Proximate perspectives– Intersubjectivity

Intersubjectivity refers to the complex capacity of people to recognize and engage others’ unique mental states. Some psychologists call this ability

"mentalizing" while others use "theory of mind," a phrase Premack and Woodruff (1978) coined as the capacity to impute mental states—including but not limited to "purpose or intention, beliefs, thoughts, knowledge, likes, guesses, pretence, promising and trusting" (p. 515)—to oneself and others. Intersubjectivity is also

an important concept in psychoanalytically oriented research, which adopts a more relational approach to the concept, defining intersubjectivity as the capacity of mutual recognition (Benjamin, 1990; 2014; Stern, 1985). This perspective is attuned to the challenge of differentiation as a child develops a sense of self amidst awareness of others and their subjectivity. More broadly within this school of thought, intersubjectivity is a theoretical framework for acknowledging and studying “the field of intersection between two subjectivities, the interplay between two different subjective worlds” (Benjamin, 1990, p. 34). Through this section I will take an approach to intersubjectivity that draws more from cognitive psychology than this tradition. But this work helpfully highlights mature forms of intersubjectivity, in which individuals do not simply absorb the surrounding norms, instead they can recognize and respond to the subjective states of others from a personal and stable position. The capacity to hold such a mature, differentiated, position is another individual difference that modulates the impact that social norms will have on regulatory behaviors.

Turning back to the cognitive psychological work on intersubjectivity, research since Premack and Woodruff (1978) has continued to focus on

populations where this capacity might be impaired in order to study its distinct processes. For example, Call and Tomasello (2008) revisit Premack and

Woodruff's (1978) initial question —does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? — with new evidence to argue that primates likely understand other's mental states in terms of perceptions and goals, but not necessarily beliefs or desires. While some of the research on theory of mind has been conducted with an aim towards understanding the cognition of primates (see Tomasello, 2014), a separate strand of research focuses on autism. Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) were among the first to suggest that the behavioral and social tendencies associated with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) may derive from an

impairment in "being able to conceive of mental states: that is knowing that other people know, want, feel, or believe things" (p. 38). More recent research on

autism maintains the central role of mentalizing deficits in ASD while recognizing a broader array of other cognitive and affective processes undergirding the diverse manifestations of ASD (Dant, 2015).

The importance of intersubjectivity for social norms and self-regulation is presented most clearly within Tomasello's (2008; 2014; 2016) work on the

evolutionary origins of human thought, morality, and sociality. For Tomasello, intersubjectivity is a crucial foundation for all of these other cognitive and social capacities, but intersubjectivity itself is not basic– instead it is the culmination of many other psychological processes. For example, Tomasello and Vaish (2013)

argue that mentalizing by itself is insufficient for supporting the development of social norms. Mentalizing would be necessary for any intensely social primate to navigate the challenges of their social hierarchy and group, and we accordingly find this capacity for theory of mind in most social primates (Tomasello, 2016). But recognizing the thoughts of others is not the same as engaging with those thoughts in a mutually recognized space. For most primates, mentalizing remains a lonely endeavor. In order to psychologically arrive at social norms, humans also engage at the level of shared intentionality. In addition to mere mentalizing, shared intentionality involves joint awareness of mental states and cooperation premised upon that mutual awareness: e.g., Rasheed recognizes: 1) that Sophie has mental states and 2) that she also reflexively knows that Rasheed has mental states and 3) with this mutual awareness both are willing to share attention and create collaborative goals and action plans. Tomasello and

colleagues (2005) describe the constellation of psychological capacities necessary for shared intentionality "dialogic cognitive representations." I use the term intersubjectivity to refer to the process in which all of these capacities are enacted.28

28. This rough sketch of mentalizing and shared intentionality is just an initial taste of the

These cognitive capacities are essential for establishing social norms. In the following long passage, Tomasello and colleagues (2005) discuss how our abilities understand others' intentions and beliefs and to form a joint

intentionality with shared goals provide the foundation for social norms and regulation:

Dialogic cognitive representations pave the way for later cognitive

achievements that may be called, very generally, "collective intentionality" (Searle 1995). That is, the essentially social nature of dialogic cognitive representations enables children, later in the preschool period, to

construct the generalized social norms (e.g., truth) that make possible the conceptualization of individual beliefs and, moreover, to share those beliefs. Sharing beliefs is responsible for the creation of social-institutional facts such as money, marriage, and government, whose reality is

grounded totally in the collective practices and beliefs of a social group conceived generally (Tomasello & Rakoczy 2003). Importantly, when children internalize generalized collective conventions and norms and use them to regulate their own behavior, this provides for a new kind of social

playing a game together. The simplicity and fluidity with which we exercise all of these complex capacities speaks to the deep automaticity of our enactment of social norms.

rationality (morality) involving what Searle (1995) calls ‘desire- independent reasons for action.’ (Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 684). In other words, social norms, experienced as both institutional facts and

internalized morality, depend on our ability to recognize the intentions, beliefs, and motivations of others, along with our desire to regulate our actions in relation to this shared reality. Since I am arguing for the social character of self- regulation, then intersubjectivity is a crucial component of regulatory behavior as it undergirds both the capacity to internalize shared goals and the motivation to pursue those goals.29

If my general hypothesis about the deeply social character of self- regulation is true, then the relevance of intersubjectivity for regulation should extend well beyond social standards, also impacting what might otherwise seem

29. Researchers discuss this set of shared goals, beliefs, intentions, and motivations as part of a group's "common ground." The phrase has a complex philosophical history, drawing from Stalnaker (1970) and an older set of concepts including Lewis' (1969) use of common knowledge and Schiffer's (1972) mutual belief. The essential component of common ground for psychological work on social norms is given by Clark (1996): "Two people's common ground is, in effect, the sum of their mutual, common, or joint knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions" (p. 93). This concept therefore extends beyond intersubjectivity to include the broader set of shared assumptions within a group (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010). In other words, the concept of common ground is similar to the socially constructed reality described by social theorists in chapter 3 (see Kashima, 2014). Tomasello (2014) convincingly argues that shared intentionality in particular, and intersubjectivity in general, precede the capacity of two or more individuals to establish a common ground. Therefore I focus on those processes while

recognizing the theoretical importance of the more expansive common ground established within a group.

to be personal forms of regulation. In support of this claim, a large body of research among children with ASD shows that deficits in intersubjectivity are deeply interwoven with difficulties exercising self-regulation, especially emotional regulation and executive functioning (e.g., Gomez & Baird, 2005; Jahromi, Bryce, & Swanson, 2013; Loveland, 2005). Importantly, however, these regulatory difficulties do not appear to impact delayed discounting among children with ASD (Demurie, Roeyers, Baeyens, & Sonuga-Barke, 2012), which underlines the importance of differentiating self-regulation as more than just self-control. These differences also suggest that intersubjectivity will primarily influence motivational and goal-specific aspects of self-regulation, especially insofar as the goals and motivations are social or emotional.

Intersubjectivity is clearly important for self-regulation, but does it shed new light upon the relationship between religion and self-regulation? At first glance, intersubjectivity appears to be quite relevant for religiosity. Various studies suggest that individuals with ASD report significantly lower levels of religiosity (Caldwell-Harris, Murphy, Velazquez, & McNamara, 2011), and empirical work from Norenzayan, Gervais, and Trzesniewski (2012) found that deficits in mentalizing mediate this relationship (see Banerjee & Bloom, 2013; Barrett & Keil, 1996; Caldwell-Harris, 2012; or for a counterargument see

Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, & Lipsanen, 2015). While this evidence suggests that intersubjective processes are related to religiosity, most of this research is aimed at explaining religious belief. In other words, intersubjectivity is taken to be analytically prior to religiosity. It remains possible that this association works both ways, such that certain religious practices and beliefs are both supported by and amplify an individual's tendency to mentalize and engage in collective intentionality (see Gervais, 2013). If that were the case, then increases in

intersubjective processing could offer a plausible mediating variable that helps to explain the influence of religiosity upon self-regulation: if religious participation increases intersubjective processing, then it might also increase attunement to the regulatory norms of the group and, ultimately, the religious person’s capacity for self-regulation. Though obviously tentative, this hypothesis is both plausible and testable.

While provisional as a mediating variable, considering intersubjectivity nevertheless keeps us attuned to certain dimensions of religious engagement that are relevant for self-regulation. Many of the theorists just mentioned (e.g.,

Banerjee & Bloom; Norenzayan et al., 2012) emphasize the way theory of mind may lead to belief in anthropomorphic supernatural agents. In contrast,

between intersubjectivity and social norms points our attention to a Durkheimian possibility– that the relationship between religiosity and intersubjectivity is rooted in experiential access to a shared sense of reality with a transcendent normative and moral force. This is the perspective motivating our engagement with moralization below, but we have one more stop before we get there.