The referential/structural framework

Reed (2006, p.3) contends that in phenomenographic studies

[…] it is not enough simply to determine a set of qualitatively different categories to have a phenomenographic result. In fact, it is not so much the categories per se that are important, but rather the differences and similarities that serve to link and differentiate one category from another, i.e. the structure and meaning related to the categories.

The identification of referential and structural aspects (Marton, 1988) is a notable change that can be seen as the further development of the what/how framework (Harris, 2011). It was the result of an exploration of the conceptions of learning by Marton (1988), who created this new analytical tool and related it to Pramling’s (1983) dichotomy of ‘what’ and ‘how’ aspects.

Bowden and Marton (2004, p.30) state that:

[the nature of a way of experiencing something] can be defined in terms of two intertwined aspects. When we talk about qualitatively different ways of experiencing something we have to deal with differences in structure and differences in meaning. To experience something implies discerning it from the context of which it is a part and to relate it to that context or to other contexts. To experience something also implies discerning the parts of what we experience and relating these to each other and to the whole.

The referential aspect of a phenomenographic analysis captures the global meaning of the phenomenon. The structural aspect is composed of an internal horizon and an external horizon. According to Cope (2004), Gurwitsch’s (1964) structure of awareness is the theoretical foundation for the internal/external horizon division. Marton (2000) and Marton et al. (2004) deem that awareness is used interchangeably with consciousness, which means “the totality of a person’s simultaneous experiences” (Marton, 2000, p.109), or “the totality of a person’s experiences of the world, at each point in time” (Marton et al., 2004, p.19). Essentially awareness is layered, because “whenever people attend to something, they discern certain aspects of it, and by doing so pay more attention to some things and less attention or none at all to other things” (Marton et al., 2004, p.9). Gurwitsch (1964, p.4) presents a layered model of awareness and contends that:

[…] every total field of consciousness consists of three domains, each domain exhibiting a specific type of organisation of its own. The first domain is the theme, that which engrosses the mind of the experiencing subject, or as it is often expressed, which stands in the “focus of his attention.” Second is the thematic field, defined as the totality of those data, copresent with the theme, which are experienced as materially

relevant or pertinent to the theme and form the background or horizon out of which the theme emerges as the centre. The third includes data which, though copresent with, have no relevancy to, the theme and comprise in their totality what we propose to call the margin.

Furthermore, Marton and Booth (1997, p.98) use the example of a reader reading a book to illustrate how a layered awareness can be applied to a very specific learning situation;

As you read this, the text is the theme of your awareness, and issues such as the nature of experience, understanding, phenomenology, and ways of experiencing number belong to the thematic field. The same theme (this text) might, of course, be seen against the background of different thematic fields. […] Furthermore, there are things are temporally and spatially coexistent with our reading of the text, such as the room in which you are sitting, […] All that which is coexistent with the theme without being related to it by dint of the content or meaning, Gurwitsch called the margin.

In phenomenography, Gurwitsch’s (1964) notions of theme, thematic field and margin are replaced by internal and external horizons (Cope, 2004); more specifically, the internal horizon refers to the theme, whereas the external horizon involves the thematic field and margin, as shown in the figure below (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5 A structure of awareness Source: Cope (2004, p.11)

Cope and Prosser (2005, p.350) describe the components, structure and relationship of the two horizons as follows;

The internal horizon consists of the aspects of the phenomenon simultaneously present in the theme of awareness, and the relationships between these aspects and between the aspects and the phenomenon as a whole. The external horizon consists of the thematic field and the margin, that is, all aspects that are part of awareness at a particular instant but which are not thematic. The external horizon as an area of awareness forms the context in which the internal horizon sits. The boundary between the external and internal horizons delimits the phenomenon from its context.

It is noted that “a way of experiencing depends on how the parts of the phenomenon are distinguished and appear at the same time in the learner’s focal awareness and the parts of it move into the background” (Ornek, 2008, p.4). Drawing on Gurwitsch’s (1964) notions, when experiencing something, it is normal that with some aspects coming to a person’s focal awareness, other aspects recede to the background (Ornek, 2008).

There is an intimate relationship between these two aspects; the “structural aspect is dialectically intertwined with the referential (or meaning) aspect of the conception” (Marton et al., 1993, p.278). Distinctive conceptions would be different “both with regard to how the phenomenon and its component parts are delimited and related to each other (the structural aspect) and with regard to the global meaning of the phenomenon (the referential aspect)” (Marton et al., 1993, p.278). Marton and Booth (1997, p.87) contend that “[s]tructure presupposes meaning, and at the same time meaning presupposes structure”. When we experience something, the meaning and structure are dialectically intertwined and occur simultaneously (Marton & Booth, 1997).

Marton and Booth (1997, p.87) draw on the example of a deer in the woods to better illustrate the meaning of structural and referential aspects;

To elaborate first on what we mean by structural aspect, we need to point out that to experience something in a particular way, not only do we have to discern it from its context, as a deer in the woods, but we also have to discern its parts, the way they relate to each other, and the way they relate to the whole. Therefore, on seeing the deer in the woods, in seeing its contours we also see parts of its body, its head, its antlers, its forequarters, and so on, and their relationships in terms of stance. The structural aspects of a way of experiencing something is thus twofold: discernment of the whole from the context on the one hand and discernment of the parts and their relationships within the whole on the other. Moreover, intimately intertwined with the structural aspect of the experience is the referential aspect, the meaning. In seeing the parts and the whole if the deer and the relationships between them we even see its stance-relaxed and unaware of our presence or alert to some sound

unheard by us-and we thus discern further degrees of meaning.

Using an example of a deer in the woods, Marton and Booth (1997, p.87) also explain the two categories of horizons;

[…] the external horizon of coming on the deer in the woods extends from the immediate boundary of the experience - the dark forest against which the deer is discerned - through all other contexts in which related occurrences have been experienced (e.g. walks in the forest, deer in the zoo, nursery tales, reports of hunting incidents, etc.). The internal horizon comprises the deer itself, its parts, its stance, its structural presence.

This framework, which includes terms such as referential and structural aspects and internal and external horizons, is illustrated in the figure below (Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6 The unit of a science of experience, a way of experiencing something

Source: Marton & Booth (1997, p.88)

Although pioneering phenomenographers have endeavoured to elaborate the referential and structural framework and its second level external and internal horizons, problems remain, and some key issues have yet to be further clarified. For instance, the

boundary between this framework and the what/how one is blurred, which may cause confusion when used in empirical studies. In addition, Irvin (2006, p.120) particularly criticises the external horizon for a lack of clarification, and argues that;

This definition [of external and internal horizon] is vague, especially concerning the external horizon. It does not identify what the “whole” is or how the relationship between parts of the phenomenon and this whole differ from relationships within the internal horizon.