RECOGNITION VS. EFFECTIVE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

If a strategy does not address ends, ways, and means, it is not a strategy but a set of aspirations.¹⁰⁶

In traditional theory,¹⁰⁷ states oversee the control and application of violence.

This is the recognized order of the modern world and is found in Max Weber’s

discourse—often the foundation for state-centric scholarly discussion. Deborah Avant cites as much, summarizing Weber’s contribution as “the obvious starting point in most investigations and even those who argue that globalization and the rise of non-state actors have affected vast portions of the world’s political arena generally assume that coercive power still resides with the state.”¹⁰⁸ The rise of PCMFs has disrupted this order,

however, so much so that their influence may have irreversibly damaged the states’ claim as the sole proprietor of violence. As we have seen in OIF, the reliance on PCMFs was extraordinary, in some instances accounting for 50 percent of the DoD’s workforce in Iraq.

While privatizing elements of force enhancement is not unprecedented, the measure to which it was done so in Iraq, was. The fact of the matter is that PCMFs now perform many of the services which, not so long ago, were considered core

responsibilities of the military. Also, the nature of conflict itself has changed with contingency operations often replacing the traditional warcraft between named

belligerents. In this regard, PCMFs offer attractive methods to engage and/or protect a state’s interests without mobilizing its military. This is even more attractive to emerging democracies who can utilize PCMFs as a cost effective method to assert their authority, and ironically, potentially demonstrate legitimacy as a body politic capable of projecting

106 Jim Lacey, “The Death of Military Strategy,” online article accessed through The National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/271678/death-military-strategy-jim-lacey#. Jim Lacey is professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps War College.

107 I am referring here to prominent Political Science and Sociological thought professed by Peter Fever, Max Weber, Sam Huntington, Morris Janowitz, et al, wherein states are defined, at least, subjectively by the ability to wage war.

108 Avant, The Market of Force, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 3.

forces on behalf of their own national interests. Furthermore, transnational actors such as NGOs and multi-national corporations are increasingly looking to PCMFs as a viable option to accomplish their goals. All of this is relevant to the position of the Westphalian state, since “a burgeoning transnational market for force now exists alongside the system of states and state forces.”¹⁰⁹

“Why,” Avant writes, “should we worry—or even care—about this market? The answer is simple, [PCMFs] may affect how and whether people can control violence.”¹¹⁰ Although Avant is basing her work on MSDFs, this thesis advances that the entire private military industry influences the management of violence and therefore—although

agreeing with her conclusion—suggests the topic be discussed more broadly. That being said, if we hold Avant’s conclusion to be accurate then we immediately see the necessity for constructing the argument of this thesis. Namely, to establish control measures that will mitigate domestic and international concerns over the utilization of PCMFs in support of a democratic projection of force. But to be effective, these control measures must be universal, i.e., applicable to both states and non-state actors.

In A History of Warfare, John Keegan challenges the Clausewitzian theory that

“war is the continuation of politics by other means.” Keegan makes the assumption that Clausewitz was describing what war ought to be,¹¹¹ i.e., that war was waged on behalf of the state’s public sphere—described by Avant as “the institution through which the use of violence could be most effectively linked to endeavors endorsed by a collective.”¹¹² Clausewitz’s theory has endured because it represents the traditional (and familiar) linkage between the use of violence for political processes and the social norms within a territory.¹¹³ But Clausewitz could not have predicted the amount of influence of the private sphere, i.e., the mass proliferation of PCMFs and their ability to be utilized as combat multipliers or even sole, force providers to both states and transnational actors.

Additionally, it is hard to imagine that Clausewitz could have foreseen the current threat

109 Avant, The Market for Force, 3.

110 Ibid.

111 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993), 1–6.

112 Avant, The Market for Force, 3.

113 Ibid.

environment; much less the impacts that COIN would have on how states––specifically Western powers––and non-state actors navigate within it.

All of this implies that the lines between national security and global security are becoming increasingly blurred.¹¹⁴ Further obscuring any clarity are the interests of the non-state actors whose endeavors rarely have any collective cohesion. “This,” Avant writes, “is true for moralists who feel responsible to intervene in order to help quell violence, pragmatists who worry about economic disruptions, and…realists who worry about breeding grounds for terrorists.”¹¹⁵ The latter comment carries significant weight, post-9/11, as the United States, as the unipolar power of the world, has taken direct interests in far-flung regions of the world under the rationale of its national security.

Unable (politically and economically) to project its military into these areas in any substantial numbers, the U.S. has increasingly turned to PCMFs. Following the U.S.’s lead, various NGOs and multi-national corporations have done the same, finding the value in pursuing their own goals while remaining politically distant from potential repercussions.

Access to PCMFs have changed the landscape of violence management and greatly increased the ways and methods that any interested party can advance its own agenda beyond traditional means, i.e., uniformed force projection. This does not mean that the role of the state has been weakened—only changed to incorporate a much wider spectrum of actors and interests. The complexity of this design, however, requires significant oversight or else it runs the risk of damaging the international norms of accepted state behavior. This is even more important considering the varying capacities of states. Developed, Western powers have a substantial foundation and numerous institutions in place capable for securing the limitations of PCMF influence. Whether they are effectively utilizing them is another matter. Several emerging democratic

powers however, are still struggling with the management of statecraft. Considering this, it is essential that the United States—as the democratic world leader—enact measures that will set the necessary precedents for legitimate PCMF utilization.

114 Avant, The Market for Force, 33.

115 Ibid., 33–34.

This chapter will look to the peculiarity of PCMF omission from the majority of the United States’ security documents in order to emphasize that effective reforms cannot take place until a public admission and nationally inclusive strategy regarding PCMF capabilities is developed. This chapter will also call the government to task by highlighting its current nom de guerre “whole of government” approach as wholly inaccurate without the formal inclusion of PCMFs. Finally, this chapter will advance the trinity of democratic civilian control¹¹⁶ offered by Professor Thomas Bruneau as the theoretical framework for future PCMF reforms.

A. U.S. STRATEGIC TRINITY VS. THE QDR: A PECULIAR