3. Data and Methodology 1 Data Source
4.1 Regression Results
The regression result from Model 1 shows that both education and hukou have significant
effect on migrant worker. For each level increase in education, the probability of an individual to
become a migrant worker will increase by 3.81%. This result matches my expectation about the
education variable. However, as of hukoudummy, having an urban hukou is likely to increase the
probability of migrant worker by over 12.2%. From the result of the third regression which
Model 1 and Model 2 are ran together, the significance of hukoudummy has doubled to 24.4%.
The regression result on hukoudummy has a high significance level but appears to be
counterintuitive. It indicates that urban hukou holders are at least 12.2% more likely than rural
hukou holders to work in cities away from their permanent residence. The general expectation
regarding the relationship between hukou status and migrant worker status is that people with
rural hukou are more willing to become a migrant worker as they can earn more by working in
non-agricultural industries in cities. However, one explanation for this regression result is that
many urban hukou holders whose hukou registered places are small cities are also willing to
work in larger cities such as the capital cities of each provinces. Based on the definition of
migrant worker in my study, it is understandable that compared to the thousands of cities in
China, a handful of the top largest cities will always be the most coveted destinations for people
who want to work away from their home residence.
Since many variables in Model 1 and Model 2 are correlated, the coefficient of
hukoudummy in regression 3 is doubled to 24.4%. The overall results in regression 3 appear to
doubled in regression 3 compared to regression 1. Regardless of the increase in number of
variables in regression 3 and the increase in R-squared from less than 1% in regression 1&2 to
2.47% in regression 3, the two sets of variables may affect each other. For instance, one’s age
and marriage status will have influence on his/her likelihood of having their parents to live with
the family or not. Dummy variable of child, number of children, and family count are also
correlated with each other. Therefore, results from regression 3 should be more relevant and
accurate.
Similar results happen in Model 2 as well. While most family-related variables appear to
be very significant, the number of children and live with family tend to have negative effects on
the dependent variable. For each extra child an individual has, the probability of him/her to
become a migrant worker decreases at 2.76% and even higher at 4.1% if taken variables from
Model 1 into account.
The amount of family member and the total family wages also have a small positive and
significant effect on the dependent variable. In Model 3, for each 1,000 yuan increase in the
family wage, the probability of one being a migrant worker will increase by 0.06%; for each 1
more person as a migrant worker in family, the probability of one being a migrant worker will
increase by 6.3%.
The result from total_family_migrantworker also indicates that having one or more
family members as a migrant worker will have a positive effect on individuals becoming migrant
workers. This result matches the discovery from a previous study on migrant worker network
which states that current migrant workers will have a positive effect on non-migrant-workers
from their own village, whereas returned migrant workers will have a negative effect (Zhao,
To run Model 3, I generated a series of variables that are multiplied by 1,000 from the
original variables for a better presentation in terms of regression results. Because these monetary
variables are counted in the unit of 1 yuan, for the better presentation of coefficients, I multiple
and generate related variables so that the coefficients can be interpreted in units of 1,000 yuan.
Any variable with “1000” at the end of its name is generated in this way, except mortgage which
was in units of 10,000 yuan. It has been eliminated from regressions because the observations are
too less to construct a probit regression along with other variables.
I conduct 4 rounds of OLS regression based on Model 3 and results are shown in Table 5.
The first regression in Table 5, which is regression 4 of the study, is set to consist only the
expenditure variables in the model. Regression 5 contains only the income variables from Model
3. Regression 6 combines the main variables from both expenditure and income categories and
eliminates variables with less observations to cover a larger part of the entire sample. Regression
7 includes all variables from both expenditure and income categories mentioned in previous
regressions.
The results from Table 5 partially verify my expectation about Model 3. There are only
two variables from regression 4 and 5 contain a significant coefficient. Med1000 in regression 4
indicates that for each 1,000 yuan increase in the medical expanse for one’s household, the
probability of the person to become a migrant worker will increase by 0.106%. In regression 5,
Total_retirement_subsidiary indicates that for each 1,000 yuan increase in the retirement
subsidiary of one’s household, the probability of the person to become a migrant worker will
increase by less than 0.001%, similar to no effect at all.
Regression 6 eliminates Total_retirement_subsidiary and Total_government_subsidiary
and effort. The results of regression 6 shows that med1000 is still the only variable that has a
significant coefficient value. For each 1,000 yuan increase in medical expense for one’s
household, the probability that the person will become a migrant worker will increase by
0.104%. Including med1000, the signs of each coefficient in regression 6 almost remain the same
if compared with regression 4 and 5. The coefficients are also way below 1% in all cases.
While all 4 regressions in Table 5 have a significant constant, regression 7 has the highest
value of pseudo R-squared. The observation number is decreased to less than 1,700 in regression
7 and the value of most coefficients are increased accordingly. While med1000 is still the only
variable that has a significant coefficient, variables such as food1000 and house1000 have
increased by more than 10 times. Their coefficients indicate that that for each 1,000 yuan
increase in food and house expenditure, the likelihood of one becoming a migrant worker will
increase by 0.173% and 0.154%. Other variables still display an almost neutral effect to the
dependent variable.
Limitations and Policy Implications
The major limitation of this study is that it does not follow the official definition of
migrant workers. Officially, individuals who work away from their household registered place
for more than 6 months are considered as migrant workers. However, due to data limitation, I
was unable to limit the samples within this time range. Another limitation is that the study did
not control for work types of agricultural or non-agricultural, which may display a clearer
difference in individuals’ choices. There are also many missing observations, for instance
The results from this study indicate that individuals tend to care more about their
responsibilities to their offspring compared to their parents or other relatives. It is also logical
that parents tend not to leave their children for work but to company them at home. One policy
implication for the government to attract more migrant workers, especially those young couples,
would be to invest in younger level education facilities to support a larger group of children, or
to offer more compensations for the migrant parents to raise children below a certain age. This
may increase their interest in working away from home knowing that they may bring their
children together to the urban areas.
Conclusion
In general, the regression results all show a significant effect on the dependent variable
migrant worker and suggest that most family factors do have a huge impact on one’s decision in
becoming a migrant worker or not. The most significant results are from the first and second
model where individual characteristics and non-monetary family characteristics are considered.
It is clear that having other family members who are able to help an individual either financially
or physically, such as taking care of one’s house when he/she is away, will have a positive effect
on one’s probability in becoming a migrant worker. If, on the other hand, family members who
have difficulties in taking care of themselves or need someone to constantly be with them, are
considered as having a negative effect on one’s probability in becoming a migrant worker.
Variables of parent alive and children all show negative effects on the dependent variable
Monetary variables do not display much of a significance in terms of influence on the
dependent variable. The only variable with significant coefficient is medical expense, which for
each 1,000 yuan increase in medical expense, the probability of one to become a migrant worker
will increase by 0.5%. It can be interpreted in the way that medical expenses, unlikely other
everyday expense on food, house and other categories, often incur with a sudden and last for a
long period of time. Individuals may have difficulties in foreseeing such event or are able to use
insurance or other kinds of methods to prevent it. It could also be that many migrant workers,
especially those with rural hukou and work in construction industry, are more exposed to
accidents than others. In that case, it could be possible that it is being a migrant worker causes
the medical expenditure to increase rather than the other way around.
In conclusion, this study adds new perspective to the issue of migrant workers and
internal migrations in China by looking the family level of characteristics from the latest data
Tables and Graphs:
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Individual Characteristics
Variables Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Migrant worker 16,024 0.660 0.474 0 1 Age 16,036 42.037 15.80 16 104 Gender 16,036 0.507 0.500 0 1 Hukoudummy 14,613 0.337 0.473 0 1 Marriagedummy 16,036 0.763 0.425 0 1 Child 16,036 0.711 0.453 0 1 SingleChild 11,409 0.49 0.50 0 1 Education 15,187 3.024 1.446 1 8 Lowedu** 5,523 1 0 1 1 Midedu*** 7,293 1 0 1 1 Highedu**** 2,371 1 0 1 1 Parents Alive 16,036 0.80 0.40 0 1
Notes: *migrant workers with urban or rural hukou status; **illiterate/semi-literate and primary school; ***junior high school and senior high school; ****3 or 4 years of college and master’s/doctoral degree.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Family Characteristics
Variables Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Number of Children 16,041 1.277 1.170 0 10
Live in Family 16,055 0.909 0.288 0 1
Parent Finance 16,055 0.211 0.408 0 1
Parent live with Family 16,055 0.194 0.400 0 1
Family Count 16,055 4.295 2.013 1 17
Family Wage* 16,055 29173.43 56,058.96 0 2,200,000
Family Expense* 15,205 90012.23 131,296.4 104 5,169,220
Total Family Members as Migrant Workers
16,055 0.873 1.154 0 9
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Monetary Characters at the Family Level
Variables Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Income 4,138 38,305.47 167,372.6 70 10,300,000
Savings 16,041 56,972.43 151,821.9 0 4,000,000
Family Income 16,027 100,768 250,891.8 160 11,400,000
Total retirement subsidiary 4,763 19,184.64 23,492.13 50 210,000
Total government subsidiary 5,853 1,894.566 7,229.344 5 300,000
Land Rental 1,460 2,966.495 6,220.176 16 75,000 Expense 16,041 90,012.74 131,342.6 104 5,169,220 Food 15,958 21,535.75 19,457.84 24 600,000 House 15,793 11,664.55 32,819.31 16 551,440 Medical 14,420 7,233.441 27,830.44 10 1,200,000 Mortgage1 1,869 250,890.3 3,409,966 100 60,000,000
Table 4: Results from Model 1 and Model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Control for
Provinces Control for Provinces Control for Provinces No Control age -0.00142 -0.000637 -0.00202 (0.00184) (0.00298) (0.00301)
age2 2.17e-05 2.61e-05 4.80e-05
(1.91e-05) (3.16e-05) (3.19e-05)
gender -0.00249 -0.0137 -0.0157 (0.00790) (0.0115) (0.0117) child -0.00165 0.0248 0.0583** (0.0141) (0.0240) (0.0239) marriagedummy 0.0250** 0.0329* 0.0408** (0.0123) (0.0190) (0.0192) hukoudummy 0.0463*** 0.0899*** 0.0961*** (0.00951) (0.0133) (0.0128) parentalive 0.00834 -0.00313 -0.00496 (0.0112) (0.0170) (0.0171) lowedu -0.0547*** -0.0296 -0.0151 (0.0193) (0.0290) (0.0292) midedu -0.0377** 0.00560 0.0206 (0.0187) (0.0268) (0.0270) highedu 0.00970 0.0539* 0.0734*** (0.0208) (0.0282) (0.0283) Number_of_Children -0.00685 -0.00857 -0.0280*** (0.00634) (0.0103) (0.0101) liveinfam 0.000866 0.0857* 0.0895** (0.0301) (0.0442) (0.0444) parentfinance 0.134* 0.119 0.0988
(0.0716) (0.0869) (0.0873) parentlivewfam -0.119* -0.0701 -0.0447 (0.0717) (0.0864) (0.0867) familycount 0.0189*** 0.0162*** 0.0136*** (0.00359) (0.00389) (0.00385) familywage1000 0.000338*** 0.000186** 0.000202**
(8.68e-05) (9.12e-05) (8.74e-05)
Total_family_migrantworker 0.0135 0.0286*** 0.0255** (0.00986) (0.0105) (0.0104) Constant 0.628*** 0.622*** 0.434*** 0.377*** (0.0529) (0.0527) (0.0880) (0.0791) Observations 14,608 6,990 6,635 6,635 R-squared 0.023 0.042 0.060 0.032
Table 5: Results from Model 3 (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES Control of Provinces No Control Control of Provinces No Control income1000 -0.00449 0.00143 -0.000117** -0.000117** (0.00570) (0.00521) (5.54e-05) (5.57e-05)
familyincome1000 0.00649 -0.00550 5.98e-05* 5.33e-05*
(0.00811) (0.00410) (3.11e-05) (3.12e-05)
savings1000 -0.000160 0.000915 3.87e-05 5.87e-05
(0.00777) (0.00368) (6.92e-05) (6.77e-05) expense1000 -0.00308 -0.000337 -0.000168 -0.000163 (0.0132) (0.00494) (0.000105) (0.000104) food1000 -0.0343 0.00904 0.00122** 0.000862* (0.0286) (0.00930) (0.000490) (0.000480) house1000 0.000709 0.00186 0.000371 0.000279 (0.0278) (0.00818) (0.000291) (0.000291) med1000 0.0202 -0.00325 0.000793** 0.000755** (0.0261) (0.0107) (0.000335) (0.000336) Total_gov_subsidi ary1000 0.0357 0.0407 (0.146) (0.0454) Total_retirement_ subsidiary1000 -0.0129 -0.00670 (0.0167) (0.00648)
mortgage1 -2.57e-06 4.94e-06
(1.51e-05) (6.03e-06)
Constant 1.642** 0.992*** 0.599*** 0.641***
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix I:
Descriptive Data of Migrant Workers in 5 Provinces of the Largest Population from Data Set
Provincial Regions
Observations Mean of Migrant Worker Annual Income* Mean of Non- Migrant Worker Annual Income* 2 Sample t-test of Unequal Variances Liaoning 1.342 28,962.59 (256) 43,430.3 (117) -0.9392 Shanghai 1,128 57,829.71 (213) 55,816.51 (83) 0.3068 Henan 1.825 31,629.35 (283) 64,824.21 (108) -0.5569 Guangdong 1,868 42,429.1 (311) 79,894.43 (233) -0.8486 Gansu 1,630 29,087.4 (230) 32,116.25 (93) -1.0885
*Numbers of observations are in brackets below the mean values. All units are in Chinese Yuan (CNY).