FACTS
- Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila
- December, 1941-Krivenko, alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate. Inc
- The registration of the lot was interrupted by the war.
- May, 1945-Krivenko sought to accomplish said registration but the Register of Deeds of Manila (RDM) denied on the ground that he is an alien and cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction.
- Krivenko filed as suit in the CFI of Manila by means of a consulta.
- CFI affirmed RDM's refusal hence this appeal.
- After the briefs have been presented, Krivenko filed a motion to withdraw the appeal.
- The case was already voted upon and the majority decision was being prepared.
- Rule 52, section 4 of the Rules of Court: Court's discretion to grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented.
- The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it.
- While the motion was pending, a new circular of the Department of Justice (Circular No. 128) dated August 12, 1947 was issued, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens.
- RDM naturally obeyed the circular.
ISSUE
Jurisdiction:
WON the Court should grant the motion withdrawing an appeal with the issuance of the said circular of the DOJ
Primary Issue:
WON an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.
HELD
The Court denied the motion withdrawing the appeal. Granting a withdrawal of appeal is discretionary upon the Court after the briefs have been presented.
- It cannot grant appellant's motion withdrawing his appeal only because the constitutional issue should be avoided.
- Also, the withdrawal was denied because under the circumstances, particularly (1) the circular of the Dept. of Justice issued while this case was pending before the Court and ordering all registers of deed to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens, together with the circumstance that (2) probably a similar question may never come up again before the Court, the effect of the withdrawal would be offensive to the opinion reached by a majority of the members of the Court after long and exhaustive deliberations on the constitutional question.
- To allow the withdrawal under such circumstances is equivalent to tolerating an offense to the constitution, offense that may be permanent.
- The Court held that NO, aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands. (The votes were: 8-3)
- The case was decided under section 5 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it PROHIBITS THE TRANSFER TO ALIENS OF ANY PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND INCLUDING RESIDENTIAL LAND WHATEVER ITS ORIGIN MIGHT HAVE BEEN.
- This provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands.
- This provision should be read in connection with section 1 of Article XIII "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated" and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens.
- This provision secures the policy of nationalization in Sec. 1 of Art.
XIII.
- It would be futile to prohibit the alienation of public lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of the Filipino citizens.
- Ratio The Court shall rule that it cannot grant a motion withdrawing an appeal if such a withdrawal would result to a permanent offense to the Constitution.
- The Court shall rule that under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and as a consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the Constitution became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.
LEE HONG HOK V DAVID FERNANDO; December 27, 1972 FACTS
- Pedro, Simeon, Rosita and Leoncio LEE HONG HOK, petitioners - Aniano DAVID, the Hon. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Director of Lands and Court of Appeals
- APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
- Petitioners wanted to declare null and void David’s Torrens Title (OCT No. 510) because they alleged to own the disputed lot (226 m22 Lot 2892, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre) through accretion.
- Jun 18, 1958 – Director of Lands issued David a sales patent of the lot
- Aug 26, 1959 – Undersecretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources issued David a Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 - Oct 21, 1959 – Naga City Register of Deeds issued David OCT No.
510 ISSUES
1. WON Lot 2892 came into being not by reclamation but by accretion, therefore a private – not public - domain (this court says it does not warrant any further consideration)
2. WON authoritative doctrines do not preclude a party other than the government to dispute the validity of a grant (this court says it does)
3. WON the indefeasible character of a public land patent after one year should not be recognized (this court says it should be).
HELD
1. Imperium is the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and dominium is the state’s capacity to own or acquire property.
Dominium enables the state to provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. The present Constitution adopts the modified concept of jure regalia, in which all lands – in Spain and its earlier decrees – were held by the Crown, and the present Constitution holds that it is the state which possesses ownership (Cariño v Insular Government). In Valenton v Murciano (1904), all lands held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us (the Spanish state) according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming in them in what they now have and giving them more if
necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.
In Montano v Insular Government, unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the sole power is vested in Congress.
The land in question is not private property; the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the public character thereof by virtue of reclamation (and not by accretion which the petitioners claim).
Therefore, the only remedy for the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud committed by respondents.
There was no fraud; everything was done in the open – notices were published, sale and awarding of land to David were public official acts of a Government officer.
The disputed lot is a result of reclamation, therefore a public land.
2. Only the government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. Plaintiffs are private parties and not government officials, and therefore cannot institute for the nullification of David’s Torrens Title, since they are not the registered owners of the land and they had not been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.
Maninang v Consolacion states that “[t]he fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant (in this case, the respondents) cannot question it.
The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government.”
Only the government can question the validity of the title which it gave.
3. Since the filing of the sales application of David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of RA 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.
After registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land is automatically covered by RA 496 --- RA 496 § 48 says that any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible.
In Aquino v Director of Lands (1919), “[t]he proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final.
In Cabacug v Lao, “a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of five years.”
David’s application was a renewal of his deceased wife’s application, wherein his deceased wife occupied Lot 2892 since 1938.
The decision of Court of Appeals of January 31, 1961 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed
GONZALES V MARCOS