The Reform Process and its Implications for the Organisation of Work

The broad social, political and economic changes discussed above have had far-reaching implications for the organisation of work in China. At a level of generality, the broadest revolution in circumstances has been the abolition of the CCP-dominated system of work units (the danwei), which has given way to an evolving political economy of market-based development. The effects of this for the organisation of work are detailed by Hassard et al. (2010: 501) as follows:

 'The development of internal product markets and increased exposure to competition'

 'The increasing exposure of Chinese enterprises to international markets'

 'The multiplication of the sources of external investment funds'

 'High rates of economic growth'.

party-state control of work organisation and a (2) tension and conflict has unfolded (Lin, 2011: 148-149).

a. The decline of direct party-state control of work organisation

Whereas once the economic space was dominated by public ownership, together with CCP behavioural control mechanisms, it is now populated with 'the rise of family farms, non-farm self-employment, domestic private

enterprises, foreign-direct-investment companies' (Lin, 2011: 148). In short, the CCP is unable to, or at least ineffective at, maintaining a significant presence in an economic realm increasingly dominated by private enterprises. As the economic imperative shifts to profit maximisation post 1978, direct political and

bureaucratic control consequently declines. Spatial and occupational mobility (equally upward or downward) has significantly increased as a result, which corresponds to an enlargement and spread of the labour market all across China. Contractual arrangements between employees and employers are now the norm, not just in private enterprises, but public ones too, providing both parties with an albeit limited legal defence against government intervention and control. Lastly, 'human capital has become an important factor in influencing the direction and destination of workforce movement, the level of remuneration and benefits, as well as the resultant inequalities among working people' (Lin, 2011: 149).

relations has increasingly developed into labour disputes, complaint, protests, resistance toward employers and government both. The causes of this

contentiousness are three-fold:

Firstly, the growth of economic insecurity on employment, healthcare, housing, old-age support, and education fronts. This insecurity is most typically felt in SOEs, whose employees, who once experienced the greatest degrees of security, have experienced the rapid emptying of their iron rice bowl as a result of the reforms:

'Under the Maoist system, they were more 'privileged' in terms of income, benefits, and status than employees in urban collective enterprises and people's communes. But the decline of bureaucratic allocation of jobs and related benefits, the onslaught of competition, and the deteriorating performance of public enterprises during the 1980s and 1990s led to a steady worsening of their economic situation. The most difficult time came during the mid- to late 1990s, when massive layoffs took place in the public sector' (Lin 2011:149).

Secondly, labour insurgence has increasingly resulted from perceptions of

injustice with regard to systemic inequalities created as a result of proto-capitalist labour practices and the government's failure (or unwillingness) to protect the rights of workers through formal rules and obligations. The situation of migrant workers, residing in cities as second-class citizens, has been a constant issue that has sparked complaints, protest, and general unrest. The most common instigator of such unrest is employers refusal to contribute to internal social services funds on behalf of migrants, resulting in their exclusion from healthcare, benefits, housing, pensions, etc. Migrant workers now seek equal rights, and are prepared

to act to get them. Lastly, poor treatment of workers by their employers has led to significant tensions and conflicts within the workplace, most notably in the private sector.

In summary, this section briefly introduced the process of China’s economic reform. It provides a background for the reform of higher education and graduate labour market, which are going to be further elaborated in the following two sections.

2.3 Higher education in China

With the re-introduction of the National College Entrance Exam (NCEE or Gaokao), as well as the re-establishment of universities in the late 1970s, China’s higher education system has been subject to huge reform and expansion in terms of the academic degree system, types of institutions, their administration, and the number of graduates studying. China has shifted from a policy of ‘elite education’ to ‘mass education’, evidenced by the sheer number of graduates produced by HEIs. During the last decade, the Chinese university system expanded four-fold in terms of student enrolment in HEIs. In 2000, student numbers totalled 5.6 million, whereas by 2010 the number of students enrolled totalled 22.3 million and 5.8 million graduates were produced (National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 2012). All of these students are part of a US/UK model for higher education. Their degree system comprises Bachelor’s, Master’s and

to cater for the different needs of students. Similar to what we find in the US and UK, there are comprehensive universities, vocational colleges and specialised higher education institutions in different subjects (Brandenburg and Zhu, 2007). Apart from divisions according to subject, HEIs can be identified by their

belonging to one of three clusters: ‘regular HEIs’ (2358), ‘adult institutions’ (365) and ‘private HEIs’ (836) (MoE, 2010a). ‘Regular HEIs’ refer to the HEIs that recruit students are graduates from high school by taking NCEE (Gaokao), including universities and specialised/vocational colleges; ‘Adults HEIs’ mainly recruit students with working experience without taking NCEE; Both ‘regular and adults HEIs’ are either central or provincial government funded; whereas ‘private HEIs’ are privately funded and target high school graduates.

In addition to the reform and expansion in terms of the number of HEIs, graduates and enrolments, concern for the quality of regular HEIs has led to two important government funded in the reform of the higher education in China: ‘Project 211’, and ‘Project 985’. ‘Project 211’ was initiated by the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China in 1995, with the aim of developing a hundred

universities into world-class institutions with high teaching and research standards. This was a goal set forth for the millennium, on the grounds that it would contribute to socio-economic development (and in turn China’s modernisation). The name – ‘Project 211’ - is derived from the twinning of ’21st_{’ century and ‘1’hundred}

universities. It is the biggest government funded project for the development of HE since 1949. As for Project 985, in May 1998, the former President Jiang Zemin

gave a speech celebrating the 100th anniversary of Peking University, commenting that the modernisation of Chinese society depended on the development of several world-class universities. Thus the MoE claimed that, during the execution of the ‘Action Scheme for Invigorating Education Towards the 21st Century’, some of the country’s universities should be given further support. The date of President Jiang’s speech (May 98) was used as part of the title for this additional project, combined with the suggestion that the government use ‘1’ per cent of annual central fiscal revenue to fund it. Peking University and Tsinghua University became the first beneficiaries of ‘Project 985’, following by 39 others now involved in this scheme. Because of the significance attributed to these two projects, universities listed on both – e.g. Peking, Tsinghua - have become a reference point by which the quality of other universities in China is measured.