What will the battlefield of the future really look like? The Desert Storm conflict indicated to many who analyzed it that the real focus of battle will no longer be force-on-force as we have tradi- tionally considered it. By the time the Allied Forces engaged the opposing Iraq forces, the enemy force for all practical purposes had already been demoralized and smashed. This was accom- plished by establishing air superiority followed by a carefully orchestrated campaign of precision air strikes (including Tom- ahawk missiles). The Iraqi ground forces were isolated by cut- ting off logistic support, severing communications with its leadership, and stinging them with the Shock and Awe achieved by B-52 strikes on the entrenched Iraqi forces in the open desert. Shock and Awe was introduced in the manner that stealth aircraft penetrated enemy air defenses and surgically attacked center-of-gravity targets with impunity. Shock and Awe was also present in the degree that coalition forces owned the night and could rapidly maneuver large units in terrain thought to be foreign, imposing, and unforgiving for the pre- dominantly U.S. forces. Instead, as Colin Powell noted, the coa- lition forces cut off the head and life lines to the Iraqi Army in the field and then set about killing it. The fact that a democrat- ically led coalition could choose not to massacre the remnants of Iraq’s army during its panic-induced retreat underscores that we knew how much power we had and could employ restraint. The impact of real-time video media coverage of these events, beamed simultaneously into government headquarters and civilian living rooms worldwide, is a phenomenon that impacted events on the battlefield and further highlighted the
compassion of that decision. In dealing with a “butcher” we could not fall to that level.
The battlefield of the future will not be a neat 200x200 mile box where you will know everything that is going on inside the box (although that would be an extremely helpful first step). The battlefield of the future will encompass every pressure point that controls or influences the elements of the battle. In examining this battlefield and the application of force and Shock and Awe, we seek to mass devastatingly accurate and simultaneous fire- power on critical nodes/targets that count for the mission at hand, rather than necessarily having to mass large armies in the field to engage one another. Clearly, the Gulf War raised war- fare to a new level with the demonstrated effectiveness and application of air to ground/water and surface to ground/ water launched precision-guided weapons. No longer will com- manders count sorties and tonnage of ordnance dropped, but rather targets destroyed per sortie! Note: there may well be an issue of affordability here. We may not be able to get (1) high tech, (2) MRC/OOTW, and (3) large armies. This does not eliminate the requirement for sufficient force in the field to defend against an all-out assault or eject another force and occupy the contested land to ensure that the objectives of the conflict are carried out. Air power can punish, simultaneously destroy center-of-gravity targets, and so demoralize the oppos- ing forces that land campaign objectives can be achieved with smaller forces. In some cases, the Shock and Awe achieved by the air campaign may result in an early cessation of conflict before the land campaign is necessary. This is more likely against a modernized, developed state than an underdeveloped government.
The confluence of several technologies, including all aspects of stealth aircraft, satellite global positioning, improved weapon targeting and terminal guidance, cruise missile technology, space relayed command & control, real-time surveillance from space, the introduction of JSTARS, and massive application of night vision techniques, are the first phase of these changes. With elements of this technology now more and more on the open market to whomever has the cash or friends, the advan- tage of obtaining greater situational awareness and real-time processing of available data cannot be taken for granted. In future environments, and short of all-out war, it is clear that political and military decisionmaking will have to establish close control of the actionable information distributed to shoot- ers in the field. It is legitimate to ask why Israeli forces that had air superiority, UAV surveillance, and extremely accurate fire- power capabilities in the most recent incursion into southern Lebanon against Hezbolla terrorist attacks had to respond with an artillery barrage to one Kaytusha rocket fired from close to a known UN encampment. When this artillery response resulted in killing more than 100 refugees fleeing the Israeli operation, the result was a public relations disaster and mission failure for the stated limited Israeli objectives. This represents a case of ill-conceived application of Rapid Dominance that resulted in counterproductive Shock and Awe generating adverse public opinion focused against Israel. This was also a case of applying high technology and state-controlled Rapid Dominance against a low-technology guerrilla warfare force. Clearly, the Hezbolla appeared to win more than they lost in this exchange. The lessons learned from this tragic incident as well as the applicability of Rapid Dominance techniques in this environment need further study. The massing and movement of
refugees in large numbers is a reality and a planning factor that must be dealt with upfront. The fact that the value of life itself is viewed differently by warring factions must also be consid- ered. If one side willingly uses refugees as a shield and the other is trying to protect their lives, then operations to achieve Rapid Dominance require clear (and perhaps restrictive) rules of engagement in the field. The rapidity of response may not always be the right tactic and an escalation of targeting differ- ent centers of gravity rather than responding directly to events in the field promises to be more effective. The theory of Rapid Dominance clearly needs further development, gaming, and simulation. Each decision to apply Rapid Dominance will be unique, complex, risky, and different from the previous one. Knowledge and information on the battlefield as well as that concerning center-of-gravity targets will be incomplete, even with a goal of total situational awareness.