The relational component

This is the least well defined and the most problematic of the components posited by Nunberg. He suggests that it

... constrains the correspondence that has to hold between index and interpretation. With we, the relational component stipulates that the index must be included in, or more generally, must instantiate the interpretation. (p9).

Thus, Nunberg claims that as the index of 'we' is always the speaker, the pragmatically inferred interpretation of any utterance of 'we' will invariably implicate some group of which the speaker is a member:

... the speaker's membership in the denotation o f we is required by the linguistic conditions on the use o f the form, (p 18).

The pragmatic principles that constrain this inferential process will not be discussed here. It will simply be assumed for the moment that if Nunberg is correct and there is a relational component then there are pragmatic principles which will resolve it. However, as will be seen, the assumption that there is such a component is not unproblematic, and it will be challenged. Furthermore, it is not only with respect to 'we' that Nunberg asserts that the instantiation o f the contextual interpretation by the relevant index is mandatory. He writes:

I have already mentioned the second difference between participant terms and demonstratives: the latter impose no requirement that the index instantiate the interpretation, (p 24-25).

The clear implication is that such a requirement is imposed with respect to all participant terms.

With respect to nonparticipant terms the position is rather different. Nunberg wavers between saying that they have no relational component whatever and claiming that their relational component is non-specific:

p 9 \ ... third person pronouns, which have no relational com ponent...

p 25: ... we should properly say that nonparticipant terms simply have no relational component.

p 27: The absence o f [an] explicit relational component in nonparticipant terms ...

p 27: ... nonparticipant terms, whose relational component imposes no requirement o f identity between index and interpretation ...

Ultimately, I shall go further than Nunberg and suggest that it may be a mistake to regard the relational component as being a part o f the semantics of any indexical term, participant or nonparticipant. I shall suggest, however, that the conceptual content of such a component may be retained in a somewhat loose or metaphorical sense as relating to the pragmatic processes o f indexical interpretation. I shall also argue that the last two comments quoted above, which stress the lack o f specificity o f the relational component, rather than its total absence, will turn out to be more helpful with respect to both nonparticipant and participant terms.

One o f the immediate and obvious problems associated with the postulation of this component is that certain indexical expressions appear to have both demonstrative and non-demonstrative indexical uses. In (1) above, reproduced again below for convenience, ’here’ is used non-demonstratively and is therefore an analogue o f a participant term, whereas in (7), also reproduced again below, ’here’ is used demonstratively and is therefore nonparticipant.

(1) I am here now.

(7) When a person is shot here, we can usually conclude that it is not suicide.

Indexical ’there’ may also occur both demonstratively and non-demonstratively, as in (15) and (16) below.

(15) Move it from there to there, (demonstrative)

(16) Hello, is Harry there? (non-demonstrative)

(These examples are taken from Levinson, 1983, p 66.)

Levinson further claims that in addition to its more usual non-demonstrative use ’now’ also may occur demonstratively, as in (17) below.

(17) Don’t do it now, but NOW.

In this case the gesture or demonstration is, of course, vocal and the example may not be altogether convincing. It might be argued that the vocal emphasis is not, in fact, demonstrative, as it is not required to determine the two distinct temporal referents in the example, as each utterance o f 'noW may be taken to refer, non- demonstratively, to the precise instant o f utterance of that particular ’now" token. However, if the vocal emphasis is removed from (17), the instruction contained in

the complete utterance becomes difficult to understand or obey, so perhaps this is an example of demonstrative ’now' after all. Furthermore, whatever is the position as regards ’now", there remains ’here' and 'there', which clearly do seem to have both demonstrative and non-demonstrative functions.

If Nunberg is correct, therefore, and non-demonstrative indexicals do have, as an encoded element o f their semantic structure, a specific relational component, and if demonstrative indexicals do not have such a component, then we will be forced to conclude, somewhat counter-intuitively, that indexical 'here' and 'there' are lexically ambiguous as between their demonstrative and non-demonstrative uses. However, I have to confess that it is not altogether clear to me what the relational component o f 'here' and 'there' would look like (if there is one). Nunberg does not elaborate on this point. In view of these difficulties, I suggest that if a semantic model of indexical utterances that does not include a specific relational component in the analysis o f participant terms can be constructed, then - ceteris paribus - such a model is to be preferred over one that does include such a

component.

It might be objected here that the putative ambiguity of two pro-locative terms hardly provides sufficient justification for the rejection of so substantial a part of Nunberg’s model. However, as will become apparent, there are additional reasons for questioning the existence o f the relational component.