Thomas (1990) argue social innovation can democratize co-operatives, and regenerate movement goals and values. Regenerative initiatives may emerge through internal democratic channels, through members‘ ties to social movements with similar goals, through the leadership of visionary boards or managers, or through a coalition of these forces. Central, of course, is leadership from Develtere‘s social movement entrepreneurs.
Additionally, co-operators have developed support structures to counter degeneration.
Britain‘s CDA network provides one example. Cornforth and Thomas (1990) also suggest the existence of well-established federations and support networks in France and Italy account for their success in generating new co-operatives relative to countries with weak support structures such as the U.K. and the U.S. In fact, Cornforth et al. (1988) argue that the democratic dilemmas of maturing co-operatives represent choice-points in the organizations‘ life-cycle; not determining influences that inevitably lead to
degeneration. For example, they argue for support structures to match the strategic requirements of worker co-operatives at each degenerative stage in Meister‘s life-cycle typology:
This would imply that CSOs continue their successful business advice, confidence-building and general development work undertaken for start-ups, and pursue management training for the second-stage development and growth of co-operatives once
established. Then they would also concentrate on ways of assisting in the third-stage conflict and combating the degenerative tendencies.
This might involve developing models of co-operative working and assisting with problems of individuals in co-operatives, from recruiting through discipline and pay differentials to how to reward–
and control–entrepreneurialism (pp. 199-200).
Similarly, Maaniche predicts a co-operative‘s democratic, movement values will be exhausted as the founding members‘ legacy recedes in the organizational culture, but he also argues that educational interventions can revitalize founding principles and energy (in Crewe, 2001, p.12). Like Cornforth et al. (1988), Maaniche portrays the entropic decline of democratic values, momentum, and projects as a function of transient historical conditions, and a challenge to innovate, rather than inevitable realities to which we
should be fatalistically resigned.
If movement polarization and degeneration pose threats, and challenges, for the social movement entrepreneurs charged with responding to these historic crises (Develtere, 1992, p. 22), then regeneration theorists like Cornforth et al. (1988) and Maaniche (in Crewe, 2001, p.12) equally present them with an agenda, in outline, for unifying competing factions and rebuilding the necessary enabling structures, cultures, and
strategies for movement regeneration. Indeed, the argument of Cornforth et al. (1988) for the role of institutional intermediaries is not narrowly focused on the instrumental and technical concerns associated with resource mobilization theory. Instead, based on their study of the worker co-operative boom in Britain in the early eighties, they also
emphasize the educational and cultural importance of movement leadership in popularizing new ideas, inspiring new actors, and conducting new campaigns:
Probably the most important development in the continuing revival of the worker operative sector has been the formation of local co-operative support organizations (CSOs). Originally these came from the efforts of small groups of local activists, radical professionals and politicians, influenced by the alternative movement and by other moves towards decentralised, grassroots activity. CSOs can be seen partly as vehicles for promoting the ideals of co-operation,
specifically those of common ownership, and partly as one of a number of fragmented, pragmatic responses to increasing
unemployment … The majority of funding for CSOs has come from Labour-controlled councils or from central government grants aimed at rejuvenating urban areas which also require local government support. (p. 19)
In a sense, the British CDA network was a movement within a movement,
institutionalizing democratic movement values from outside official structures which had become managerial—rather than developmental—in their orientation and slow to respond to new needs. As the Québec case examined here illustrates, co-operative movement degeneration is not inevitable. Not only do co-operative enterprises tend to outlast investor enterprises (Bond, Clément, Cournoyer & Dupont, 1999). Over the century and a half since its birth, the modern co-operative movement has spread across the globe and across sectors (Birchall, 1997). Certainly, some co-operatives have failed.
Some sectors have encountered fatal setbacks. But others have expanded and enhanced their competitive position, retaining economic leverage for their members, insuring their continued loyalty, and inspiring others to action. New co-operative models have also been invented to respond to new threats and opportunities. The co-operative movement, in short, has demonstrated a compelling capacity for innovation, re-invention, and regeneration, often by rediscovering its social movement roots and historic alliances.
Post WWII Italy is a compelling example of this regenerative capacity. While the war decimated the economy, the fascist regime singled out co-operatives for special
punishment. Mussolini‘s forces encouraged the harassment of co-operative leaders and the destruction and nationalization of co-operative property.5 Despite this, the movement recovered in the post-war context. Activists‘ commitments were deepened by their persecution, leading national reconstruction through mobilizing networks such as La Lega. Enjoying broad-based popular support, Italy today boasts one of the planet‘s most successful co-operative movements (Earle, 1986; Ammirato, 1996).
Another example of movements‘ capacity to adapt and innovate is the case of the
Mondragon group (Oakeshott, 1978; Whyte & Whyte, 1991; Morrison, 1991). Also a by-product of the anti-fascist resistance, this complex of over 250 worker-owned firms is based in the Basque country in Spain. It employs over 90,000 workers (Mondragon,
5 Movement newspaper La Cooperazione Italiana published a list of 198 co-operatives attacked by fascist squads during the months of January to June 1921 alone (Earle, 1986, p. 25).
2009). Developing its own university, research and development unit, and movement bank, this mobilizing network contrasts sharply with the degenerative model of an imbalanced or frozen co-operative movement that lacks developmental commitments.
While traditional co-operative movements may succumb to institutional isomorphism, degeneration, and de-mutualizations—particularly as traders have come to dominate these organizations with a market-driven managerial ideology—the Mondragon model strives to balance enterprise and associational interests (Webb, 1987; Matthews, 2001;
Axworthy, 1985; Oakeshott, 1978).
Similarly, as this study illustrates, the Québec model both institutionalized support to co-operative entrepreneurship, and introduced structural innovations that sustain the
associative viability of the movement through the latest wave of globalization. Its network of CDRs, like the British and French networks that inspired them, is both a development mechanism for new co-operatives and a regenerative mechanism for the movement as a whole. It thus provides a model for regeneration in the present context.
The theoretical framework developed in this chapter has focused on co-operative movement-building, degeneration, and regeneration as key factors in conditioning the prospects for new co-operative development campaigns. It has been argued that
degenerative processes need to be a concern to movement leaders—from established and emerging sectors and managerial and elected ranks alike. However, it also suggests that regeneration strategies can effectively offset and reverse these processes. Following on Cornforth et al. (1988) and Maaniche (in Crewe, 2001), this review finds that institutional intermediaries, educational and cultural interventions, and the reconstruction of
mobilizing networks can each play a crucial role. Like Gramsci‘s ―organic intellectuals‖
or Foucault‘s ―specific intellectuals,‖ Develtere‘s social movement entrepreneurs have an important role to play in unifying the movement‘s diverse actors—from established co-operative managers and emerging co-co-operative activists to disenchanted co-co-operative workers and estranged social movement partners—in a process of whole movement renewal.