SECTION 1. Action by Government against individuals.— An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise; (b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which,-by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. (1a)
SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action.— The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof, must commence such action. (3a)
D2016 | Public Officers | Prof. G. Dizon-Reyes 31 SEC. 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor
may commence action with permission of court.— The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in which the action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon the relation of another person; but in such case the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the action in an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought. (4a)
SEC. 4. When hearing had on application for permission to commence action.— Upon application for permission to commence such action in accordance with the next preceding section, the court shall direct that notice be given to the respondent so that he may be heard in opposition thereto; and if permission is granted, the court shall issue an order to that effect, copies of which shall be served on all interested parties, and the petition shall then be filed within the period ordered by the court. (5a) SEC. 5. When an individual may commence such an action.— A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor in his own name. (6)
SEC. 6. Parties and contents of petition against usurpation.— When the action is against a person for usurping a public office, position or franchise, the petition shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, if any, with an averment of his right to the same and that the respondent is unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons who claim to be entitled to the public office, position or franchise may be made parties, and their respective rights to such public office, position or franchise determined, in the same action. (7a)
SEC. 7. Venue.— An action under the preceding six sections can be brought only in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondent or any of the respondents resides, but when the Solicitor General commences the action, it may be brought in a Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court. (8a) SEC. 8. Period for pleadings and proceedings may be reduced; action given precedence.— The court may reduce the period provided by these Rules for filing pleadings and for all other proceedings in the action in
order to secure the most expeditious determination of the matters involved therein consistent with the rights of the parties. Such action may be given precedence over any other civil matter pending in the court. (9a)
SEC. 9. Judgment where usurpation found.— When the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, position or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the petitioner or relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires. (10a)
SEC. 10. Rights of persons adjudged entitled to public office; delivery of books and papers; damages. — If judgment be rendered in favor of the person averred in the complaint to be entitled to the public office he may, after taking the oath of office and executing any official bond required by law, take upon himself the execution of the office, and may immediately thereafter demand of the respondent all the books and papers in the respondent's custody or control appertaining to the office to which the judgment relates. If the respondent refuses or neglects to deliver any book or paper pursuant to such demand, he may be punished for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court. The person adjudged entitled to the office may also bring action against the respondent to recover the damages sustained by such person by reason of the usurpation. (15a)
SEC. 11. Limitations.— Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose; nor to authorize an action for damages in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question. (16a)
SEC. 12. Judgment for costs.— In an action brought in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, the court may render judgment for costs against either the petitioner, the relator, or the respondent, or the person or persons claiming to be a corporation, or may apportion the costs, as justice requires. (17a)
D2016 | Public Officers | Prof. G. Dizon-Reyes 32 It is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the
title to a public office. If there is no dispute as to who has title, and there is a usurper, mandamus is the proper remedy.
Title to office cannot be collaterally attacked. It can only be assailed by direct action, i.e., quo warranto.
Action can be brought only by the Government or a person claiming to be entitled to the office. Person bringing the action must show a clear
legal right to the office. A mere contingent interest, or a claim based on a temporary appointment or a designation, cannot be the basis for quo warranto action. Petitioner who did not have the requisite qualifications at the time of his appointment cannot be said to have such clear legal right.
Quo warranto action cannot prosper if brought beyond the prescribed period (exception: Cristobal v. Melchor).
Filing of a quo warranto complaint suspends the 1-year period. However, administrative proceedings do not.
Quo warranto in Election Law
Quo warranto in general Issue is eligibility of
candidate
Issue is validity of appointment
Plaintiff does not necessarily become rightful occupant of the office
Plaintiff may be declared the person legally entitled to the office and court will order that he be placed therein
Electoral proceeding under the Omnibus Election Code
Prerogative writ to compel a person to show his title to a public office or franchise
Filed within 10 days from proclamation
Presupposes that respondent is already holding office
May be filed by any losing candidate
Only one who claims a right to the office and will be entitled to assume it in case of successful suit may file
Tarrosa v. Singson (1994)
SUMMARY: Singson was appointed Governor of the
Bangko Sentral by President Ramos, effective on July 6, 1993. Tarrosa filed suit as a taxpayer to enjoin Singson from performing his functions as BSP Governor until the Commission on Appointments confirms his appointment. Tarrosa argues that Singson’s appointment has to be
confirmed by the CoA pursuant to RA 7653§6 (the BSP Law).
DOCTRINE: Tarrosa’s petition is in the nature of a quo
warranto proceeding as it seeks to oust Singson on the allegation that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of BSP Governor. The question of title to an office, which must be resolved in a quo warranto proceeding, may not be determined in a suit to restrain the payment of salary to the person holding such office, brought by someone who does not claim to be the one entitled to occupy the said office.
Mendoza v. Allas (1999)
SUMMARY: In 1989, Mendoza was the Director III of the
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs. In 1993, he was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector of Cagayan de Oro and Allas was appointed as Acting Director in his place. However, in 1994, he was terminated from his position in view of Allas appointment as Director III by the President. Mendoza filed a petition for quo warrant against Allas before the RTC. RTC granted his petition and ruled that he was illegally terminated from office and that the appointment of Allas was void. On appeal, the CA granted Mendoza’s MTD and its decision became final. However, when Mendoza moved to have the RTC decision executed, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA denied said motion, on the ground that the contested position vacated by Allas was now being occupied by Godofredo Olores.
DOCTRINE: CA correctly denied the motion for
execution. Mendoza cannot be reinstated nor paid with back salaries. The petition for quo warranto was filed by Mendoza solely against Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of Mendoza to the contested position as against Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source.
Class Notes: What could have Mendoza done to
escape the effect of the SC ruling? Could he have impleaded Allas’ successors?
Romualdez-Yap v. CSC (1993)
SUMMARY: While on leave for medical reasons,
Romualdez-Yap, PNB’s Senior VP assigned to the Fund Transfer Department, was separated from the service. The CSC upheld her separation on the ground that the PNB was undergoing a reorganization, and pursuant to its plan, the FTD had to be abolished. The CSC decided that the abolition was made in good faith. Assuming there was bad faith in Yap’s termination, she was actually barred from assailing it seeing as she did not
D2016 | Public Officers | Prof. G. Dizon-Reyes 33 seasonably assert her right thereto, or within a year from
her ouster.
DOCTRINE: A person claiming to be entitled to a public
office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action for quo warranto (Rule 66, Sec. 6, Rules of Court). The petitioner therein must show a clear legal right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. An action for quo warranto should be brought within 1 year after ouster from office; the failure to institute the same within the reglementary period constitutes more than a sufficient basis for its dismissal since it is not proper that the title to a public office be subjected to continued uncertainty. An exception to this prescriptive period lies only if the failure to file the action can be attributed to the acts of a responsible government officer and not of the dismissed employee.
D2016 | Public Officers | Prof. G. Dizon-Reyes 34