Rationality for Choice versus Post-decisional Rationalisation

To recap, the theory of disruption has its arguments positioned ahead of a point at which decisions are made, assessing the motivations, beliefs and rationality (or its lack thereof), as they lead to or shape those decisions. Accordingly, it builds argument on these bases to explain what shapes incumbents’ responses to disruptive innovations. However, as to what consequences follow from the actions resulting from those decisions has not been much of a concern. It has nevertheless been demonstrated so far that such an approach leads to

great job in drawing the line between where Christensen stands and the opposite side of the line in his explanation that decision-making “is prior to and culminates in the action of a human being.”1 _{On the other hand, sensemaking “is concerned with making things that have} already happened meaningful to us. It follows from, and is based on, the prior action of a human being.”2 _{What he explains is that the dominant focal points of the two look at}

contrasting sides of time as it relates to actions to explain human conduct. The sensemaking perspective swings between the two lines, although it is less concerned about the future and how it influences perception and rather explains how reflective thought guides the action that is unfolding into an unknowable and indeed sometimes treacherous terrain.

As previously highlighted, human decision-making is under the fate of bounded rationality resulting in decision-making processes which are good enough, or satisfying.3 _{Burgelman and} Grove highlight another challenge with such an assumption: “In spite of the best attempts at business and engineering schools to inculcate rational analysis, when the business gets into serious difficulties or key managerial assumptions are challenged, objective analysis takes second seat to personal/emotional reactions.”4 _{The point here is not to deprive rationality of} its rightful place in organisational processes, or more precisely, attempts people make to achieve it, but rather to revisit conspicuous cautions already flagged on it. Further, the sensemaking perspective does assume some rationality of organisational members, but only contextually and plausibly so. Indeed, Weick asserts that despite the potential for being good at making decisions, organisations can still falter if they fail at making good sense.5

The jarring gaps between the aspired goals in plans and the outcomes of those plans 6

stubbornly place demands on theories of organisations to account for the actions of organisational members instead of focusing just on their supposed rational or irrational intentions. This is perhaps a consequence of the slippages between espoused theories of actions and what in effect is done.7 _{The importance can be stressed by underlining that}

actions leave in their wake trails which, along with their intended and unintended outcomes, have to pass the test of accountability and high expectations, which make up organisational

1 _{Boland (2008, p. 55)} 2 _{Boland (2008, p. 55)} 3 _{Simon (1991)}

4 _{Burgelman and Grove (1996, p. 19)} 5 _{Weick (1993, p. 636)}

6 _{Brusnsson (2007); Burgelman & Grove (1996)} 7 _{Argyris & Schon (1974)}

contexts. Such assumptions as decisions which mirror actions1 _{already fail this test because,}

as we have seen, some decisions which are said to have led to the actions are sometimes only constructed or modified after the action has already elapsed, in the interest of accountability. Similarly, well planned projects do not always lead to intended goals, which open up a window for finding acceptable justifications to construct accounts for the outcomes, which, despite being plausible, may not necessarily be accurate. These invented stories are presented as though one has been rational or at least justifying why they may have failed to be so, at the time of or prior to taking actions.

While the concept of accountability as a crucial feature of organisational contexts is clear in sensemaking, it is implied in discussions of disruptive innovation theory. The suggestion that incumbents are publicly traded makes a straightforward example. Nevertheless, the mere fact of their existence as organisations suggest that Weick’s sensemaking perspective and its explication of accountability as an important feature of organisations mean Christensen’s organisations of focus bear a similar characteristic. The point here is to underline

accountability as a core issue in organisations, which highlights the necessity for both efforts to act rationally and to justify outcomes for which people are responsible. However, cognitive biases related to efforts to act rationally and rationalisation for outcomes of actions already taken are like two roads going in opposite directions, each leading to the end of the other. The end of rationalisation for outcomes is a position constructed following the arrival (outcomes), driven towards legitimising why this position was reached. Conversely, the end position of rational action (why choosing the alternative) is first specified, and justification for why it must be reached constructed beforehand.

Although negative outcomes of clear choices can be judged by observers as being

consequences of error in judgement, rationalisation of decisions highlights the possibility that people may alternatively be motivated to cover these presumed errors in order to look

accountable, to preserve their self-esteem (e.g. the view that they are excellent leaders). Brunsson has in particular remarked that when faced with negative consequences of their decisions, organisations disguise in order to cover up for the discrepancies.2 _{His point is} similar to the “postdecisional” attempts to reconstruct meanings of prior decisions, which is

1 _{Christensen & Bower (2003, p. 18)} 2 _{Brunsson (2007)}

aimed towards influencing how negative consequences are perceived, as discussed in the sensemaking perspective.

The point is not to disparage arguments that errors in judgement do occur, but to shift the focal point towards the conduct which may ensue when actors perceive or anticipate such judgements from observers, and the fate of vestiges of such conduct. For instance, it could lead to manipulative conduct as people make efforts to reorganise their environments so that it remains favourable to what they aimed to achieve (e.g. disrupted projects which were ongoing). What these expositions highlight is that rationalisation of actions will, consciously or unconsciously, function in the service of portraying decision makers as rational, which is what they have set out to portray themselves as in the first place.1 _{However, that may come at} a cost, which will begin to be visible from the next section, although the more related later debates on organisational actions have better vignettes of how such costs may be incurred.