1(π11)} (can be empty set) be the
largest subset of π΄2 with cost strictly smaller than π1(π11). Due to π1( π΄1) = MMS1(2, π΄1βͺ π΄2), then swapping πβ2 and π11 would not produce a 2-partition in which the cost of both bundles are strictly smaller than π1( π΄1), and thus π1( π΄2\ πβ2βͺ {π11}) β₯ π1( π΄1), equivalent to
π1( π΄2\ π2β) β₯ π1(π12) > 2
9π1(πΈ). (A-1)
Then, by π1( π΄1) β π1( π΄2) > 16π1(πΈ) and π1( π΄2\ π2β) β₯ π1(π12), we have π1(π11) β π1(πβ2) > 16π1(πΈ), which allows us to claim that every single chore in π΄2\ πβ2 has cost strictly greater than 16π1(πΈ);
otherwise, we can find another subset of π΄2whose cost is strictly smaller than π11 but larger than π1(πβ2), contradicting to the definition of πβ2. As a result, bundle π΄2\ πβ2 must contain a single chore; if not, π1( π΄2) > 16π1(πΈ) Β· | π΄2\ πβ2| β₯ 13π1(πΈ), which implies π1( π΄1βͺ π΄2βͺ π΄3) > 109 π1(πΈ) due to π1( π΄1) > 49π1(πΈ) and π1( π΄3) β₯ π1( π΄2) > 13π1(πΈ). Thus, bundle π΄2\πβ2only contains one chore, denoted by π21. So we can decompose π΄2 as π΄2 ={π21} βͺ πβ2 where π1(π21) β₯ π1(π12) > 29π1(πΈ).
Next, we analyse the possible composition of bundle π΄3. To have an explicit discussion, we introduce two more notions Ξ1, Ξ2 as follows
π1( π΄1) = 4
9π1(πΈ) + Ξ1, π1( π΄2) = 2
9π1(πΈ) + π1(πβ2) + Ξ2.
(A-2)
Recall π1( π΄1) > 49π1(πΈ) and π1(π21) β₯ π1(π12) > 29π1(πΈ), so both Ξ1, Ξ2 > 0. Similarly, let πβ3 β arg minπβ π΄3{π1(π) : π1(π) < π1(π11)}, then we claim π1( π΄3 \ πβ3) β₯ π1(π12); otherwise, swapping πβ3 and π11 yields a 2-partition of π΄1βͺ π΄3 in which the cost of both bundles are strictly smaller than π1( π΄1) = MMS1(2, π΄1βͺ π΄3), contradicting to the definition of maximin share. By additivity of cost functions and Equation (A-2), we have π1( π΄3) = 39π1(πΈ) β π1(πβ2) β Ξ1β Ξ2, and accordingly π1( π΄1) β π1( π΄3) = 19π1(πΈ) + π1(πβ2) + 2Ξ1+ Ξ2. This combing π1( π΄3\ π3β) β₯ π1(π12) yields
π1(π11) β π1(πβ3) β₯ 1
9π1(πΈ) + π1(πβ2) + 2Ξ1+ Ξ2. (A-3) Based on Inequality (A-3), we can claim that every single chore in π΄3 \ πβ3 has cost at least
1
9π1(πΈ) + π1(πβ2) + 2Ξ1 + Ξ2; otherwise, contradicting to the definition of π3β. Recall π1( π΄3) =
3
9π1(πΈ) β π1(πβ2) β Ξ1β Ξ2, then due to the constraint on the cost of single chore in π΄3\ πβ3, we have | π΄3\ π3β| β€ 2. Meanwhile, π1( π΄3\ πβ3) β₯ π1(π12) implying that bundle π΄3\ πβ3 can not be empty. In the following, we separate our proof by discussing two possible cases: | π΄3\ πβ3| = 1 and | π΄3\ π3β| = 2.
Case 1: | π΄3 \ πβ3| = 1. Let π΄3 \ πβ3 = {π31}. Therefore, the whole set πΈ is composed by four single chores and two subsets π2β, π3β, i.e., πΈ = {π11, π12, π21, πβ2, π31, πβ3}. Then, we let T = (π1, π2, π3) be the allocation defining MMS1(3, πΈ) and without loss of generality, let π1(π1) = MMS1(3, πΈ). Next, to find contradictions, we analyse bounds on both MMS1(3, πΈ) and π1( π΄1).
Since min{π1(π21), π1(π31)} β₯ π1(π12) β₯ 12π1( π΄1), we claim that π1( π΄1) β€ 189 π1(πΈ); otherwise π1( π΄1) + π1(π21) + π1(π31) > π1(πΈ). Notice that πΈ contains three chores with the cost at least
2
9π1(πΈ) each, if any two of them are in the same bundle under T, then MMS1(3, πΈ) > 49π1(πΈ)
and consequently,MMSπ1( π΄1)
1(3,πΈ) < 98, contradiction. Or if each of {π12, π21, π31} is contained in a distinct bundle, then the bundle also containing chore π11 has cost at least π1( π΄1) as a result of min{π1(π21), π1(π31)} β₯ π1(π12) and π΄1={π11, π12}. Thus, MMS1(3, πΈ) β₯ π1( π΄1) holds, contradicting to π1( π΄1) > 43MMS1(3, πΈ).
Case 2: | π΄3\πβ3| = 2. Let π΄3\πβ3 ={π31, π32} and accordingly, the whole set can be decomposed as πΈ = {π11, π12, π21, πβ2, π31, π32, πβ3}. Note the upper bound π1( π΄1) β€ 189π1(πΈ) still holds since min{π1( π΄3\ πβ3), π1(π21)} β₯ π1(π12). Then, we analyse the possible lower bound of MMS1(3, πΈ). If chores π12, π21are in the same bundle of T, then MMS1(3, πΈ) > 49π1(πΈ) holds and soMMSπ1( π΄1(3,πΈ)1) < 98, contradiction. Thus, chores π12, π21 are in different bundles in T. Then, if both chores π31, π32 are in the bundle containing π12 or π21, then we also have MMS1(3, πΈ) > 49π1(πΈ) implyingMMSπ1( π΄1(3,πΈ)1) < 98, contradiction. Therefore, only two possible cases; that is, both π31, π32 are in the bundle different from that containing π12 or π21; or the bundle having π12 or π21 contains at most one of π31, π32.
Subcase 1: both π31, π32 are in the bundle different from that containing π12 or π21; Recall π1(π11) > 183π1(πΈ) + π1(πβ2) and the fact min{π1(π12), π1(π21), π1(π31 βͺ π32)} > 184π1(πΈ), the bundle also containing π11 has cost strictly greater than 187π1(πΈ). Thus, MMS1(3, πΈ) > 187π1(πΈ), which combines π1( π΄1) β€ 189π1(πΈ) implying MMSπ1( π΄1(3,πΈ)1) < 97 < 43, contradiction.
Subcase 2: bundle having π12 or π21 contains at most one of π31, π32. Recall π1(π21) β₯ π1(π12) and min{π1(π31), π1(π32)} β₯ 19π1(πΈ) + π1(πβ2) + 2Ξ1+ Ξ2, thus in allocation T there always exist a bundle with cost at least 19π1(πΈ) + π1(π2β) + 2Ξ1+ Ξ2+ π1(π12) and results in the ratio
π1( π΄1)
MMS1(3, πΈ) β€ π1(π11) + π1(π12)
1
9π1(πΈ) + π1(πβ2) + 2Ξ1+ Ξ2+ π1(π12). (A-4) In order to satisfying our assumption MMSπ1( π΄1)
1(3,πΈ) > 43, the RHS of Inequality (A-4) must be strictly greater than 43, which implies the following
π1(π11) > 2
9π1(πΈ) + 2π1(πβ1) + 4Ξ1+ 2Ξ2. (A-5) However, based on the first equation of (A-2) and π1(π11) β€ π1(π12), we have π1(π11) β€ 29π1(πΈ) +
1
2Ξ1 < 29π1(πΈ) + 2π1(πβ1) + 4Ξ1 + 2Ξ2 due to Ξ1, Ξ2 > 0. This contradicts to Inequality (A-5).
Therefore, MMSπ1( π΄1(3,πΈ)1) > 43 can never hold under Case 2. Up to here, we complete the proof of the upper bound.
Next, as for tightness, consider an instance with three agents and a set πΈ = {π1, ..., π6} of six chores. Agents have identical cost functions. The cost function of agent 1 is as follows:
π1(ππ) = 2, βπ = 1, 2, 3 and π1(ππ) = 1, βπ = 4, 5, 6. It is easy to see that MMS1(3, πΈ) = 3. Then, consider an allocation B = {π΅1, π΅2, π΅3} with π΅1 = {π1, π2}, π΅2 = {π3} and π΅3 = {π4, π5, π6}. It is not hard to verify that allocation B is PMMS and due to π1(π΅1) = 4, we have the ratio
π1(π΅1)
MMS1(3,πΈ) = 43.
A.2 Algorithm 1
The following efficient algorithm, which we call π΄πΏπΊ1, outputs an EF1 allocation with a cost at
most 54 times the optimal social cost under the case of π = 2. In the algorithm, we use notations:
πΏ(π) := {π1, . . . , ππ} and π (π) := {ππ, . . . , ππ} for any 1 β€ π β€ π.
Algorithm 1
Input: An instance πΌ with two agents.
Output: an EF1 allocation of instance πΌ.
1: Partition πΈ = πΈ0βͺ πΈ1βͺ πΈ2 where πΈ1 ={π β πΈ | π1(π) < π2(π)} and πΈ2 ={π β πΈ | π1(π) >
π2(π)} (we assume π1(πΈ1) β€ π2(πΈ2) and the other case is symmetric).
2: Order chores such that ππ12(π(π11)) β€ ππ12(π(π22)) β€ Β· Β· Β· β€ ππ12(π(πππ)), tie breaks arbitrarily. For chore π with π1(π) = 0, put it at the front and chore π with π2(π) = 0 at back.
3: Find index π such that π1(ππ ) < π2(ππ ) and π1(ππ +1) β₯ π2(ππ +1).
4: if π = 0 then
5: Run a round-robin algorithm: let each of the agent 1, . . . , π picks her most preferred item in that order, and repeat until all chores are assigned.
6: return the output
7: else
8: Let O be the allocation with π1 =πΏ(π ) and π2 =π (π + 1).
9: if allocation O is EF1 then
10: return allocation O.
11: else
12: find the maximum index π β₯ π such that π2(π ( π + 2)) > π2(πΏ( π )).
13: return allocation A with π΄1 =πΏ( π + 1) and π΄2 =π ( π + 2)
14: end if
15: end if