Proposed conceptual framework

The study of fertility determinants is very complex and there exist many theories or models developed by various scholars. There are also numerous controversial issues. One of the main deficiencies in the existing models is the lack of adequate data to test every variable in the model. It is evident that many elements in these theories cannot be adequately tested from the available data for Pakistan, such as the opportunity cost of women's time, and net wealth flows. Nevertheless, conceptual frameworks suggested by Davis and Blake (1956), Hill et al., (1959), Freedman (1975), the wealth flow theory of Caldwell (1976 and 1982), the proximate determinants of Bongaarts (1978 and 1982) and the institutional approach of Hull (1987) are the guiding principles in studying fertility behaviour.

The relevance of Muslim culture is considered one of the distinguishing factors to differentiate fertility as it evolved over the 1950-80 period of world change (Donaldson, 1991:9). The changes in the demographic situation of Pakistan, the Muslim society in South Asia with the highest fertility, can be examined to ascertain the relevance of different theories explaining fertility transition.

The demographic transition theory is not considered a scientific theory and is a generalization lacking a measurable and specifiable causation mechanism. Nevertheless, this grand generalization remains fundamental to many assumptions upon

which population and development policies are based. The theory itself is based largely

upon the historical experiences of Europe which differed greatly from those of present

day Pakistan.

Mortality declined slowly in Europe over a long period of time, and it was

brought down largely by the improvement in standard of living. The decline in mortality

in Pakistan was caused largely by technological advances transferred from the West and

not so much from improved standards of living. These declines were not only quicker

but brought down the level of mortality below that of early industrial Europe, resulting

in much higher rates o f population growth. The mechanism which probably did most to

bring down fertility in the West, that is the improved standard of living, is still absent in

Pakistan.

Pakistan's rate o f population growth of around three per cent is considered, by the

historical standards o f Europe, high and unprecedented. Because o f high fertility, the

age structure in Pakistan is much younger than it was in Europe, making it much more

difficult to reduce the rate of population growth. The momentum for continuing growth

inherent in the young age structure in Pakistan will ensure a substantial growth in population even if fertility were suddenly to drop to replacement levels.

The present levels of fertility in Pakistan, with a crude birth rate of around 40 per

thousand and total fertility rate o f around six children per woman are much higher than

those o f pretransition Europe. The main reason for this difference is the early and near

universality of marriage in Pakistan. But with fertility so high, it would have to fall a

great deal farther than it did in the West in order to achieve a low rate o f growth. To

date, there has been no evidence o f such a decline in fertility in Pakistan.

There is some evidence that universal primary education may reduce the level of fertility in less developed countries. Primary education, especially for women, may

result in a desire for smaller families by expanding nontraditional opportunities and by

increasing the opportunity costs o f early marriage and familial roles. Education also raises the costs o f children through school-related expenditure while diminishing their

productive value in agriculture and at home. It is also argued that education may make

people more receptive to family planning information.

However, because the school-age population is increasing so rapidly, Pakistan is

having difficulty maintaining even past enrolment ratios, which were quite low.

Pakistan has a very weak education base both quantitatively and qualitatively. Only 26

per cent o f the population knows how to read and write, and only 49 per cent of its

primary and 16 per cent of its secondary school age population is enrolled in school.

The efficiency of the primary education system, measured in terms of dropout and

repeater rates, is among the lowest in the world. The literacy level for the female

population is even lower, 17 per cent, and its enrolment ratio is only 33 per cent

(Government o f Pakistan, 1986:15-18). It appears that with the present population

growth rate of 3 per cent per annum, Pakistan will find it impossible to provide

universal, high quality education within a decade or two even if fertility were to decline

quite rapidly.

Europe's fertility decline was accompanied and reinforced by urbanization and a

movement away from agricultural employment. In Pakistan, however, fertility may

remain high because o f rapid population growth; demand for non-agricultural jobs far

exceeds the supply; and urbanization without urban jobs will not improve the standard

o f living. The scarcity of jobs and, thus, the low standard of living may in part account

for the unusual fact that fertility differentials between urban and rural areas are

negligible.

If the increase in non-agricultural employment of women was a factor in

Europe's reduced fertility, it is not likely to be a factor which will reduce fertility in

Pakistan. The number o f women entering into employment would be severely limited

because of the rapid growth o f working-age population and partly because of the lack of

work prevalent among women.

Because o f the early and near universal marriage in Pakistan there is greater

the proportion marrying than existed in Europe. European marriage patterns prior to the decline in fertility consisted of much later and less universal marriage (Coale, 1986). There has been an increase in the mean age at marriage for females in Pakistan, yet it is still very low, around 17 years. Most girls are married off before they reach the age of 20. The minimum legal age for marriage for females is 16 and for males 18. This was fixed in 1962 and there appears very little chance of raising this farther because of prevailing religious and cultural values of Pakistani society. Only expansion of education for women and girls may help in further raising the age at marriage.

During the 1960s, Pakistan's rate of economic growth was much more rapid than any experienced during the European transition. The rapid growth did not continue during the 1970s, due to political unrest and war with India. Again during the 1980s, the rate of economic growth accelerated indicating a great potential for rapid economic expansion. The rapid economic growth in the 1960s, however, did not result in a reduction of fertility, perhaps because this economic growth was not sustained for a long period and also not accompanied by similar development in the social sector, such as women’s education.

Since World War II the methods of birth control have become much more effective than the traditional methods used in the European decline of fertility. Modem methods of contraception, if acceptable and accompanied with appropriate motivation, provide a greater potential for a rapid fertility decline than existed in Europe. There were no population policies and family planning programmes to supply these contraceptives during the European fertility transition, whereas these are now present in many less developed countries and have the potential to accelerate a decline in fertility. In Pakistan, the family planning approach remains the chief policy instrument for reducing the rate of population growth. But there is widespread disillusionment with the family planning approach as the principal policy instrument for reducing fertility. Several surveys conducted in Pakistan found little evidence of a fertility decline due to use of family planning methods.

It is evident that there is little motivation to control reproduction in Pakistan.

Either it is not within the range of conscious choice to limit fertility, or it is not

perceived to be an economic or social advantage to do so. High fertility and many

children are still considered economically rational at the individual and family level,

even though high fertility is not economically rational from the societal or national

point o f view and there is a concern that rapid growth o f population is likely to intensify

the pressure on resources and erode overall economic welfare (National Institute of

Population Studies and Population Welfare Division, 1990).

Birth control efforts are likely to be effective to some degree only in receptive settings. Usually there are changes in lifestyle or the level of risk affecting living standards before birth control can be successfully introduced. Education, irrigation, grain reserves, transportation, and government planning are some of the changes; policies stressing a population threat to national progress may lead to transition onset. If the progress is not felt at the village level, however, the policies typically will fail (Donaldson, 1991:18).

This study will focus largely on the status o f women and the correlates of

reproductive behaviour, that is family planning and fertility. The decision to concentrate

on fertility control was taken mainly for three reasons. First, Pakistan has invested a

reasonable amount o f its national budget in direct programmes, such as family planning

and integrated health, to curtail Pakistan's high fertility. Investments have also been

made in other programmes, such as agriculture and education, which have indirect

effects on fertility. Second, Pakistan has a long history o f population policy which has

supported family planning. Thirdly, recent family planning prevalence data are

available.

In view o f the high fertility levels, and likelihood of the static role of other

intermediate variables of fertility in Pakistan, the family planning programme appears

to be an important policy instrument for reducing fertility in future. The basic aim of

this study is therefore to explore reasons for low acceptance of family planning and the

examine the status of women in the family and society and to highlight the demographic

and socio-economic context within which family size decisions are made. Therefore a

detailed description of Pakistani society, family functions and status of women in

particular will be given before referring to quantitative data pertaining to the

reproductive behaviour o f women in Pakistan. The proposed conceptual framework,

which incorporates parts o f the theories or frameworks discussed earlier, is intended to

serve as a basis for studying levels and differentials of contraception and fertility in

Pakistan (Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3: Proposed conceptual framework for analysis.

Age at marriage Family Planning Programme Fertility Attitude towards family size Status of women Knowledge of Family Planning Demographic Socio-economic and cultural variables

The proposed framework considers marriage and contraception as the two main intermediate variables which affect the level of fertility. To varying degrees, age at marriage and the practice of contraception are determined by demographic background variables (such as the age of the woman, number of living children), socio-economic variables (education of the woman and her husband, work status of the woman and occupation of her husband, and place of residence) and cultural and environmental behaviour.

The impact of contraception on fertility will be given considerable importance in this study. As indicated in Figure 2.3, background variables have an effect on use of contraception directly as well as indirectly through three other intervening variables, namely, status of women, attitude towards family size and knowledge of family planning methods. These variables also have a direct effect on the use of contraception. The family planning programme also determines the level of use of contraception directly as well as indirectly through knowledge of family planning, status of women and attitude toward family size. The description of the demographic, socio-economic and family planning variables is undertaken in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter contains a brief description of the data source, sample, quality of data, variables used in the analysis and demographic and socio-economic profile of the population under study. After discussing the data and sample, the variables discussed here are grouped into three broad categories: demographic profile; socio-economic profile; and knowledge of, attitude towards and use of family planning methods. Most of these variables will be used in the subsequent analysis. They are examined here to provide a more complete picture of factors influencing the reproductive behaviour of women in Pakistan.

3.2 The data