judgment.
ANS. - Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal and an administrative charge. As a crime, it is punished under Art. 204 of the RPC, the elements of which are: (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; and (d) the judge knows that his judgment is unjust. The gist of the offense therefore is that an unjust judgment be rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, knowing it to be unjust.
An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, or both. The source of an unjust judgment may be error or ill-will. There is no liability at all when required to exercise his judgment or discretion. A judge is not liable criminally for any error which he commits, provided he acts in good faith. Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability. If in rendering judgment the judge fully knew that the same was unjust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and must have been actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy, revenge, greed, or some other similar motive. Mere error therefore in the interpretation or application of the law does not constitute the crime.
The nature of the administrative charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is the same as the criminal charge. Thus, it must be established that the judge rendered a judgment or decision not supported by law and/or evidence and that he must be actuated by hatred, envy, revenge, greed, or some other similar motive.
If for every error of a judge he should be punished, then perhaps no judge, however good, competent and dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judicial service without a tarnished image. Somehow along the way he may commit mistakes, however, honest. This does not exclude members of appellate courts who are not always in agreement in their views. Anyone belonging to the minority opinion may generally be considered in error, and yet, he is not punished because each one is entitled to express himself. This privilege should extend to trial judges so long as the error is not motivated by fraud, dishonesty, corruption, or any other evil motive. (Dela Cruz vs. Concepcion, 54 SCAD 640, 235 SCRA 597, Aug. 25, 1994).
Q -If a judge is charged and the complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the case, will the case be dismissed? Why?
ANS. -No. The fact the complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case against a judge will not necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Once charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the complaint. The Supreme Court has an
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interest in the conduct of members of the Judiciary and in improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its efforts in that direction may not be derailed by the complainant's desistance from further prosecuting the case he or she initiated.
To condition administrative actions upon the will of every complainant, who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act, is to strip the Court of its supervisory power to discipline erring members of the Judiciary. Definitely, personal interests are not
material or controlling. What is involved here is a matter of public interest considering that a judge is no ordinary citizen but an officer of the court whose personal behavior not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach. (Imbing vs. Tiongson, 48 SCAD 101,229 SCRA 690, Feb. 7, 1994).
Q -. X applied for the position of an RTC judge without revealing that he has two pending cases. Is the act of X proper? Why?
ANS. -No. A judge is held guilty of gross misrepresentation when he failed to disclose that he was facing two serious criminal charges when he accepted appointment and subsequently qualified as RTC judge. The argument that he had not yet been convicted and should be presumed innocent is beside the point, and so is the contention that the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide do not involve moral turpitude. The important consideration is that he had a duty to inform the appointing authority and the SC to determine on the basis of his record his eligibility for the position he was seeking. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Estacion, Jr., 181 SCRA 33, Jan. 11, 1990).
Q - Why should a judge regulate his extrajudicialactivities?
ANS. -Judges are enjoined not only to regulate their extrajudicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties but also prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law. (Balayan vs. Ocampo, 218 SCRA 13, Jan. 29, 1993).
Q - May a judge issue a subpoena to a person whohas no case in his sala? Why?
ANS. -No. In the absence of a case in his sala in connection with which a party could be subpoenaed, a judge has absolutely no power or authority to issue a subpoena to such party.
The judge, in using a subpoena form for criminal cases to summon a party upon the request of another who had no case before his court, invited legitimate criticism against his office as an instrument
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of oppression. His act constitutes ignorance of the law and oppression which should warrant disciplinary sanction. (Caamic vs. Galapon, Jr., 56 SCAD 14, 237 SCRA 390, October 7, 1994).
Q - Maya judge meet one of the parties i;n a case inside his chambers without the other party and meddle with the issues confronting the parties on the pretext of settling it? Why?
ANS. -No. In the absence of their lawyers, a judge ought not to meddle in issues confronting the parties even on the pretext of settling their cases as such act would compromise the integrity of his office. Judges are cautioned to avoid in-chamber sessions without the other party and his counsel present, and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that they not only act impartially and with propriety but are also perceived to be impartial and proper.
The act of a judge in meeting with complainants without the presence of counsel and warning them not to tell anyone, and demanding money under the guise of forging peace between the parties constitutes grave misconduct. (Capuno vs. Jaramillo, Jr., 53 SCAD 329, 234 SCRA 212, July 20, 1994).
Q - Maya judge solemnize marriage without marriage license? Why?
ANS .- No. For solemnizing marriages even without the requisite marriage license, a judge is deemed to have actually trifled with the law's concern for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status, which should merit administrative sanction, without prejudice to the civil and criminalliabilities he may have incurred as well. (Cosca vs. Palaypayon, Jr., 55 SCAD 759,237 SCRA 249, Sept. 30, 1994).
Q - During the incumbency of a judge, he sent out handbills indicating his intention to run for a congressional seat. Was the act of the judge proper? Why?
ANS. -No. A judge acted improperly when he sent out letters/handbills manifesting his intention to run as a congressional candidate while still the incumbent judge and prior to the commencement of the campaign period. He took advantage of his position to boost his candidacy, demeaned the stature of his office and must be pronounced guilty of gross misconduct. (Vistan vs. Nicolas, 201 SCRA 524, Sept. 13, 1991).
Q - Should a judge report to his office even if he has no hearings? Why?
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regular days. The law regulating court sessions does not permit any "day off' from regular office hours to enable the judge to engage exclusively in research or decision-making, no matter how important. (Mendoza vs. Mabutas, 42 SCAD 423, 225 SCRA 411, June 17, 1993).
Q - A judge used his chambers as his family's residence. Was the
ANS. -No. A judge cannot use his chambers as his family's residence even with the Governor's permission. Government property is for official use only and not for the personal use of the official. (Presado vs. Geova, 42 SCAD 507, 223 SCRA 489, June 21, 1993). Court rooms cannot be used as judge's living quarters. (Felongco vs. Dictado, 42 SCAD 700, 223 SCRA 696).
Q - If the order of a judge was questioned before a higher court, should he appear personally to seek a reversal of the order that is unfavorable to his action? Why?
ANS. -No. The judge whose order is under attack is merely a nominal party. Wherefore, a judge, in his official capacity should not be made to appear as a party seeking reversal of a decision that is unfavorable to the action taken by him. A decent regard for the judicial hierarchy bars a judge from suing against the adverse opinion of a higher court. (Santiago vs. CA, 184 SCRA 690, April 27, 1990).
Q - The judge failed to render judgment in a case within the reglementary period. His reason is the failure of the stenographer to transcribe the notes. Was the contention proper?
ANS. - No. A delay in the transcription of stenographic notes cannot be considered a valid reason for the delay in rendering judgment in a case. With or without the transcribed stenographic notes, the 90-day period for deciding cases should be adhered to. (Balagot vs. Opinion, 195 SCRA 429, March 20, 1991).
In one case, the Supreme Court said that the failure to decide a case particularly one involving a simple violation of the Bouncing Checks Law for over five years is an inordinate amount of procrastination tantamount to gross negligence. It is not enough for judges to pen their decisions; it is also important to promulgate and make them known to all concerned at the earliest possible time and within the mandated period. (Soyangco vs. Maglalang, 196 SCRA 5, April
19, 1991).
Q - Describe the power of courts to cite persons in contempt.
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him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice to be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with court orders.
And as in all other power of the court, the contempt power, however, plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly.
Clearly then, judges are enjoined to exercise utmost restraint in the use of their contempt powers. They are expected to avail of the contempt power only as a last resort when all other alternative courses of action are exhausted in the pursuit of maintaining respect to the court and its processes. Thus, when a less harsh remedy presents itself to the judge, he should at all times hesitate to use his contempt power, and instead opt for the less harsh remedy. (De Guia vs. Guerrero, Jr., 54 SCAD 1,234 SCRA 625, August 1, 1994).
Q - Is "immorality" as a ground for imposition of ad. ministrative sanctions limited to illicit sexual intercourse alone?
ANS. -No. Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but inCludes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and as inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. (Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth ed., 1990, 751; cited in Alfonso vs. Judge Juanson, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-904, Dec. 7, 1993,46 SCAD 603).
For, it has been held that there is no dichotomy of morality; a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code of Judicial Ethics dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judge's official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. (Junio vs. Rivera Jr., 44 SCAD 308, 225 SCRA 688, Aug. 30, 1993).
In Sicat vs. Alcantara, et al., 161 SCRA 284, May 11, 1988, wherein the respondent judge was chargedwith immorality for having an illicit affair with a married female court employee, the Supreme Court declared:
"The personal and official actuations of every member of the Bench must be beyond reproach and above suspicion. The faith and confidence of the public in the administration of justice cannot be maintained if a
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judge who dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity, and if he obtusely continues to commit an affront to public decency. In fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the Judiciary."
In another case where a municipal judge was charged with having illicit relations with a concubine under scandalous circumstances, it was stated that if good moral character is required of a lawyer, with more reason should that requirement be exacted of a member of the Judiciary who at all times is expected to observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public decency. Thus, even as an ordinary lawyer, a judge has to conform to the strict standards of conduct demanded of members of the profession. Definitely, fathering a child with a woman other than his lawful wife fails to meet these standards. A judge suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality in public office when he labors under the delusion that he can be a judge and at the same time have a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. (lmbing vs. Tiongson, 48 SCAD 101,229 SCRA 690, Feb. 7, 1994).
Q - Explain the basic reason for disqualification of judges.
ANS. - The underlying reason for the Rule on Disqualification of Judges under Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, is to ensure that a judge, sitting in a case, will at all times be free from inclinations or prejudices and be well capable to render a just and independent judgment. A litigant, we often hear, is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of a judge. Due process requires it. Indeed, he not only must be able to so act without bias but should even appear to be so. Impartiality is a state of mind; hence, the need for some kind of manifestation of its reality.
Verily, a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, inhibit himself voluntarily from sitting in a case, but it should be based on good, sound or ethical grounds, or for just and valid reasons. It is not enough that a party throws some tenuous allegations of partiality at the judge. No less than imperative is that it is the judge's sacred duty to administer jus- tice without fear or favor. (Parayno vs. Meneses, 50 SCAD 170,231 SCRA 807, April 26, 1994).
Q - Why should a judge who is related to a party in a case pending in his sala disqualify himself?
ANS. - The rule of compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where the judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively
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presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice. (Garcia vs. Dela Peiia, 48 SCAD 171, 229 SCRA 766).
Q - The respondent was charged with immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. The acts were allegedly committed when he was still a practitioner. The complainant alleged that respondent had carnal knowledge with his wife in at least five (5) occasions without specifying the dates. In fact, his wife allegedly admitted having sexual intercourse with him. Now that he is a judge, can he be removed for those acts he committed when he was still a practitioner? Explain.
ANS. -No, for the acts were done before he became a judge. Proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be the basis for his administrative discipline. The respondent may have undergone moral reformation after his appointment, or his appointment could have completely transformed him upon the solemn realization that apublic office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. (Section 1, Article XI,1987 Constitution). It would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall again in the path. No man is beyond reformation and redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a high price for the honor - his private and official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. (Jagueta vs. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27 [1974]). And the lawyer who is thereafter appointed thereto must perforce be presumed to have solemnly bound himself to a way of conduct free from any hint or suspicion of impropriety. The imputation of illicit sexual acts upon the incumbent judge must be proven by substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases. (Alfonso vs. Judge Modesto Luanson, Dec. 7, 1993,46 SCAD 603).
Q - Judge Enrique A. Cube was, on May 31, 1993 appointed Presiding Judge of Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 22, Manila. Subsequently, information was received by the Judicial and Bar Council that he was previously dismissed in 1972 as Assistant Fiscal of Pasay City for gross misconduct and dereliction of duty for failure to prosecute a criminal case which led to its dismissal with prejudice.
Cube applied for appointment to the Judiciary sometime in 1992. In the Personal Data Sheet he was required to accomplish,