A relational construct

If traits are one extreme of the relationship-specificity continuum, then individual attributes which are wholly relationship-specific, theoretically showing no

consistency across interactions with different people, are at the other end

(Asendorpf & van Aken, 1994). According to Asendorpf and van Aken, an entirely relationship-specific attribute may not be easy to find in the way people behave but substantial relationship specificity has been shown to feature in developmental research. The authors highlighted children’s inhibition and their social competence in a very familiar group of peers as moderately relationship-specific attributes. Asendorpf (1990) provided evidence that inhibition in peer groups becomes relationship-specific to some degree during group socialisation.

Relationship specificity can be seen as central to the concept of attachment

relationships. At the core of attachment theory is the primacy of the caregiver-infant relationship. Bowlby (1969) proposed that an infant has a strong tendency to prefer a principal attachment figure for security and comfort. As well as this, most infants have multiple attachment figures but the existence of an “attachment hierarchy” means it should not be assumed that they treat all attachment figures as equivalent or that they are interchangeable (Cassidy, 1999). Attachment research has gone some way to demonstrating this hierarchy (Ainsworth, 1967, 1982; Colin, 1996). Ainsworth (1982) described how the combination of several attachment figures would not compensate for the loss of the principal attachment figure and how children could tolerate major separation from subsidiary figures with less distress than from the principal attachment figure.

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Attachment theory can be conceptualised as relational in its claims that the attachment bond reflects the quality of the specific infant-caregiver relationship (Ainsworth et al., 1978). This was demonstrated by Ainsworth et al. (1974) through the association found between mother-infant interactions observed at home during the first year of life and Strange Situation classifications. An example of relationship- specificity can also be seen when an infant’s attachment relationship with their mother is not the same as their attachment relationship with their father. Fox, Kimmerly, and Schafer (1991) noted that out of 11 samples which examined the concordance of infant attachment classifications to mother and father, only in three of these samples was classification to one parent found to be dependent on

classification to the other parent (Goossens & van IJzendoorn, 1990; Lamb, 1978; Owen & Chase-Lansdale, 1982). This suggested that it was not only possible but probable that a child would be securely attached to one parent and insecurely attached to the other. This was called into question by Fox et al. after carrying out a meta-analysis on these 11 studies, when they concluded that security of attachment to one parent was dependent upon security to the other parent and that type of insecurity (avoidant/resistant) to one parent was dependent upon type of insecurity to the other. However, the concordance found in classifications does not preclude attachment being relational. One explanation proposed by the authors was that parents may be concordant in their caregiving behaviour; both interacting in a similarly responsive and sensitive way to their infant. However, it was noted that there were few studies supporting similar parenting in couples. Another explanation given was that infant temperament might lead infants to behave similarly during the strange situation regardless of whether the mother or father was taking part. This consistent behaviour would lead to an infant being given a similar attachment classification to both parents.

Maternal mind-mindedness, with its evolution out of attachment theory, has been put forward as a relational construct. This is the second conceptualisation to be addressed in this thesis to explain the variability found in mothers’ levels of mind- mindedness. This perception of mind-mindedness emerges from the view of attachment as “an affectional tie that one person or animal forms between himself and another specific one – a tie that binds them together in space and endures over time” (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970, p. 50). Correspondingly, if maternal mind-mindedness is viewed as a relationship-specific construct, it implies there is a uniqueness to each relationship with maternal mind-mindedness being governed by the

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relationship between a mother and child in the same way that attachment is a bond between one person and another specific individual.

One explanation for the failure to find a correlation between levels of mothers’ mind- mindedness with their own infants and whether they were likely to attribute mindful intention to how unknown infants behaved, in an unpublished study by Meins, Fernyhough, Arnott, and Wilson (as cited in Arnott & Meins, 2007), was that mind- mindedness was specific to the mother-infant relationship. Their argument was that mind-minded mothers do not always show this tendency but instead are mind- minded when interpreting an infant’s behaviour with whom they have a relationship. However, the limits of relationship-specificity are not clearly delineated. Questions regarding mother’s mind-mindedness with two children she knows well or what the link might be to a specific known infant, for example a sibling, are not addressed. A comparison of mothers’ and fathers’ mind-mindedness with one child, specifically looking at couples’ levels of concordance, has also been a focus of research into the relationship-specificity of the construct. As part of a study looking at relations between parental attachment representations, mind-mindedness and infant

attachment security, Arnott & Meins (2007) explored whether there were differences in mind-mindedness, operationalised using the interactional measure, between mothers and fathers or alternatively whether there was concordance between partners. A directional hypothesis was not proposed but it was thought that if no concordance was found between partners, this would lend support to mind-

mindedness being relationship-specific. On the other hand, if parents interacted in similar ways with their offspring then concordance in mind-mindedness might be found. If a mother and father showed a similar tendency to represent their infant’s internal states and to respond appropriately in an interaction, this was perceived to be a demonstration of partners’ concordance in mind-mindedness. A trend was found towards concordance in partners’ proportional use of appropriate mind-related comments but this positive correlation failed to reach significance. No concordance was found in partners’ proportional use of non-attuned mind-related comments. Arnott and Meins argued that this lack of significant concordance between partners supported the proposal that mind-mindedness is a relationship-specific construct. However, a word of caution was given due to the sample size, pointing out that the findings should be considered preliminary until replicated in a larger sample.

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The interpretation by Arnott and Meins (2007) of the relationship-specific nature of mind-mindedness as the reason behind the failure to find concordance between couples, can be critiqued along theoretical and methodological lines. Given that no information is provided about parents’ mind-mindedness across other relationships, it could equally be argued that partners could have different tendencies from each other to be mind-minded with their child and that this is a result of mind-mindedness being a cognitive-behavioural trait rather than it being specific to that particular parent-child relationship. Importantly, it is not known whether mothers and fathers are equally mind-minded with their other offspring because only one child per couple was included in analysis. Consequently, it cannot be concluded that a lack of concordance in couples’ levels of mind-mindedness with a single infant should be seen as strong evidence that mind-mindedness should be conceptualised as a relationship-specific construct.

Arnott and Meins (2007) also wanted to investigate how interactional mind- mindedness related to mothers’ attachment representations, given that this operationalisation of mind-mindedness measures parents’ representations during online interactions. The association found between parental attachment

classification, measured using the AAI, and mind-mindedness was stronger in fathers than in mothers. When it came to whether or not they commented

appropriately on their infants’ internal states, fathers’ interactions with their infants were governed more strongly by representations of their own attachment

experiences than happened with infant-mother interactions. Arnott and Meins, in addressing why mothers appeared to be less influenced by their representations of childhood attachment than fathers while interacting with their infants, proposed that one explanation involved the potential relationship-specific quality of mind-

mindedness. The authors argued that mothers may learn more than fathers about their infants, including what they like and dislike and their moods, because they often spend more time with them in the months following birth. This is consistent with the proposal that mind-mindedness is relationship-specific, and that

relationships involving greater knowledge of the infant possibly increase the tendency to comment appropriately on an infant’s internal states rather than particular parental attachment representations.

Whether adult mind-mindedness should be considered a quality of close

relationships or instead should be considered trait-like was addressed in a series of four studies (Meins et al., 2014). Relations between mothers’ representational mind-

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mindedness for a child and another individual had not been investigated before the current study was carried out but this was addressed in the first of Meins and colleagues’ studies. In this, 37 mothers were interviewed and asked to describe their children, aged between 5 and 8 years, and their current romantic partner. These descriptions were coded using the standard representational measure (Meins et al., 1998). Mothers’ mind-minded descriptions of their children were found to positively correlate with those of their partner. The authors argued that this was consistent both with mind-mindedness being a trait and a construct specific to close relationships because a mother’s relationship with a child and a partner could be considered comparable in terms of intimacy. Importantly, it was not possible to investigate whether mothers’ mind-mindedness generalised across relationships with their children because only one child was described per mother. Therefore, whether maternal mind-minded representations vary depending on the child was not addressed.

The remaining studies differed from the first in terms of participants and method. Participants comprised undergraduates who wrote their descriptions of others within seven lines (Study 2), or individuals who responded to an online questionnaire on a social networking site associated with a university (Studies 3 and 4). An adapted coding scheme which included two extra categories (self-referential comments and comments focusing on the relationship) was used (Meins, Harris-Waller, & Lloyd, 2008). In the second study, young adults’ mind-minded descriptions of their romantic partner and close friend were positively correlated. This was also

interpreted as being in line with mind-mindedness as a trait-like quality and a facet of close relationships. In the remaining studies, in addition to a close friend, famous people and paintings were described on the basis that evidence in support of mind- mindedness as a trait would be found if mind-mindedness did not vary depending on whom was being described. Individuals’ mind-minded descriptions of a close friend were found to be unrelated to those of famous people and paintings. This was argued as support for mind-mindedness being a relational construct rather than a trait-like quality.