1.3.1 Tsunami Response
1.3.1.1 Nation-Wide Early Warning System
The National Disaster Warning Center was established on May 30th, 2005, functioning as a focal point to integrate and analyze all information coming from international information providers, domestic governmental agencies and general public networks in order to decide whether or not a warning message will be disseminated. The warning would be directed to emergency response personnel, governmental agencies and the general public to start an evacuation process and prepare for emergency response operations. The warning message is automatically disseminated through different channels of communication to different targets. The national television pool, national radio stations network, and amateur radio network are used purposely to reach the general public. Cell phone text messages, email and facsimile are sent to relevant governmental organizations and personnel at national and provincial areas. Police, Military and Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation emergency personnel receive the same warning message through their trunk-radio and assigned-frequency radio networks. Another instant warning message is disseminated by siren towers. As of April 2006, 57 out of 77 siren towers have been installed in southern Thailand in tsunami affected areas.
Along a coastline within tsunami inundation coverage, siren towers have been installed with the broadcast of warning messages in five different languages to warn people who are out on the beach and the locals who are not reachable by any other means of communication. The siren towers are automatically activated from the national center in Bangkok with a relay time of
warning message sent from the national center and will proceed with their tasks as planned and drilled. Emergency personnel will update situations periodically to NDWC and wait until a termination of state of emergency is released from the center to allow people to return accordingly.
Problems and difficulties fall under a classic argument of bureaucracy regarding how governmental organizations and public agencies cope with change. First, NDWC as a national organization needs not only legislation to support its existence and authorities requiring other agencies to cooperate, but also competent staff in emergency management to perform all procedures effectively. The recruitment of new personnel is time consuming, and skillful human resources in the field are rare. Secondly, NDWC is trying to enlarge and enrich its responsibilities by taking not only tsunami but all natural hazards into account. It creates a large amount of concern and hesitation from governmental agencies who originally are taking responsibility for issuing warnings such as the Departments of Meteorology, Mineral Resources, Royal Irrigation and Hydrographic of the Royal Navy. Last but very important, provincial governors have to clearly understand and willingly accept the role of the national center as a decision maker who has full authority to issue a warning message that requires provincial and local authorities to react accordingly. The nation-wide warning system and management require the integration of intergovernmental coordination, information sharing and communication networks for a warning message to be effectively disseminated in order to save lives and property.
1.3.1.2 Nation Wide Emergency Response
The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) has relocated more personnel
been prepared and assessed to be ready for emergency response. Evacuation map, risk assessment, building codes, and evacuation procedures have been developed. DDPM is working to adapt their action plan to a generic action plan for other provincial emergency agencies and responsible governmental organizations such as the Department of Mineral Resources who also has responsibility for the geographical assessment of risk areas.
It is clear that technical infrastructure and resources can be placed in position and made available. However, organizational authority and inter-organizational structure require clear direction and procedures to follow. Legislation needs to support the authority and guide how interagency coordination should be conducted effectively. More importantly, DDPM also needs the cooperation of other emergency agencies and communities in evacuation management in order to carry out an action plan appropriately. Coordinating emergency operations also requires a skillful and well-trained workforce. Tsunami drills that are conducted periodically to test the warning system and the evacuation procedures can help them to understand how to work together in implementing evacuation operations. However, all emergency personnel, police, military, coastguard, provincial officers and medical units, need to learn to work together in emergency response operations and disaster mitigation. Failure or malfunction of one unit should be effectively compensated by the other neighboring units’ operations, so that the entire emergency response system has the capacity to continue to deliver assistance to those in need.
The DDPM Academy joined by international disaster reduction agencies and emergency experts, provides training courses to emergency response personnel around the country in areas exposed to multi-hazards. The problems and difficulties of the tsunami response triggered an awareness and recognition of the basic requirement for emergency operations, well-trained emergency personnel. However, training courses provided by the DDPM academy need to
consider the nature of natural disaster in the nation as well. Flood problems, drought crises and fire have a higher potential for occurrence than earthquake and tsunami. DDPM emergency personnel and action plans need to adapt to such facts. Technology and training programs from experts can not be used at their highest potential if local emergency personnel can not apply them to their operations and the situations they confront. Those training programs need to be developed, so that the skills trained are applicable to multiple hazards. Further, co-training programs among different geographical units and among different agencies need to be developed accordingly.
1.3.2 Flood Crisis and Massive Accidents in Bangkok Metropolis
1.3.2.1 The Establishment of Central Emergency Agency
In April 2005, Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) established its central emergency agency, Civil Emergency Relief Department (CERD), to be responsible for multi-hazards emergency operations in a large scale especially fire in Bangkok metropolis. CERD is functioning as coordinator of emergency field personnel when the scale of emergency is considered too large for district emergency units. CERD was transformed from a Fire Fighter Unit under National Police Department. There are not enough personnel, equipment, and fire stations to support multi-hazards operations. From an organizational competency perspective, CERD confronts with the same problems as NDWC in recruiting new personnel and in providing those training courses as well as reaching out for expert consultation. In addition, CERD is still adjusting to its position as the central emergency agency working with other agencies of BMA, and to the new status of its personnel as civil servants rather than police officers. Norms and
cultures of organizations still play significant roles and affect how personnel work and view their respective lines of authority.
BMA approved a budget to purchase fire trucks and build more fire stations in the outer city area of Bangkok metropolis. Action plans of emergency management are designed and translated to all emergency personnel. The Civil Emergency Relief Department has recruited more personnel and built facilities and mapped the city construction and traffic in emergency response. CERD also provide many training programs to emergency personnel in other hazards than fire. Those training programs are also conducted with the participation of district officers, volunteers, communities and private sector companies.
1.3.2.2 New Assignments to District Offices in Bangkok Metropolis
BMA tasked the district offices to increase the number of members in district Civil Defense Volunteer Units (CDVU) to be able to create a stronger network of frontline emergency personnel to expand its emergency response coverage. CDVU volunteers also work closely with district enforcement officers in coordinating night-surveillance to protect communities from crimes and day-surveillance to inspect any malfunction of public construction or equipment that can cause an emergency or accident. BMA expects the district offices to reach out to communities more effectively by initiating a coordination activity between the two units as mentioned. Problems arise because the CDVU is composed of volunteers who have less incentive to participate in preparedness activities unless district offices can encourage them to accept responsibility for the safety of the communities. At the same time, district officers lack the motivation to do more work.
In addition to emergency management preparedness, BMA assigned every district office
access district areas in emergency maintenance, such as street pipe damage, road destruction and drainage problems. This unit, which is called Bangkok Emergency Service Team (BEST), structurally includes different divisions under the district office which are Civil Engineering, Enforcement, and Drainage. This unit is expected to deliver services effectively and efficiently to create a satisfactory relationship between communities and district offices. The problem is how to draw the lines of responsibility among BEST, CDVU, and district office emergency personnel.