Taking up Genette’s definition from Narrative Discourse Revisited, we recommend that focalization be defined as the author’s temporary or de- finitive withholding of information from the reader. Under the term “per- spectivization”5, on the other hand, we understand the representation of something from the subjective view of a fictive entity (narrator or char- acter). At the same time, this mode of viewing is always a part of that which the author depicts for the reader. A connection between focal- ization and perspectivization can exist to the extent that perspectivization often serves to account for a restriction of information within the fictional world. As such, perspectivization can become a way to achieve focal- ization. Once again, however, perspectivization is not focalization, for a
5
We are consciously not using the term perspective here, but rather perspectivization, in order to indicate that the structure found in this case—just as with focalization—can be traced back to a constructive activity on the part of the author.
text can contain (implicit) information that transcends the figural and/or narratorial capacities of knowledge.
In order to determine whether the communicated information in a par- ticular passage of the text is complete (as regards the events that have been narrated up to this point), one must have a standard for measuring the completeness of information. One must specify under what conditions one can say that the author enables the reader’s “omniscience”. This is the case, according to our assessment, when the reader is placed in a position in which (up to a certain point of the narrative discourse) he can:
(a) order the depicted incidents chronologically and spatially (coherence level I),
(b) recognize the said incidents as to be expected within the represented world (i.e., according to a stereotype or schema)6 or as eventful (i.e., di- verging from the stereotype)7 (coherence level II),
(c) comprehend the incidents in their causal, final and consecutive re- lations (coherence level III).
Coherence Level
Type of relation Activities of the reader I Temporal and spatial
first x, then y, then z; x here, y there, z there
Ordering of the presented incidents according to their chronological se- quence in the represented world. Mapping of the presented incidents onto spaces.
II Correlative
If x, then also y
Ordering and expansion of the pre- sented incidents according to intra-, inter- and extratextually established schemata.
III Causal/ultimate/consecutive
y because of x y in order to x x so that y
Comprehension of the presented in- cidents with regard to causes, moti- vations and consequences.
Table 1: Levels of Coherence in the Reconstruction of Narrated Stories
6
Compare to the procedure of sequence formation as Barthes has described it in several works (collected in Barthes [1985]).
7
Such breaks in schema on the level of the “histoire” are repeatedly described as a structural characteristic essential for the narratability of events. Barthes speaks in this context of “narrative transgression” (1985), Quasthoff of “plot disruption” (1980), Lot- man (1977), Renner (1983) and Schmid (1992) of an “event” and Herman (2002) of “non-stereotypic actions and events”.
We assume in traditional narratological fashion that a narrative is the rep- resentation of a story comprising at least one action. As Bremond has al- ready demonstrated, every plot is sequentially structured insofar as it is made up of multiple phases. The reconstruction of a plot can thus take place on the basis of a universal sequencing schema, such as Bremond’s elementary sequence, which is composed of a “possibility” (éventualité), a “process of actualization” (passage à l’acte), and an “outcome” (achie- vement) (Bremond 1973: 131). We offer another schema here in its place, out of which one more clearly sees:
(a) that the so-called “possibility” is based upon a subjective perception of situation and a subsequent (conscious or unconscious) formation of in- tention,
(b) that the “process of actualization” can have effects that the agent could not foresee.
Figure 3: Sequencing Schema “Action”
Complete knowledge with reference to an action is achieved as soon as the reader comes to know its cause, its underlying intention(s), its actual- ization and its results. If the corresponding information (in relation to the events presented up to this point) is not communicated to the reader, he is dealing with focalization.
It is also necessary to further specify the mode of the communication of knowledge: when can a piece of information be seen as communicated
Action
Cause Intention Actualization Result
Primary Effects
Secondary Effects Stimulus Treatment
or withheld by the author? The explicitness of a piece of information can- not be the criterion of differentiation in this regard, for even a text whose semantics remain closely attached to a conventionally and invariably fixed literality contains implicit information. In the domain of the “Im- plicit I”, which is connected to the wording and in which the recipient moves without any lack of information, focalization can therefore not exist (cf. Linke & Nussbaumer 2001: 437). The “Implicit II”, on the other hand, is understood as “non-literal” and “variable” because it does not be- long to the semantics of the wording and demands pragmatic inferences on the part of the reader. Even so, it also conveys deducible propositions to an adequately competent reader. Focalization does not occur in this case either.
One can only speak of withheld information, then, in the case of a pro- position:
(a) that the reader needs in order to reconstruct the occurrence in the “actual world” (cf. Ryan 1991) according to coherence level III (see table 1),
(b) that is not explicitly given where the reader would need it,
(c) that the reader cannot discover by combining given propositions with relevant cultural knowledge8.
In the practice of narrative analysis, it is of course not necessary to make explicit every element of the sequencing schema “action” for each action that is mentioned in the text. However, the majority of actions (in fictional narrative worlds as well as in everyday life) are generally self- explanatory, as understanding a plot means being able to explain at any moment its individual elements. Thus, one’s attention should be drawn above all to those elements of the sequence whose explication—as a re- sult of focalization—seems difficult or disputable.
8
Whether cultural knowledge that is activated in the reception process holds factual rel- evance can be determined through its power of integration or its functionality. We can apply here, for example, the rules formulated by Titzmann, which determine when a potentially relevant piece of knowledge can be considered functionalized, and thus fac- tually relevant in the text (cf. Titzmann 1977: 360). This is the case when a conclusion which can be reached through a textual proposition with the help of this piece of knowledge (a) is “itself a textual proposition,” or (b) is “in its turn functionalized” as the implicit condition of another proposition.