Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery. concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness.
1. Since rape is now a crime against persons, it should be considered deleted from the text of this article, and has accordingly been excluded in the following discussions, except when necessary.
2. Concubinage and adultery can be prosecuted only by the offended spouse regardless of age and even if incapacitated. A complaint filed by the offended spouse, even if a minor, is valid and operative for purpose of the case (see Quilantan, et al., vs. Caruncho, etc., 21 Phil. 399).
3. To be considered an offended spouse who can initiate criminal action for adultery, one must actually be married to the accused spouse at the time the complaint was filed. Where the supposed offended party, who is a foreigner, had obtained a divorce in his country from the accused before he filed the adultery case in the Philippine he no longer has the status of an offended spouse who can institute such proceedings (Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, ect., et al., G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989).
4. Seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness can be prosecuted exclusively and successively by the following parties: a. Offended party:
(1) Even if she is a minor, she can validly file the complaint (U.S. vs. Gariboso, 25 Phil. 171).
(2) If she is of legal age and not otherwise incapacitated, only she can file the complaint (Benga-Oras vs. Evangelista, ect., et al., 97 Phil. 612).
If she is a minor or is otherwise incapacitated and she refuses or fails to file the complaint, either of her parents, grandparents, or guardian, in that successive order, can file the complaint (People vs. Bangalao, et al., 94 Phil. 354; People vs. Pastores, et al., G.R. No. L-29800. Aug. 31, 1971).
b. Parents, grandparents or guardian in this succeeding order:
(1) Either of the parents can file the sworn written complaint (People vs. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-28810, Mar. 27, 1974; People vs. Mariano, G.R. No. L-47437, Sept. 29, 1983);
(2) Either of the grandparents, whether on the paternal or maternal side; and (3) Legal or judicial guardians (People vs. De la Cruz, 59 Phil. 531).
c. The State, as parens patriae, when the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she could file the complaint and she has no known parents, grandparents or guardian.
5. In adultery and concubinage, only the offended spouse, even if a minor but not otherwise incapacitated, can validly extend the pardon or consent contemplated in those crimes.
6. In seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness, the decisional rules on the validity of a pardon extended to the accused are as follows:
a. The offended minor, if with sufficient discretion, can validly pardon the offender by herself if she has no parents or the offender is her own father and her mother is dead (People vs. Inciong, CA, 1 O.G. 904).
b. The parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended minor cannot extend a valid pardon to the offender without the conformity of the offended party, even if the latter is a minor (U.S. vs. Luna, 1 Phil. 360; People vs. Lacson, CA, 55 O.G. 9460).
c. If the offended party is of legal age and not otherwise incapacitated, only she can extend a valid pardon to the offender. 7. The pardon in seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness, as specified in Art. 344 of this Code and Sec. 4 (now, Sec. 5) of Rule 110, must be express; but in adultery and concubinage, a pardon, whether express or implied, will bar a criminal prosecution (People vs. Guinucud, et al., 58 Phil. 73; People vs. Cornejo, et al., 60 Phil. 785).
8. The subsequent marriage between the offended party and the accused extinguishes the criminal liability of the latter or shall remit the penalty already imposed upon him, together with that of the co-principals, accomplices, and accessories, except:
a. In adultery and concubinage;
b. Where the marriage was invalid or contracted in bad faith in order to escape criminal prosecution (People vs. Santiago, 51 Phil. 68);
c. In “private libel,” or the defamatory imputation to the complainant of the commission of the crimes of concubinage, adultery, seduction, abduction or acts of lasciviousness (People vs. Orzame, CA, 39 O.G. 1168); and
d. In multiple rape, insofar as the other accused in the other acts of rape committed by them are concerned (People vs. Bernardo, 38 O.G. 3479). For the one who marries the offended party, his liability as a principal in the rape he committed and his participation in the other rapes is extinguished; and the liability of the other accused based on or with respect to the their participation in the rape committed by the one who marries the victim is also extinguished, but not their liability in the other crimes of rape committed by them or their other co-accused.
Art. 345. Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity.
1. These are the special provisions on civil liability arising from specific crimes against chastity, which may in proper cases be supplementary to the general provisions on civil liability ex delicto in Title Five, Book One of the Code. It will be noted that acts of lasciviousness are not included in the provisions of this article, possibly because of the precise nature of the relief granted by it. In all events, Art. 2219 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in the crimes against chastity stated therein, including acts of lasciviousness, by the victim as well as by he parents.
2. Three forms of civil liability of the persons guilty of crimes against chastity are provided here, which then included rape before its reclassification. At any rate, since it is in this article where such provisions are still found, the discussions affecting the crime of rape should be taken in relation to Arts. 266-A to 266-D. This article specifies:
a. Indemnification of the offended woman in seduction or abduction. In adultery, the adulterer or paramour, and in concubinage, the concubine may also be ordered to indemnify the offended spouse.
b. Acknowledgment of the offspring, except (1) in adultery and concubinage since only a natural child may be acknowledged; (2) where either the offended party or the accused is married (People vs. Luchico, 49 Phil. 689; People vs. Belandrez, 85 Phil. 874; People vs. Bayani, G.R. No. 120894, Oct. 3, 1996); and (3) when paternity cannot be determined as in multiple rape (People vs. De Leon, 88 Phil. 783 [Unpub.]).
c. Support for the offspring in every case, hence a married man who is the offender must give support, and in multiple rape all the offenders must give support even if paternity be determined (People vs. Veto, 80 Phil. 438).
3. A controversial question is whether in rape cases (and the same may arise adultery, concubinage, seduction cases), where the victim is a married woman, the offender should be ordered to give support to the offspring.
a. In People vs. Sanico (46 O.G. 98), the Court of Appeals ruled that since the rape victim was a married woman, it could not order the offender to support the child, obviously relying on the cases of U.S. vs. Yambao (4 Phil. 204), U.S. vs. Hernandez (29 Phil. 109), and People vs. Luchico, supra, wherein no support was decreed because all the offended parties in those cases were married women.
b. It is suggested that said holdings should be reviewed and revised to the end that as long as the offender’s paternity can be established or presumed, he should support the hapless offspring even if the mother is a married woman. Otherwise, the phrase in this article requiring support “in every case” would be limited only to the so-called natural children and would exclude other illegitimate children whose rights to support are recognized in civil law. The reason given in the Yambao case that to require support would put the accused and the victim in contact is eliminated by the legal provisions that custody of the offspring cannot be given to he offender since there are moral and legal obstacles (Art. 299, Civil Code; Art. 204, Family Code).
The reason why no support could be decreed to be paid by the rapist in Yambao was because the victim was already 4 months pregnant by her husband when she was raped by the accused. In Hernandez, the woman had not conceived even after 16 months from the rape. Also, in Luchica, the victim did not conceive despite virtually the same lapse of time from the commission of the crime. Obviously, the Supreme Court could not order support for a child that was neither conceived nor could be conceived as a consequence of the rapes committed by the respective accused in those cases.
Finally, under Arts. 184 and 185 of the Family Code, the classification of natural and acknowledged natural children has been eliminated, as they are now classified as either legitimate or illegitimate. Art. 176 of said Code refers to parental authority over illegitimate children and likewise provides for their entitlement to support (People vs. Bayani, supra).
1. This article provides for the liability of the persons therein stated in crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness (Chapter II); seduction, corruption of minors and white slave trade (Chapter III); and abduction (Chapter IV), who act as accomplices in those crimes, but who shall be punished as principals. In fact, such aggravated penalties will subject those accomplices to more penalties than the actual principals, as they will be meted out additional accessory penalties, that is, for teachers or persons entrusted with education and guidance of the youth, either temporary or perpetual special disqualification. Furthermore, all those falling within the terms of this article shall be punished with special disqualification from the office of guardian.
2. The foregoing provisions constitute an exception to Art. 52, and apply to all crimes against chastity, except adultery and concubinage (Chapter I) which are not included therein.