RELATING TO OTHERS AS PERSONS

As seen previously, Heidegger’s account of Dasein and das Man is invaluable in the analysis of social situations and the dynamics of the relationship between the individual and the society. Sartre’s account of relations with particular Others, on the other hand, provides important insights for the discussion of the interpersonal domain of relationships. Furthermore, as has already been noted, at the heart of both of these accounts lies an inevitable conflict, one which for Heidegger arises from the inauthenticity of das Man, presenting difficulty for Dasein’s quest of authenticity. For Sartre, however, this conflict is much more deeply placed, arising from the conflicting nature between the way an individual sees herself and the way the Other sees her. As

such, in order to understand the dynamics of our relations with the Other and the conflict at the heart of this relation, it is first important to note the way in which one relates to individual Others as persons, as conscious beings like ourselves.

A detailed account of the nature of our being is no doubt beyond the scope of this work, however, without diverging from the subject matter, a few observations, made by Sartre, about the nature of our being, illuminate the matter at hand. Sartre observes that the fundamental element in our human consciousness is intentionality – the fact that our consciousness is first and foremost directed outwards and is consciousness of something, out there in the world. It follows from this characterisation that our conception of ourselves, the way we see ourselves in the world is fundamentally as subject: my being for my solitary self is one of a self-aware conscious subject. With intentional consciousness as the defining feature of our being, we are subjects with the ability to take things out there in the world as objects of our consciousness. In our awareness of ourselves and the world, therefore, we are conscious subjects aware of other things that comprise our sense of the world in which we dwell, and these other things are always taken as objects of our consciousness, i.e. as things that we are consciously aware of. It is this conception of oneself as inherently a subject, which is fundamentally transformed in one’s encounter with the Other. In the presence of the Other, my being as a subject is transformed to one of object. This is since, through the recognition of the Other as a conscious being such as myself, i.e. as a person, I realise the possibility that as a subject, the Other can take me as the object of his consciousness. This recognition of the Other as a person like myself, Sartre claims, comes from certain emotions that I can only feel in the presence of the Other, such as shame and guilt. Sartre argues that the very existence of these emotions, the very possibility of feeling these emotions, makes evident the essence of the Other as a person for whose consciousness I can be an object. In such a situation, I realise that the Other can see me, and this being seen by the Other, reveals me to myself anew. This is since I now see myself through the eyes of the Other, as I appear

to the Other, as an object, and through the judgements that the Other can pass on me. “By the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in the position of passing judgement

on myself as an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other” (Sartre, 2003, p. 246).

The presence of others opens up new possibilities for me. Possibilities which rely on the recognition of others as persons, and which include those of meaning-making, the feeling of certain emotions, and understanding of oneself and the world in which one dwells. In Sartre’s terminology, in the presence of the Other, my Being for myself – being-for-itself – is transformed into the mode of being of things – being-in-itself –, in the eyes of the Other. And this new mode of being found only in the presence of others, bears no resemblance to what I know myself to be: “I am unable to bring about any relation between what I am in the intimacy of the For-itself, without distance, without recoil, without perspective, and this unjustifiable being-in-itself which I am for the Other” (Ibid.). This transformation is crucial for me to realise my being fully, since it makes possible a more complete knowledge of myself, and the feeling of certain emotions, which exist only in the presence of the Other. It is because of this crucial transformation and the new possibilities brought about by it, that Sartre (much like Heidegger), argues that our being as humans is essentially social; it is through our relationships with others that our being is made complete. Sartre argues “I need the Other in order to realize fully all the structures of my being” (Ibid.). And it is thus that our being, as a For-itself, is inherently, and essentially, a being-for-others.

This transformation, however, despite opening up new possibilities for one’s being, also gives rise to conflicts with the Other. This conflict arises due to the unfamiliar nature of myself in the face of the Other: the Other forces me to see myself in a new way, one which bears no resemblance to the image I hold of myself, i.e. as a subject with certain characteristics. This objectification of my being by the Other is naturally met with fierce resistance and leads to an unresolvable conflict in which both I and the Other attempt to establish our subject-ness by escaping the inevitable objectification of the other. This struggle is seen in various modes of one’s relationship with the Other, as Sartre argues, from loving to hateful to indifferent, at the heart of all kinds of relationships remains an unresolvable and necessary conflict. This is since in all instances, different in appearance as they might be, the struggle to save one’s subjectivity from the look of the Other will be present. “Everything which may be said

of me in relations with the Other applies to him as well. While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine, while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me. We are by no means dealing with unilateral relations with an object-in-itself, but with reciprocal and moving relations” (Sartre, 2003, p. 386).

However, it is because of this conflict, this constant objectification of myself by the Other, that the possibility of experiencing emotions such as guilt and shame are created. This possibility is important for a moral way of being, but is also crucial in one’s understanding of oneself. As such, the fact that such emotions are made possible and find meaning in the presence of the Other, makes clear the importance of interpersonal relationships in our emotional lives, despite the existence of an ever- present and unresolvable conflict. Such emotions are made possible because of, rather than despite, the existence of this conflict. It is through interacting with others, and therefore being taken as object of the Other’s consciousness, that one sees an image of oneself that might otherwise remain concealed from one’s consciousness and therefore experiences. It is not only that through the judgement of others one becomes able to articulate a certain experience or emotion that one was already feeling. Rather, the emotional experiences themselves are brought about through the interaction with others and through the judgements made by others about one. Given the importance of Others in creating such emotions, and the importance of emotional experiences, especially in depression, in addition to an account of our relations with the Other, it is important to have an account of the phenomenology of emotions.