Relational Process Variables

Groupthink: a dysfunctional process

In 1972, Irving Janis published Victims of Groupthink, a study of foreign policy fiascoes resulting from poor decision-making processes. Janis analysed historical decisions that resulted in policy disasters and one additional case, the Cuban missile crisis, which he believed served as an example of a good decision-making process.

Janis coined the term groupthink to describe the process of defective decision- making that could lead to poor quality and even disastrous decisions. Janis describes groupthink as:

A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action... the deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures. (Janis, 1972, p. 9)

Groupthink can happen when group members avoid conflict within the group through failure to adequately criticise and evaluate potential solutions. The group arrives at a consensus but it has sacrificed the decision-making process (task) in favour of preserving relationships, which might be threatened by conflict (for

example disagreeing with the group consensus). Although groupthink is a process and as such must be considered as a process mediator of decision-making, the antecedents that lead to it include inputs such as the group norms.

... groupthink is not simply a matter of fixed attributes of a group, nor is it a question of the types of personalities that happened to be dominant within the group. If the same committee members show groupthink in making decisions at one time and not at another, the determining factors must lie in the circumstances of their deliberations, not in the fixed attributes of the individuals who make up the group. The determining factors seem to be variables that can be changed and lead to more and productive norms... (Janis, 1983, p. 158)

Janis and Mann (1977) identified seven defective decision-making processes that could lead to faulty decision-making: (a) not considering a sufficient number of options or alternatives, (b) insufficiently discussing the objectives such that important values are not taken into consideration, (c) not considering the

consequences of the preferred solution, (d) not obtaining sufficient information to critically evaluate pros and cons of the preferred solution, (e) not resolving non- supporting or conflicting information or examining biases for a particular solution, (f) not reconsidering the costs and benefits of rejected solutions, and (g) not developing implementation or contingency plans. Adopting rational decision- making procedures can counter or prevent these defective processes. For example, in their case study of the jury deliberations in the trial of U.S. versus John DeLorean, Neck and Moorhead (1992) argue that the "presence of methodical decision-making procedures such as parliamentary procedure, alternative examination procedure and information search procedure" (p. 550) served to prevent the occurrence of groupthink. "One key method for avoiding

groupthink is to develop effective decision-making norms in the team" (Moorhead, Neck, & West, 1998, p. 345). Conceivably, board of directors could also use methodical decision-making procedures and develop effective decision-making norms to prevent groupthink

Janis (1972) did not make any links between specific antecedent conditions and resulting groupthink symptoms, or as Neck and Moorhead (1995) observed, "all the antecedent conditions led to all the groupthink symptoms” (p. 547). This failure to link specific antecedents with specific groupthink symptoms makes the groupthink theory difficult to test. However, sufficient research has been done through case studies (Moorhead & Neck, 1991; Neck & Moorhead, 1992; Raven, 1998; Hensley & Griffin, 1986), laboratory or field tests of various aspects of the model (Callaway et al., 1984; Callaway, Marriott, & Esser, 1985; Courtright, 1978; Flowers, 1977; Leana, 1985; Moorhead & Montanari, 1986) and additional

variables to the groupthink model to explain its occurrence (Neck et al., 1995; Turner & Pratkanis, 1994) and provide support for the theory. Vigilance, described in section 3.9.3, is a strategy recommended for avoiding groupthink.

Group cohesion

Maslow (1954) observed that the need for "belonging" was fundamental to

humans. This need can motivate people to rise above their self-interest and serve the 'greater good" in this instance, the goals of the group. However, Janis (1982) observed that members might come to value their belonging to the group so much, that they will devalue their independent thinking when it is in conflict with the views of the group. Janis (1982) identified this as a “concurrence-seeking tendency”, group cohesion, where group members who find themselves at odds with the known position of the group, override their own judgment in favor of group conformity and unanimity (Janis, 1972). Fear of rejection and overemphasis on maintaining group cohesion and unanimity can lead to groupthink.

In Janis’ theory, group cohesion is an antecedent to groupthink. Kurt Lewin (1952) applied principles from quantum physics to try to explain group behavior. In his field theory, Lewin argues that group cohesion needs to be created and sustained for its positive effects of increasing member’s participation and commitment to the group. Lewin also emphasized the need for objective evaluation of alternatives, extensive data gathering, and use of objective criteria, elements of rational decision-making procedures.

Subsequent research indicated that both the quantity and quality of group interactions relate to group cohesion (Lott & Lott, 1961; Moran, 1966) and that cohesive groups were more productive, satisfied with their outputs and had a greater desire to work together (Exline, 1957; Schacter, Ellertson & Gregory, 1951). Studies have shown the potentially positive benefits of group cohesion which included more sharing of information and less self-censorship of unshared information (Leana, 1985) which may improve decision-making quality.

Another groupthink study found that highly cohesive groups made poor quality decisions without adequate decision procedures to counteract their concurrence seeking tendencies (Callaway et al., 1984). Calloway and Esser's groupthink study (1984) found that inadequate decision procedures lead to poor decisions in highly cohesive groups. Cohesiveness was operationalised by telling subjects they were members of a "select, congenial, effective" group or by saying group members had "meaningful incompatibilities" (p. 159). The two by two study focused on cohesiveness and problem solving procedures. Some groups were given no procedures while others were. The procedures were read aloud and given out in written form to the groups; no training in use of the procedures was offered. Highly cohesive groups were more confident and had the fewest disagreements, as there was minimal critical inquiry. Highly cohesive groups without adequate decision-making procedures made poorer decisions. Leana (1985) found that groups high in cohesiveness had greater information gathering

vigilance than did non-cohesive groups. This may indicate that groups go through various stages of development much as other living beings (Musselwhite, 1982).

Cohesiveness is a property or characteristic of "the group" and yet "the group" as a distinct entity is a theoretical construct whose attempts at scientific measurement have focused on the individuals (e.g., the tangible parts the group). Researchers have aggregated data on individuals and drawn conclusions about group-level phenomenon. The literature is full of studies focusing on groups and cohesion (Barry, 1997; Cota et al., 1995; Levine, 1990; Moorhead, 1998; Nordqvist, 2005; Paulus, 1998; Rozell, 2003; Turner, 1992; Witteman, 1991). However, the

definitions of cohesion differ significantly as do measurement methods, effects on the group and its members, as well as group performance (Mudrack, 1989). The group cohesiveness construct has thus far proven to be indefinable. There is general agreement as to what cohesiveness represents, but there is incredible variety and indiscriminate usage of definitions in research (Mudrack, 1989, p. 44). The group cohesiveness construct has not achieved a precise definition,

consistent measurement or standard experimental manipulation (Mudrack, 1989).

Building sufficient cohesion within a board to get the benefits of increased

productivity, satisfaction, sharing and decreased self-censorship (Lewin, 1952; Lott & Lott, 1961; Maslow, 1954; Moran, 1966) may be the aim of imploring directors to look for opportunities to learn more about fellow board members: "The better you get to know and understand about other people on the board, to develop

chemistry, the more effective you'll be as a total board" (Finkelstein et al., 2003, p. 110). However, as directors and executives build stronger social ties and mutual trust, information gathering and processing efforts may be sacrificed. Under these conditions, pressures toward cohesion may increase resulting in directors and/or executives acting as mind guards: withholding information or views that conflict with the known views of the majority, and exerting pressure on those whose opinions contradict the majority, thus protecting the board from information contrary to its beliefs (Janis, 1982a). The recommended countermeasure is

vigilance. But, vigilance, the anti-dote to excessive cohesion, does not naturally take place to the degree required unless it is imposed on or adopted by the group, usually through formal decision-making procedures (Hirokawa, 1987). Therefore, the formal adoption of vigilance techniques by the board may have a positive impact on board decision-making performance.

Leadership

The pivotal importance of board leadership is especially emphasised in the role of the chair, described as "vital to the board members' engagement in various ways"; it sets the culture of the board (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005). Yet little

research attention has been given to systematically exploring behavioural consequences of board leadership (Huse, 2005).

Leadership for the board may be viewed as facilitating problem-solving and decision-making aimed at board or organisational goal attainment (Fleishman et al., 1991). There are many approaches to viewing leadership: emergent, trait, situational, charismatic and transformative leadership to name but a few

(Fleishman et al., 1991). A commonly accepted model of leadership behaviors and the causal variables that influence the demonstration and perception of

leadership has not yet been determined. Nevertheless, research into the influence of the leader’s behavior on group decision-making has found significant

differences in quality of group decision-making when the leader acted primarily directive or participative as noted by Janis (1977).

Neck and Moorhead (1995) used ‘closed’ interchangeably with ‘directive’ and proposed that "closed leadership style and methodical decision-making

procedures" were the moderating variables, which explained why groupthink may, or may not occur within the same group in different decision-making situations. Neck and Moorhead defined a moderator variable as one "that affects the direction and\or strength of the relation between an independent variable and a dependent variable (Baron & Kenney, 1986)". They emphasised that their model "does not

suggest that closed leadership style behaviors and methodical decision-making procedures cause the presence of groupthink symptoms and thus defective decision-making, but, rather these behaviors moderate the relationship between antecedent conditions and groupthink symptoms" (p. 549). The leadership style behaviors exhibited by the group leader did not create but, in fact, facilitated or counteracted "the concurrence seeking and closed inquiry pressures existing within the decision-making group that displays groupthink antecedent conditions" (p. 551). They described closed leadership style behaviors as: "(1) does not encourage member participation, (2) does state his\her opinions at the beginning of the meeting, (3) does not encourage divergent opinions from all group

members, and (4) does not emphasize the importance of reaching a wise decision" (p. 550).

Flowers (1977) found that groups whose leaders used a directive leadership style "suggested fewer solutions, used fewer outside sources of information, and used less information before a decision and more information after the decision in justification" (cited in Callaway et al., 1984, p. 158) than groups whose leader displayed an open leadership style. Further testing the groupthink model, Leana (1985) found that leadership behavior, not group cohesiveness, determined solution generation and adoption. Groups with a directive leader generated and discussed significantly fewer solutions than did groups with a non-directive leader. Groups with a directive leader were more likely to adopt the leader’s expressed solution preference when the leader expressed a preference early in the

discussion.

Participative leaders were more likely to encourage information surfacing and sharing whereas directive leaders were more active in using information once it was made available to the group (Larson et al., 1998). Directive leaders repeated unshared information whether it was originally held by them or other group

members (Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Franz, 1998). Participative leaders discussed more information (both shared and unshared) than directive ones but

directive leaders repeated information (especially unshared) more than participative leaders did (Larson et al., 1998).

Skill in the generation, resolution and control of conflict appears to be another attribute of effective board leaders:

A leader with skill in the use of disagreement can: (a) turn it into

constructive channels if it becomes interpersonal; (b) generate it when it doesn't exist; and (c) give minority views a chance to be heard if unofficial leaders dominate (Maier, 1963; Maier & Solem, 1952). (Maier & Thurber, 1969, p. 248)

Conflict can improve decision-making by requiring innovative problem solving in the presence of what may seem to be obvious solutions (Maier et al., 1969).

By studying failed strategies, Finklestein (2005) found “how the flawed preferences of key leaders derailed their competitive strategies” (Finkelstein, 2005, p. 26). Personal biases are part of the human condition. Formal decision-making procedures can help counter a chair's tendency toward directive or closed

leadership through establishing robust problem analysis, solution generation and evaluation methods as well as productive decision-making rules. Leadership responsibilities have been categorised into two main functions: (1) objective task accomplishment and (2) facilitation of group interaction (Fleishman et al., 1991). Use of formal decision-making procedures aid in objective task accomplishment while meeting and decision rules, social and facilitation skills aid in promoting and maintaining good group dynamics.