e fact that sentences of the form ‘theFisG’canbe used to communicate singular propositions (or object-dependent propositions), is not a problem for the Russellian analysis according to Reimer and Devitt. Whatisa problem
5 However, this is not to be construed as a defense of the standard Russellian semantics for de nite descriptions. I have already argued in Chapter II and Chapter III that the orthodox Russellian analysis (and various Neo-Russellian variants) suffer from other signi cant problems. e aim here is only to demonstrate that the semantic ambiguity hypothesis, as it is defended by Reimer and Devitt, is untenable. Moreover, it’s oen assumed that a defense of the unitary Russellian analysis of descriptions (or some other unitary analysis of descriptions, e.g. the Frege/Strawson analysis that is standard in linguistics or the analysis I have argued in favor of in Chapter III)mustexplain referential readings in terms of eithergeneralizedorparticularizedconversational implicatures. I amnotattempting to bolster such a line of defense because I do not believe that such a Gricean explanation has any hope of succeeding. Towards the end of this Chapter I will instead propose an alternative explanation of referential uses based on the semantic analysis of de nite descriptions proposed in Chapter III.
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is theregularity(i.e. thestatistical frequency) of the referential uses. is use is, Reimer and Devitt maintain, thestandarduse.
Puzzle: given that Donnellan, Chastain, and others have made the frequency of referential uses of descriptions apparent, why are so many philosophers so committed to the view that such uses do not exemplify a convention, or at least not a semantic convention? (Devitt 2004: 305, my italics)
[...] the fact that the referential use of de nite descriptions is astandard (i.e.statisticallycommon) use of such expressions,doespose a problem for Russell’s eory. (Reimer 1998: 89, italics in original)
Reimer’s and Devitt’s central contention is that de nite descriptions are regularly used referentially, viz. to communicate singular thoughts, and that given this high frequency of referential uses, it is implausible to maintain that the referential meaning is somehow mediated by—or pragmatically derived from—the attributive meaning. Rather, if a standard use of ‘the F isG’ is referential, one should instead conclude that on such uses these sentencesliterally expresssingular propositions. at is, if the standard use of de nite descriptions is referential, we should conclude that this is a semantic convention rather than attempt to explain these uses in terms of pragmatic, e.g. Gricean, inferences, as argued by e.g. Neale (1990: 83-91). is is, in its essentials, the argument.
Following Bach (2004: 227), I label this argument the argument from regularity (rather than convention) and throughout this chapter, I will refer to the thesis that referentially used descriptionsliterally express (viz. semantically express) singular propositions as the RDT (the referential descriptions thesis). I now discuss the putative advantages of motivating the RDT using the argument from regularity.
First, when the RDT is motivated in terms of the putative empirical observation concerning frequency of use, namely that speakers regularly use de nite descriptions to convey singular thoughts, this allows one to avoid the problem raised by Neale (cf. above). e reasoning is that while it is plausible to analyze de nite descriptions as genuinely ambiguous between attributive and referential meanings, this is not plausible for other determiner phrases, e.g. ‘every F’, ‘both Fs’, ‘seventeen Fs’, ‘many Fs’ etc. Even though these determiner phrases can be used — in appropriately loaded contexts — to communicate object-dependent propositions (as Neale demonstrated, cf. above), they are not standardly so used. It therefore seems implausible to think that such object-dependent uses constitute asemanticconvention rather than a phenomenon which has a pragmatic explanation.
But Reimer and Devitt do acknowledge that when an expressionE is standardly used (i.e. with a high statistical frequency) to meanE∗, this does not guarantee thatE literallymeansE∗.
However, as a little re ection will show,standarduse is no guarantee ofliteraluse. In order for a (simple or complex) expressioneto be capable ofliterallyexpressingpit must be the case thatpis appropriately constrained by thelinguisticmeaning. (Reimer 1998: 95)
In other words, the literal meaning of any expressionEis constrained by its linguisticmeaning. In other words,Ecould literally expressE∗only ifE∗ is consistent with the linguistic meaning ofE. As an illustration, Reimer says,
If (e.g.) I say ‘She is tall’, and my intended referent does not satisfy the indexical’s linguistic meaning (i.e., is not a female), then it seems plausible to suppose that, while I may well havecommunicateda sin- gular proposition, no proposition wasliterally expressed(on account of reference failure). (Reimer 1998: 93)
While the semantic import of ϕ-features such as gender is a notoriously difficult topic, cf. e.g. Heim (2008) and Sauerland (2008), Reimer’s general idea, as it applies to e.g. de nite descriptions, appears to be the following. Suppose that for some expression ϕ,ϕtakes linguistic constituents e1...en as its arguments. e literal meaning ofϕ(e1...en) is then (at a minimum) constrained by the linguistic meaning of the constituents e1...en and the product of their composition. is way, the constraint that ‘theFisG’ (used referentially) can be true only if the intended referent isF, is built into the analysis, sinceFis a linguistic constituent of ‘theF’.6Let’s refer to this as the
linguistic meaning constraint(LMC).
Now, the (LMC) helps avoid several of the problems that Donnellan’s analysis faces. First, Donnellan’s analysis of referential descriptions has the consequence that ‘the F isG’ can be true even if no individual isF. What is required to make ‘the F isG’ true on its referential use is simply that the intended referent is G. But assuming the (LMC), this consequence of Donnellan’s view (which is generally considered very counter-intuitive and thus problematic) is avoided. Even if ‘theFisG’ is used referentially, it can only be true if the intended referent isF.
Another fairly clear problem with Donnellan’s analysis is that the restric- tor predicate,F, appears to make no semantic contribution in ‘theF’ when
6 Reimer’s and Devitt’s remarks on this issue are unfortunately somewhat vague, but Devitt states “I [have] assumed that ‘F’ also contributes to the meaning of ‘theF’ pointing out the prima-facie implausibility of claiming otherwise” (2004: 291).
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this description is used referentially. Given that it is possible for ‘theFisG’ to be true even when no individual isF, the restrictor is in a sense semantically vacuous. is consequence is also avoided if the (LMC) is adopted, because it ensures that the restrictor predicate plays an importantsemanticrole — it constrains what the speaker can semantically refer to using ‘theF’ and thus what the speaker canliterallyassert. Hence,
e proposition expressed [by a referential use of ‘theFisG’] will be of the form: x is G, where the identity ofxwill vary with the context of utterance. In such cases, the object or individual referred to (x) contributes directly to the proposition literally expressed,provided it satis es the (univocal) linguistic meaning of the de nite description: provided it is the (contextually) uniqueF. us, the contribution of the linguistic meaning in such cases is merelyindirect. (Reimer 1998: 93) — [my emphasis]
Finally, the (LMC) has one additional advantage, namely that when the RDT is motivated by observations about regularity of use (that is,frequencyof use), the argument threatens to justify the conclusion that for some non-literal meaningχpragmatically derived from another expressionϕ(e1...en), if the meaning ofχ isregularlyconveyed by uses of ϕ(e1...en) then it should be plausible to assume that the literal meaning ofχis identical to the meaning of ϕ(e1...en). But this conclusion would be too strong. However, if one, following the (LMC), assumes that the literal meaning of an expression ϕ(e1...en) is constrained by the linguistic meaning of the constituents ofϕ, this problematic consequence can plausibly be avoided. For example,
It would also seem plausible to suppose that the linguistic meaning of every constituent of the sentence uttered must contribute insome way (directly or indirectly) to the proposition literally expressed. To illustrate. While sentences of the formCould you do x? are standardly used to meanDo x,such is not their literal meaning, which concerns a query as to the hearer’s ability to dox. (Reimer 1998: 95) — [my emphasis]
While it’s not perfectly clear how Reimer intends to get from the general claim about the contribution of linguistic constituents to the speci c claim about the meaning of modals like ‘could’, I assume here that this point should be explicated in terms of a constraint like the (LMC). I.e. since the linguistic meaning of the constituents ‘you’ and ‘could’ in (136a) appear to make no direct contribution to the meaning of (136b), the (LMC) is supposed to prevent us from concluding that (136a)literallymeans what is expressed by (136b).
b. Pass the salt.
To further illustrate, adopting the (LMC) provides a straightforward expla- nation for the intuitive implausibility of assuming that theliteralmeaning of (137a) is identical to the literal meaning of (137b) even though speakers regularly convey the literal meaning of (137b) using utterance tokens of (137a).
(137) a. John kicked the bucket. b. John died.
Moreover, in support of this claim, consider what one would normally convey by an utterance of (137c).
(137) c. Johnliterallykicked the bucket.
So, to avoid the conclusion that (137b) is the literal meaning of (137a), we should adopt the independently plausible assumption that the linguistic constituents of (137a) must makesomesemantic contribution. And if (137a) had the same literal meaning as (137b), the constituents ‘kick’, ‘the’, and ‘bucket’ would make no such contribution. We therefore conclude that (137b) cannot be the literal meaning of (137a).