The Quantitative Sample

The sample I used in the quantitative portion of this research included all democracies that I could find at least 70% of the data for all 49 variables measured in this research.

Democracies were identified using the Freedom House (2007) classification of democracy. Countries qualify as democratic if they have a competitive, multiparty political system; universal adult suffrage for all citizens (except prisoners); regularly contested elections that are free, fair, secure, in absence of voter fraud, and representative of the public will; and public access of major political parties through media and campaigning.

While the sample of democracies used in this research began with a considerably higher

N, sufficient data could only be found for 101 democracies. As such, the countries studied in this portion of the project were selected based on dependent variable data availability.

One initial limitation of this research is that while a significant amount of dependent variable data were found for all countries, those with remarkably less also happened to be those in the developing world. Including the GDP per capita control and being mindful of the

important role that government resource capacity plays in drug policy should help minimize the effect that this limitation has on my research.

Of the independent variables, there is considerable missing data on the political bargaining variable. The reason for this is because the two existing studies on this topic (Lijphart, 1999; Siaroff, 1999) provide a combined N of 36. Nonetheless, there were sufficient data for the remaining independent variables used in this analysis.

Beginning with law enforcement, most countries tended to rely on some form of law enforcement instrument in their approach to the illicit drug problem. Overall, the average country reached a score of 5.9 out of a range 0 to 12 on the law enforcement index. As Table 4.1 shows, law enforcement instruments of drug policy are mostly implemented across multiple regions of countries as opposed to one in particular. Generally, a majority of countries adopted measures that include civil asset forfeiture and strict sentences for drug traffickers. In contrast, a slight majority chose not to commit to mandatory minimums or drug courts. The big contrasts in the sample tend to be over imprisoning both hard and soft drug possessors.

The only real surprise in the law enforcement data was a complete turnaround of Bulgaria’s drug laws in 2004. While most of the world’s countries seem to be liberalizing their drug laws regarding possession, the Bulgarian National Assembly changed possession of soft and hard drugs for personal use from an administrative offense requiring no imprisonment, to a quite significant crime punishable by sanctions laid out in the Penal Code. Several international bodies, including the European Union critiqued this amendment. Changes have yet to be

Table 4.1

Law Enforcement Instruments Instrument None One

Region One Region More than N Missing

prison soft drugs 43 0 57 100 1

prison hard drugs 33 0 68 101 0

mandatory min. 39 0 22 61 40

asset forfeiture 15 1 44 60 41

stiff sentence 7 0 82 89 12

drug court 50 0 26 76 25

Despite strong commitments of our sample to law enforcement efforts, fewer states seemed to employ deterrence-based prevention methods, many of which go hand in hand with law enforcement objectives. One of the major problems with this dependent variable was missing data. The average country score was 1.6, with a low of 0 and a high of only 8. Table 4.2 reveals there to be more of an emphasis placed on police education and fear tactics than school and workplace drug testing. This may be in large part because the former two have been around much longer than the latter innovations.

Table 4.2

Deterrence-Based Prevention Instruments Instrument None One

Region One Region More than N Missing

police education 34 1 34 69 32

fear tactics 34 1 34 68 32

school testing 63 1 6 70 31

workplace testing 60 1 5 66 35

The other prevention variable seemed to yield different results. As Table 4.3 illustrates, a majority of countries are committed to combating the drug problem through education rather than deterrence-based policy instruments. Another easy observation to make is that education- based anti-drug policy initiatives are implemented far more so both locally and regionally than law enforcement or deterrence-based initiatives. There also seems to be a more even distribution

of countries choosing to implement education-based prevention policies across the three different levels. With a low of 0 and a high of 10, the average education-based prevention score was 4.5.

Table 4.3

Education-Based Prevention Instruments

Instrument None One

Region More than One Region N Missing health curricula 9 5 69 83 18 skills training 21 10 32 63 38 recreation 32 2 21 55 46 health campaign 6 10 60 76 25 prevention outreach 21 4 33 58 43

Turning to the treatment instruments, the abstinence-based treatment index is second to the harm reduction index in having the most number of instruments available to policymakers. This again supports the reason why each dependent variable index is examined independently from the other dependent variable indices—for there is really no fair way to compare them. As Table 4.4 shows, abstinence-based treatment methods seem to be provided less in individual regions, and more in multiple regions. With a low of 0 and a high of 14, the average abstinence- based treatment score was 6.3.

The main difficulty in conducting cross-national research on drug policy that includes analyses of treatment and prevention is that very little data exist on these topics. The current research includes these policy domains to avoid overemphasizing the clash between harm reduction and law enforcement. As such, while there are higher rates of missing data in the prevention and treatment indices, they are still of great benefit to this research.

Table 4.4

Abstinence-Based Treatment Instruments

Instrument None One

Region One Region More than N Missing

treatment outreach 22 4 31 57 44 outpatient 8 5 70 86 15 inpatient 2 7 77 83 18 low threshold 30 7 28 65 36 mandatory treatment 30 0 17 47 54 detoxification 7 6 50 63 38 prison treatment 23 4 31 58 43

The substitution-based treatment data, while limited in the number of instruments, flourished in terms of data availability. The average country score was 1.9, while the maximum score was 6. Methadone maintenance is provided within sample countries slightly more so than buprenorphine. All other substitution-based treatments (ie: morphine) are implanted at quite lower rates than the other two forms. In total, 53 countries in this sample offer some form of substitution-based treatment. Considering the cost of this type of treatment, combined with the fact that it is not abstinence based, it is surprising that at least 50% of the sample engages in this initiative. Table 4.5 shows the some of the similarities and differences in data between the three different categories of substitution-based treatment.

Table 4.5

Substitution-Based Treatment Instruments

Instrument None One

Region More than One Region N Missing methadone 43 5 44 92 9 buprenorphine 56 7 29 92 9 other 45 6 13 64 37

Last of the six drug policy types, harm reduction appears to be the least utilized, yet has a higher score average (3.9) than both substitution-based treatment and deterrence-based

do not subscribe to harm reduction, those that do, accomplish a lot with it. While Table 11 does not illustrate this, a quick examination of the sample’s drug policy scores reveal that most countries which engage in harm reduction tend to commit, or at the very least ‘experiment’, with quite a few instruments17_.

As Table 4.6 illustrates, the data show that of the harm reduction instruments adopted by the sample’s countries, there is a gradual increase in implementation as we move away from the single region and towards the multi-region level. The most common instrument used—at the multi-regional level of course—is needle exchange. Second to that is harm reduction outreach. Although separate from needle exchange, harm reduction outreach often accompanies this instrument. Table 11 illustrates the commitment of countries to each instrument in the harm reduction index.

Table 4.6

Harm Reduction Instruments

Instrument None One

Region

More than One Region N Missing heroin maintenance 88 0 8 96 5 medical marijuana 79 2 5 86 15 decriminalization 62 0 13 75 26 de facto decriminal… 46 0 24 70 31 needle exchange 38 5 45 88 13 tolerance zones 76 0 3 79 22 safe sites 78 2 7 87 14

harm red. outreach 35 7 36 78 23

pill testing 75 1 10 86 15

reintegration program 46 4 27 77 24

The sample used in this research offers sufficient data to create the six different indices used in this research. When all data for each drug policy approach are combined into one

17 _{For the purposes of this research, experiments in drug policy (which are almost always limited to harm reduction)} were included in the dataset if they lasted for more than 2 years. A norm among most developed countries is to run a harm reduction program as a so-called ‘experiment’ so that they avoid domestic and international flack. Many of

category the lowest N is 91. The data range from a low of 0 in all categories, to a high of 20 in the harm reduction category. A frequency distribution performed on the six drug policy indices and six drug policy scores reveal how many countries had adopted policy instruments from each of the different approaches to drug policy. The second last column on the right side of Table 4.7 shows the number of countries subscribing to at least one or more policy instruments in each of the six approaches. The far right column shows the remaining number of countries in the sample that did not choose to adopt at least one policy instrument from each drug policy approach.

Table 4.7

Summary Statistics for Drug Policy Indices and Scores*

* Figures in green shade represent drug policy indices while figures in blue shade represent drug policy scores. When examining the raw drug policy scores of each country, it appears that sample countries subscribe to law enforcement and abstinence-based treatment the most, followed by education-based prevention and harm reduction second, then deterrence-based prevention and substitution treatment third. However when controlling for the amount of observations made in each variable, abstinence-based treatment, education-based prevention, and law enforcement are the most sought-after approaches to the drug problem; while deterrence-based prevention, substitution-based treatment, and harm reduction are less utilized.

To illustrate the variety of countries endorsing certain approaches to the drug problem, Table 4.8 shows the top 10 committing countries per drug policy type. Data for the case study countries that did not make it to the top ten are included underneath the list of other countries

Variable N Mean Std.D Mean Max Yes No

Law Enforcement 101 0.632 0.28 5.9 12 98 3 Deterrence Prevention 91 0.389 2.48 1.6 8 53 38 Education Prevention 93 0.689 4.03 4.5 10 83 10 Abstinence Treatment 93 0.701 4.96 6.3 14 90 3 Substitution Treatment 92 0.390 2.45 1.9 6 52 40 Harm Reduction 94 0.223 6.07 3.9 20 60 34

Table 4.8

Top Ten Countries per Policy Type

Index Countries Law Enforcement Thailand (12); United States (12); Philippines (11);

Romania (19); Japan (10); Israel (10); Bahamas (10); Sierra Leone (10); St. Vincent & Grenadines (10); St. Lucia (10)

Case: Canada (8); Austria (4); Netherlands (2) Deterrence-based

Prevention

Philippines (8); United States (8); New Zealand (6); South Africa (6); Nicaragua (6); Mexico (6); Iceland (4); Ecuador (5); Ukraine (4); Georgia (4)

Case: Canada (2); Austria (0); Netherlands (0) Education-based

Prevention

Netherlands (10); United Kingdom (10); Austria (10); Spain (10); Canada (10); Norway (10); Belgium (10); Australia (10); Italy (10); Slovenia (10)

Case: United States (2) Abstinence-based

Treatment

Switzerland (14); Austria (14); Canada (12); Netherlands (12); United Kingdom (12); Australia (12); Ireland (12); United States (12); Greece (12); Taiwan (12)

Substitution-based Treatment

United Kingdom (6); Switzerland (6); Slovenia (6); Portugal (6); Netherlands (6); Luxembourg (6); Germany (6); Austria (6); France (6); Belgium (6)

Case: United States (4); Canada (4)

Harm Reduction Switzerland (20); Netherlands (20); Spain (18); Canada (17); Australia (15); Germany (12); Czech Republic (12); United Kingdom (11); Austria (10); United States (10) Moving to the other side of the regression model, I had better luck obtaining more

complete data. With the exception of political bargaining, the independent variable data collected for this research was fairly comprehensive. Data analyzed for regime type show an N of 98 with 45 countries presidential and 53 parliamentary regimes. In total, 73 countries have proportional representation while 28 countries have an alternative electoral design. The intergovernmental relations variable shows less skewness with 34 states being federalist and 67 having unitary

legislatures while the remaining 42 are bicameral. Finally, a recoding of the political bargaining variable into a dichotomous scheme shows that with a low N of thirty-five, 21 countries are pluralist while 14 are corporatist.

Of the four control variables used in this research, the sample’s most evenly distributed data are found in the political ideology control variable. With an N of 87, exactly 30 countries were coded as conservative, 27 as centrist, and 30 as liberal. This distribution is satisfying in that at the very least we know that the sample of countries chosen for this research represent all different types of political ideology. Just as varied, yet less evenly distributed, the data of our sample show that 53 countries have a GDP per capita that is less than $9,999, 20 have a GDP per capita between $10,000 and $19,999 and 28 have a GDP per capita that is over $20,000 (U.S.). Including these data in the analysis will help us take into account and manage the effect that political ideology and resource capacity have on drug policy.

The control data I used for international pressure revealed a wide range of possible influences that international factors can have on domestic decision-making. Though data on the ratio of trade to GDP revealed a slightly skewed distribution in the sample, it is not severe enough to merit any transformations of the data. Finally, data on drug usage revealed that the maximum combined score of drug use is 23 (Ghana), followed by 22.8 (Australia) and 21.3 (Canada). By far, the lowest drug usage scores were 0.02 (Sao Tome & Principe) and 0.07 (Moldova). Table 4.9 illustrates some summary statistics about the independent and control variables used in this research.

Table 4.9

Summary Statistics for the Independent and Control Variables

Variable N Missing Applicable Statistics

Regime Type 98 3 presidential = 45; parliamentary = 53

Electoral Design 101 0 majoritarian = 28; proportional representation = 73 Intergovernmental R. 101 0 federalism = 34; unitary governance = 67

Cameralism 101 0 bicameral = 42; unicameral = 59 Political Bargaining 35 66 pluralism = 21; corporatism = 14 Resource Capacity* 101 0 poor = 53; moderate = 20; rich = 28

Political Ideology 87 14 conservative = 30; centrist = 27; liberal = 30

International Pressure 95 6 min = 25.9; max = 214.8; mean = 88.7; std.d = 39.7 Drug Usage 95 6 min = 0.02%; max = 23%; mean = 6.6%; std.d = 5.6

* Poor means a country’s GDP per capita is less than $9,999 (U.S.); moderate means it is between $10,000 and $19,999; and rich

means a country’s GDP per capita is over $20,000.

The data I gathered for the institutional index had a very normal distribution. While this variable does not serve as the core explanatory variable of this research, its high N certainly enables it to be very powerful in examining the effect of political institutions on drug policy. As Table 4.10 illustrates, this sample includes several countries with cooperative policymaking environments as well as several with more competitive policymaking environments.

Table 4.10

Institutional Index Summary Statistics and Country Scores* Variable Statistics Top Ten Cooperative Top Ten Competitive mean = 0.35 max = 0.76 min = 0 std.d = 0.16 N = 101 Norway (0.75); Sweden (0.75); Denmark (0.70); Israel (0.69); Netherlands (0.68); Finland (0.67); Luxembourg (0.66); Iceland (0.57); Mauritius (0.54); Austria (0.53)

Chile (0); Haiti (0); Mexico (0); United States (0.06); France (0.11); Argentina (0.12); Bolivia (0.12); Brazil (0.12); Burundi (0.12); Philippines (0.12)

* The only case country to not make in the top ten was Canada (0.14); which ranked 11th _{in the competitive category.}