The (r)evolution of science and the scientific method

The Scientific Revolution that took place in Western science in the seventeenth century⁵ meant the foundations of some decisive conceptual, methodological and institutional changes that affected the development of Western science history (Henry, 2002, p. 2).

The term “revolution”, however, should be carefully assessed as, according to some scholars (Crombie, 1974; Hall, 1954), this movement did not aim at breaking up with the past and was rather a natural evolution that started in the Middle Ages with philosophers like William of Ockham, who maintained that real knowledge came from sensation (Crombie, 1974, p. 217; Hall, 1954, p. 163). Seventeenth-century empiricism shared this basic principle but with a slightly different approach, especially regarding the application of science to the solving of problems. Basically, the new philosophy was a reaction against old Aristotelian methods of learning. Embedded in its own principles, the Aristotelian tradition failed in opening up new directions and was stuck in a series of abstractions and repetitions. As Hall (1954: 165) explained “Aristotelian science was a hollow structure, dealing with abstractions rather than real things, justified by no fertility in works.”

From medieval times, the Catholic Church had the monopoly in the keeping and transmission of knowledge. By the beginning of the nineteenth century science was available to most social classes and scientists and researchers were not unusual jobs.

5 The peak of the movement took place in mid-seventeenth century. However, precursor activities already started in the sixteenth century and the eighteenth century meant a consolidation of the movement (Camiña, 2013, p. 29).

Nevertheless, this change was slow and many factors took part in it. Political issues modified the distribution of power and the people that had the control of knowledge.

Social changes led to different approaches to knowledge and the creation of different schools of thought, which ultimately led to a shift from insight to systematic study (Burke, 2004). In the case of England, the humanist movement that had reached the country in the last decades of the fifteenth century meant a development of experimentation as a method of obtaining knowledge. As Crespo (2004a) pointed out, previous scholastic models of knowledge were based on the establishment of a series of reasoned, purely theoretical deductions derived from a set of previously established principles. Humanists, on the other hand, were rather concerned with searching solutions to specific problems. Their interest was not on immutable divine truths but on specific issues that could affect man. Another implication of the humanist movement was the universalization of knowledge, which meant that knowledge became accessible outside universities and religious centers.

The names of Francis Bacon (1561-1642), Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) and René Descartes (1596-1650) have been traditionally cited as the leading precursors of the new philosophy of science (Goodman & Russell, 1991; Hall, 1954; Krämer-Friedrich, 1988) The British Francis Bacon thought that knowledge should be reformed. Continuous circular communication was causing an endless circle of error repetition in the sciences.

To correct this situation, he suggested that books should be left outside and new information should be sought through the direct observation of nature. Observation, collection and classification of natural phenomena became thus the main endeavors of natural philosophers. The innovative approach to science introduced by Bacon has been repeatedly praised (Camiña, 2013; Snyder, 2009) and it has been claimed that “modern

science was consciously modeled upon Bacon's system” (Hall, 1954, p. 166). Bacon's contribution to the rise of science in the seventeenth century can be summarized in three basic points: a) his writings and vehement style served as an impulse for science; b) his development of the theoretical basis of the inductive method, based on observation and experiment to extract conclusions became the standard methodology; c) his emphasis on the separation between science and religion became a reality. This proposal, however, was far from being rebellious. His idea was that by knowing more, people would be able to appreciate better God's work and His Glory would be revealed. Baconianism was indeed very well regarded by followers of Oliver Cromwell during the Interregnum (1642-60). Coley (1991) asserted that the rise of Puritanism was closely linked to the rise of this new approach to learning. Self-restraint, orderliness and simplicity, the main tenets of Puritanism, greatly coincided with the new science's necessities.

Another precursor of the new philosophy of science, Galileo, was also concerned with specific problems. For him, the most important step was abstraction: real properties of bodies are purely physical and there is no distinction between real and mathematical truth. He was also rather concerned with the classification of science and tended to assume that labeling can be misleading if based on superficial characteristics.

However, not all scientists shared his view. For Descartes all knowledge had to come through deduction. Experimentation was thus an invalid way to reach valid conclusions.

As Hall (1954, p. 173) remarked “the difference between Galileo and Bacon in this respect is that the former emphasized mainly the role of experiment in testing a theory, or determining its constants, while the latter stressed the role of experiment as a means of obtaining information.” As it is well-known, even if their theories were extremely influential, neither Galileo nor Descartes became the only sources of knowledge. The

idea that the Scientific Revolution and the experimental method was a solid theory is partly wrong. In the beginning there were many discrepancies and on the whole, the idea of a unified Scientific Revolution was constructed time after it actually took place.

As far as scientific schools are concerned, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed a constant dispute between empiricism and rationalism. Empiricists and rationalists did not agree on the validity of purely sensorial or deductive methods when applied to propositions related to the external world. The theory of empiricism, first formulated in the seventeenth century highlighted the role of experience and sensation as opposed to the traditional process of reasoning inherited from medieval scholasticism. Empiricists were concerned with the establishment of a method that could provide specific solutions for particular problems. This practical view of knowledge rejected the validity of intuition and deduction as valid ways of knowledge.

Empiricist philosophers –Locke, Hume, Berkeley– found it necessary to directly expose our senses to the subject of study. Empirical study, thus, became a synonym for a kind of study that depends on evidence that may be noticed by the senses. Experiments were required hence to formulate valid scientific statements.

Following the teachings of Bacon, Galileo and Descartes, Isaac Newton (1643-1727) is one of the leading figures of the Scientific Revolution. He is considered to have revolutionized modern science and the practical application of his theories concerned scientists well until the twentieth century. The success of Newtonianism can be said to rest upon several issues. First, the method itself presented an innovative approach to science in a time where Aristotelian scholasticism was indeed stuck and could not keep up with changes in society. Nevertheless, no matter how innovative Newtonianism was, “neither Newton nor the seventeenth century at large invented the

concept of experimentation”, Applebaum (2000, p. 461) claimed. The recipe for success should, hence, come from other sides. The propaganda carried out by members of the scientific academies, the main materialization of the Scientific Revolution, was very important in this respect, as will be shown in the following section. New philosophers also secured an affinity with religion. This was especially important, given that religion had been the main bastion of science for more than one thousand years. An abrupt confrontation with religious authorities would have minimized the expectations of success for the new science. The Baconian scientific method was, as has been already pointed out, deeply religious, even if it sought for a separation of science and religion.

Similarly, Gresham College, one of the main precursors of the London Royal Society, was a Puritan institution. The allegiance to the Crown was another decisive point in the success of Newtonianism. Obviously looking for funding, new philosophers made sure that the network of academic societies and the work carried out there was made available to the state. Finally, the utilitarian approach that was included in the new philosophy helped establish economic ties in society. Commercial applications of scientific discoveries together with the growing market of increasingly specialized scientific apparatus could be pointed out as indicators that this revolution was not only scientific but also economic.

This new idea of modern science, though highly innovative, still relied too much in Aristotle and other traditions. Magic, astrology, alchemy and witchcraft were still very important. The culture of curiosities displayed in public, performances and experiments were also part of the new science, as Bensaude-Vincent and Blondel (2008) claimed. Our present-day understanding of sciences is narrower than it was for modern Europe population. Popular courses in chemistry, botany and physics were common. A

curious audience with amateur knowledge in those disciplines demanded experiments to satisfy their curiosity, which sometimes became entertainment shows. Instrument makers also favored popular representations of science in an attempt to raise sales. For Bensaude-Vincent and Blondel (2008), entertainment is not incompatible with pedagogy and these shows played a double role: they were fun demonstrations serving as disseminators of science. Public demonstrations attired the attention of a wider audience. The benefits of this were numerous, similar to the workshops and activities organized by today's museums and scientific institutions: they were fantastic disseminators of science, created a public taste and contributed to the development of science and instrument-making. Ultimately, they also contributed to the advancement of society.

As far as the eighteenth century is concerned, the Enlightenment is considered the most important historical, intellectual movement in Europe and America at that time.

The Age of reason aimed at establishing an authoritative system which would manage to organize society and banish superstition and irrationality. Hall (1954, p. 216) depicted this tension between English scientific groups, followers of Newton and French and German Cartesians, led by Leibniz. He pointed out that this antagonism was especially evident between 1665 and 1720 and it triggered allegiance based on nationalism rather than scientific reasons. At the same time, he also clarified that the fundamentals of the scientific community were not at risk because, after all, both schools of thought were in the same direction and they were not completely opposites.

The increase of industrial production contributed to the development of a type of science which searched to be applicable to situations of real life. Deduction and intuition were thus substituted by practical applications of scientific theories. Although

the formal distinction between pure and applied sciences was not established until some time later, the eighteenth century was the turning point which marked the beginning of the applied branches of science. Applied sciences were seen as the best way to improve the development of industry. Consequently, science acquired some social implications and it was generally considered as a form of culture which would help improve the national manufacturing, agriculture, medicine, administration and other fields of society.

The nineteenth century implied, on the other hand, the professionalization of science. This century was characterized by a constant search for progress. The effects of the Industrial Revolution had already established by that time the new courses that science had to follow. This was an age of great development for the applied branches of science. Basic elements of our everyday life, such as the automobile, the airplane or the telephone were invented in this century. It is also important to highlight the key role that Darwin's theories played in nineteenth-century British society. Apart from raising social controversy, they changed the general perspective of science in modern society, which became increasingly more differentiated from religion. Although Darwin was mainly a biologist, his theories reformulated the whole view of science within society. Almost two centuries after the beginning of the Scientific Revolution, the panorama of science in the Western world had radically changed. From complicated manuscripts based on Aristotelian theories and written in isolated monasteries, science had become a profession with a rigid method based on observation and experimentation and whose influence had a direct impact on society at the end of the nineteenth century. This change would have not been the same if it had not been paired with an institutionalization process that physically secured the visibility of the new people of science.