Media analysis: How the media reported on transitional justice
4.7 Reporting on events in the civic sphere
The nature of events in the civic sphere is different to trials since most of them (except the instance of Cyrillic signs in Vukovar) happened at one fixed point in time and were not on-
going in the same sense as trials. Other than the events in Vukovar, the other events also did not capture the attention and imagination of the public in same way as the trials did, consequently overall reporting was lower. The most reported on instances did, however, occur recently and, given the short-term effects of agenda-setting (that more recent issues will be far more important in the eyes of the public), this means that there is a great potential for such events to shape the public agenda (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987: 46). As subsequent chapters will show, many of the themes discussed in the articles analysed below also reverberate strongly in the survey, focus group and interview data.
Much like with reporting on war crimes trials, there was a large discrepancy in the number of reports on different events. As Table 8 demonstrates, reports on Vukovar outnumbered reporting on all other instances by a large margin.
Table 8. Total number of thematic articles on events in the civic sphere.
Event Total number of Thematic Articles
Vukovar Cyrillic signs (2013)44 792
Josipović vs Pupovac argument (2012) 171
Hedl death threat (2005-2011) 72
Milanović heckling (2013) 64
Pusić assault (2005) 8
Source: Own compilation
It is unclear why Vukovar took such a focus, although as later chapters show, the city forms a key symbol in the Croatian war narrative. Much of the debate about Cyrillic in Vukovar taps into the war narrative and the amount of reporting exemplifies the central place the city occupies in the Croatian version of the war narrative (these concerns outweigh, for example, potential economic concerns or other issues). Reporting on this instance also usefully exemplifies the higher proportion of Internet portal involvement in reporting on civil society instances (which may also partly explain the increase in reports over time). Of the total 792 thematic reports on Cyrillic in Vukovar, 301 were recorded on the right wing, often nationalistic, portal Dnevno.hr. This further shows the importance of Vukovar in the Croatian war narrative, but also the growth of horizontal media in Croatia. These media hold the potential to question events in society and, as Dnevno.hr shows, allow for views from both sides of the spectrum.
4.7.1 Vukovar: Themes discussed
The short-term effects of agenda-setting mean that this issue, covered so intensely and recently, may have exerted a strong influence that remains on the public agenda today. The amount of protest and the referendum attempt surrounding this further highlight the importance of the issue on the public agenda, although it is important to keep in mind that public protest is not always reflective of an issue’s salience and these events have also seen the involvement of many extreme but vocal groups and individuals. For the most part the issue (that on the face of it was primarily concerned with the recognition that ought to be provided to the Serb community in the city) was discussed in relation to four broad themes: the rule of law and the interpretation of it (24%); party politics and government efficiency (17%); minority equality and relations (15%); and, the war narrative (13%).
For many vertical media outlets, the events were an example of the lack of rule of law in Croatia, in that this was a law that had to be enforced but the state was struggling to do so, while others saw it as a misinterpretation or misuse of the law, since it should not apply to Vukovar. For example, Novi List quoted the President of the Croatian Parliament, “Vukovar is Croatia, Vukovar is Croatian and Croatian standards and laws have to be implemented in it for the sake of all the citizens of Vukovar, but also for all the citizens of Croatia” (Novi List, 2013). The discussion of minority laws also stood out: it was sometimes discussed as a problem in terms of the rule of law, at other times it was presented in terms of human rights and democracy. Party politics in particular were often referred to in these debates, as the two sides in it were seen as reflecting the political make up of Croatia. Jutarnji List wrote “the balance of power between the conservative and liberal options in the country are transparent when we talk about Cyrillic in Vukovar” (Butković, 2013).
When discussing the events with regard to minority equality or relations, sources often argued that dialogue was necessary. Večernji List wrote, “Everyone has to sit down at the table, including the government of the Republic of Croatia, members of the Stožer45for the Defence of Croatian Vukovar, war veterans’ organisations, representatives of the Serbs, and talk until they find a solution” (Zadro, 2013). At the same time, the newspaper, much like many other sources, associated Cyrillic with the memory of the Homeland War, “the Serbs
45 Stožer, meaning both committee and headquarters, for the Defence of Croatian Vukovar is the full
name of the group organising the protests in Vukovar, however, they are most commonly simply referred to as the Stožer. The use of stožer as “headquarters” highlights the use of military terminology in war veterans’ associations’ post-war activities.
also have a great role in this since they have to accept the fact that it was under this alphabet that a lot of evil happened in the nineties” (Zadro, 2013). Articles frequently tapped into the war narrative (discussed in more detail in Chapter 6), in which Vukovar holds a large symbolic role of victimhood. Much of this debate was centred on the atrocities committed in the city during the war by Serb forces and on the missing victims. So it was not uncommon to read, “while the residents of Vukovar are still looking for the bones of their children, Cyrillic should not be brought in” (Sabolić, 2013).
On the other hand Dnevno.hr wrote about the theme of the war narrative more than other sources, so much so that it was discussed as frequently as the rule of law and party politics. Their point of view was relatively specific: they saw the events as proof that the Homeland War was not over; they stressed the need to first find the missing victims; and, they saw Cyrillic as a symbol of Greater Serbian aggression against Vukovar specifically and Croatia generally. They connected this to what they see as broader issues in Croatian society, which are also reflected in the focus group data: the existence of a conspiracy in Croatian government; many parts of the government being pro-Serbian or Yugonostalgic; and, the view that Croatian politics is defined by a conflict between communists and Ustashe (a recurring theme). An article from April 2013 titled “The Fight for Croatian State Independence Continues” summarises the various facets of this in saying, “The introduction of Cyrillic in Vukovar is not the main goal of the Yugoslav-minded politicians in the Republic of Croatia, instead their goal is to help the Greater Serbian politics to take down the Croatian state, the Republic of Croatia, and to once again create a new kind of ‘Yugoslavia’ that would be, as those before it, the grave of the Croatian narod. This would be nothing else than ‘Greater Serbia’” (Ćuk, 2013). This article also exemplifies a common dynamic in the Croatian horizontal media. The original article was taken from Dragovoljac.com, another similar Internet portal. It is common practice for Croatian media outlets to “borrow” articles from one another, thereby increasing their dissemination.
4.8 Conclusion
Given the predominance of episodic reporting in the written press and television (at least in the case of Gotovina on the main national channel) it is possible that the public does not draw connections between various connected issues, such as for example war crimes trials, unearthing facts about the conflict or the general inefficiency of Croatian courts. These would not be discussed in episodic reports, leading to a general ignorance of broader societal problems. When the public did read thematic reports about war crimes trials then
they were more than likely to be reading about the trial of Gotovina (something that is likely to also hold true for episodic reporting). Reporting on this trial alone made up 55% of total thematic reporting in the 3,475 articles analysed in this study and was the predominant war crimes trial news story during all years from 2000 until 2015. This does not, however, mean that the Gotovina trial made up 55% of total reporting on war crimes trials, since this study did not analyse all trials or even all transitional justice related reports.
When the public read about Gotovina, they read reports that connected the trial to Croatian accession to the EU and NATO; Croatian party politics; ICTY bias or inefficiency; and, the rule of law and its interaction with the aims of the war or the war narrative. No one topic took precedence in terms of frequency of reports overall, although some were more frequent during certain periods, so further studies could reveal what elements have remained on the public’s agenda. If individuals did read about domestic war crimes trials, then they would have read something slightly different. The focus in these reports was for the most part split in two ways, on the one hand was a discussion about the efficiency of Croatian courts and on the other a discussion about fact-finding, which could be in support of or against the predominant war narrative. The trial of Norac, however, stood out compared to other domestic trials. Not only was it one of the few trials considered to have been well-run, but it also featured a much higher proportion of reporting on the war narrative being juxtaposed with a fact-finding effort. This opens up the question whether a well-run trial features less discussion about the judicial system and, therefore, opens up space for debates about other aspects of transitional justice (for example expressivist aspects). Moreover, the growth of horizontal media, from Internet portals to social media outlets, has allowed for a proliferation of views that have questioned many of the mainstream issues that have received shallow episodic coverage. Horizontal media were particularly active in their coverage of events in the civic sphere, again exemplifying their potential for the building of dialogue in society.
Assuming the hypotheses of agenda-setting and priming hold true: that issues which receive more attention in the news become the ones the public sees as most important and that the media, by focusing on some things instead of others influences how political actors are judged (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987), then what does this mean for the Croatian public’s opinion of transitional justice? Given that frames are highly influenced by the environment that journalists work in, it is possible that the prevalent norms in society affect framing as much as framing may affect them. In other words, the media may be reflecting societal values rather than influencing them. Causality is hard to ascertain, the influence could flow in both directions, and a deeper analysis of narratives in Croatian society may at least shed more light on this.
The confusion of post-conflict transition means that the media do have a greater potential impact on audiences, especially in a situation where many people claim to be unfamiliar with events occurring around them, a common response in the focus groups. Messages that were more in support of transitional justice norms do, in this sense, have the potential to lead to a more positive agenda. The results in this study are, however, inconclusive in many ways. Focus group, interview and survey data show that many issues within the realm of transitional justice are not questioned seriously and that both the Croatian public and media share narratives surrounding the Homeland War. A future analysis could break the framing down into more detailed categories to gain a better understanding of how the media write about transitional justice. In tandem with nationally representative quantitative studies, such analyses could make broader conclusions about agenda-setting effects in Croatia.
Agenda-setting is about how much importance an audience attaches to certain issues and is usually measured quantitatively. The focus groups, however, showed that the importance of the issue was taken-for-granted and was importance as a topic was rarely discussed, interpretations were instead disputed in group discussions. This highlights a disjunction between agenda-setting and media distrust (discussed in more detail in the following chapter). Generally, despite high levels of distrust in the media, individuals nevertheless reproduced what the media write. Consequently, for many historical issues the primary source of information for individuals is the media or sensationalist publications, rather than academic, historical works, creating a reliance on the media for historical interpretation. Among certain groups this is further exacerbated by a sense that the Yugoslav regime falsified history and, therefore, nothing from communist historiography could be trusted, creating a vacuum that was filled by amateur journalists and quasi-historians, rather than scholars. Agenda-setting does seem to occur in this context, but it competes with agendas that already exist in the audience (gained from personal experience, hearsay, media images rather than articles or reports, and so on) and the media material is then recast using these other sources. This places an emphasis on the interpretation of an issue, rather than the salience of it. It also helps explain why many narratives related to the transitional justice process in Croatia feature so many contradictions, which are further explored in the focus group and interview analyses.
CHAPTER 5